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ABSTRACT 
Using a comprehensive data set on (surviving and non-surviving) UK equity mutual funds 
(April 1975 
- 
December 2002), this study uses a bootstrap methodology to distinguish 
between `skill' and `luck' in fund performance. This methodology allows for non-normality 
in the idiosyncratic risks of the funds 
-a major issue when considering the `best' and `worst' 
funds and these are the funds which investors are most interested in. The study points to the 
existence of genuine stock picking ability among a relatively small number of top performing 
UK equity mutual funds (i. e. performance which is not solely due to good luck). At the 
negative end of the performance scale, the analysis strongly rejects the hypothesis that most 
poor performing funds are merely unlucky. Most of these funds demonstrate `bad skill'. The 
study also examines the economic and statistical significance of persistence. Sorting funds 
into deciles based on past raw returns or on past 4-factor alphas, strong evidence is found that 
past loser funds continue to perform badly in terms of their future 4-factor alphas while little 
evidence is found that past winner funds provide future positive risk adjusted performance. 
However, on investigating relatively small `fund-of-fund' portfolios of past winners, evidence 
of positive persistence is found. Using a cross-section bootstrap approach the study derives 
the empirical distribution of final wealth at a 10 year horizon and finds that if transactions 
costs are above 2.5% per fund round trip, a passive strategy seems at least as good as the 
active strategies examined while with transactions costs of 5% the passive strategy is most 
probably superior. The study also examines the market timing performance of the funds. 
Using a nonparametric test procedure the study evaluates both unconditional market timing 
and timing conditional on publicly available information. A relatively small number of funds 
(around 1%) are found to successfully time the market while market mistiming is relatively 
prevalent. 
viii 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
This study examines the performance of open-end mutual funds (Unit Trusts and Open 
Ended Investment Companies (OEICs)) investing in UK domestic equity during the period 
April 1975 to December 2002. A data set of 1,620 funds is examined. This represents 
almost all UK domestic equity mutual funds in existence at the end of the sample period 
and includes over 200 nonsurviving funds. In contrast to the US mutual fund industry, 
there have been comparatively few studies of the performance of UK mutual funds. 
Studies of UK funds have, for the most part, examined issues such as risk adjusted 
performance, survivor bias and performance persistence. 
This study makes a number of contributions to three areas of the existing literature 
on UK mutual fund performance. First, it distinguishes between skill and luck in fund 
stock picking ability. Second, it examines persistence in this ability. Third, it evaluates a 
second aspect of performance, i. e. market timing. 
In this first area, this study directly addresses the issue of `skill versus luck'. It 
uses alpha, a, and the t-statistic of alpha, tQ 
, 
as the measures of risk adjusted 
performance of mutual funds. However, it does not assume, as many earlier studies do, 
that a fund's idiosyncratic risk has a known distribution. Instead a bootstrap procedure is 
applied to determine the empirical distribution of idiosyncratic risk. This is not just done 
fund-by-fund but uses the entire cross-section of funds. The procedure makes it possible 
to obtain separate performance distributions for funds which are in the tails of the cross- 
section distribution 
- 
precisely the funds that investors are likely to be most interested in 
(i. e. extreme `winners' or `losers'). Indeed the procedure generates separate individual 
nonparametric sampling distributions under the null hypothesis of no abnormal 
performance at every point in the cross-section distribution of performance, i. e. for the 
best fund, 2nd best fund, 3rd best fund etc down to the worst fund. This methodology 
allows for non-normality in the idiosyncratic risks of the funds 
-a common finding among 
top and bottom performers. By comparing the bootstrap distribution against the actual 
distribution of fund performance it is possible to determine whether high a (t«) funds 
1 
exceed random sampling variability in the performance measure, i. e. luck. Similarly, it is 
possible to evaluate whether poor performance is worse than bad luck. 
This bootstrap methodology represents an original and significant contribution to 
the extant literature on UK mutual fund performance. The technique has been applied to 
US mutual funds in an unpublished working paper by Kosowski, Timmermann, Wermers 
and White (2004). 
We perform a number of bootstrap techniques to account for serial correlation or 
heteroscedasticity in the idiosyncratic risk of each fund as well as possible cross-section 
correlation (across funds) in this risk. The bootstrap procedure is robust to possible 
misspecification but reported results are of course dependent on the chosen performance 
model. To address this the study examines a wide range of alternative performance 
measurement models which are divided into three broad classes (i) unconditional models 
(Jensen 1968, Fama and French 1993, Carhart 1997) (ii) conditional-beta models, in which 
factor loadings are allowed to change with conditioning public information (Ferson and 
Schadt 1996) and (iii) conditional alpha-beta models where conditioning information also 
allows for time varying alphas (Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman 1998). 
This work also examines whether skill varies across (i) funds of different 
investment objectives (income stock funds, general equity funds and small stocks funds) 
and (ii) funds domiciled onshore versus offshore (although all funds invest only in UK 
domestic equity). These separate subcategories represent a more homogenous risk group 
of funds and therefore applying the bootstrap procedure separately controls for risk 
characteristics in these funds' stockholdings which may not be captured by the 
performance model. It also enables the study to examine questions such as whether the 
small stock market is less efficient and whether offshore funds incur an informational 
asymmetry cost. This is the first UK study to examine this onshore/offshore question. 
The study controls for survivor bias by including 216 `nonsurviving' funds in the 
analysis. Furthermore, the sample period under investigation in this study (28 years) is the 
longest among similar studies in the literature. Both of these factors mean there is a greater 
amount of information informing the actual and bootstrap distributions of performance. 
This reduces any possibility that findings may be survivor biased or may be sample-period 
specific. 
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This study also examines the possible role of a momentum effect in stock returns 
in explaining the cross-section distribution of mutual fund returns. Notwithstanding some 
work by Fletcher and Forbes (2002), no detailed analysis has been conducted on a 
momentum effect among UK equity mutual funds. This study makes significant 
contributions to the extant UK literature in this area. First, it applies a much improved 
measure of momentum using the comprehensive London Share Price Database: in the 
construction of the momentum variable the portfolios of past winner and loser stocks 
calculated at each time period t are based on stocks which were available to fund 
managers at that time in history and not just on the historical time series of stocks which 
continue to exist at the end of the sample period. The latter calculation risks introducing a 
survivorship bias as the momentum factor would be based solely on stocks which have 
survived to the end of the sample period. Second, the robustness of momentum findings to 
variations in its definition is also examined. 
The second major area of contribution of this study is in its examination of 
persistence in mutual fund performance. A crucial issue is whether abnormal performance 
can be identified ex-ante and for how long it persists. Persistence in the sense of 
`statistical predictability' is usually examined using (rank) correlations or regressions of 
future on past performance or using a contingency table approach. `Economic 
predictability' is usually based on the alpha from a strategy of holding a portfolio of past 
`winning' funds (rebalanced periodically) or by observing actual trades of mutual funds 
(i. e. holdings and buy/sell data) and using a characteristic selectivity measure in an event 
study framework. 
For tests based on `statistical predictability' the evidence is rather mixed. Early 
US studies suggest some predictability in performance at both long and short horizons 
(Grinblatt and Titman 1992, Hendricks, Patel and Zechauser 1993, Brown and Goetzmann 
1995, Goetzmann and Ibbotson 1994). On balance, more recent studies suggest that 
predictability among past winners is rather more tenuous but some predictability is found 
when a portfolio of past winning funds is rebalanced frequently (e. g. at least once per 
quarter) and the performance horizon is not longer than about one-year (e. g. Carhart 1997, 
Wermers 1997, Blake and Morey 2000). For UK data on mutual and pension funds there 
is little evidence of `statistical predictability' amongst past winner funds but much 
stronger evidence that poor performers continue to under-perform (e. g. Blake and 
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Timmermann 1998, Allen and Tan 1999, Fletcher and Forbes 2002, Blake, Lehmann and 
Timmermann 1999, Tonks 2004). 
US studies examining `economic predictability' using actual trades of mutual 
funds find that one-year persistence among past winner funds is due to stocks passively 
carried over, rather than newly purchased stocks of winner funds performing better than 
newly purchased stocks of past loser funds (Chen et at 1999, Wermers 2003). 
Results from an analysis of persistence are usually interpreted as direct tests of the 
EMH in a market where entry barriers are relatively low, there are many professional 
traders who operate in a competitive environment and information is available at relatively 
low cost 
- 
precisely the conditions under which the EMH is expected to be valid. 
Therefore mutual funds provide a way of testing the behavior of investors against the 
classic paradigm of finance theory where individuals are assumed to make rational 
decisions in relatively frictionless and low information cost markets, which leads to the 
elimination of inferior financial products and the growth in successful ones. 
This study contributes to the debate on persistence in several ways. First, the study 
does not focus on `statistical predictability' as this does not necessarily result in explicit 
investment rules that produce future positive risk adjusted returns. The statistical approach 
measures the average association between the relative orderings of funds in a pre-sort and 
post-sort period using correlation, regression or contingency tables. However, although 
such tests may provide prima facie evidence of persistence it is often not clear how this 
may be exploited by investors. Measured persistence could be due mainly to repeat losers 
rather than repeat winners. In addition, (Spearman) rank correlations treat each point in the 
ranking equally and lack power against the hypothesis that predictability in performance is 
concentrated in the tails of fund performance. Instead this study concentrates on the 
economic value of persistence by focusing on the approach of recursively rebalancing a 
portfolio of past winning funds. Here, if persistence is found it may represent an 
exploitable strategy for investors. Second, as well as analyzing the post-sort performance 
of quite large and possibly heterogeneous portfolios of funds (e. g. deciles), as done in 
earlier studies, the study also examines alternative smaller fund-of-fund portfolios which 
is probably of more practical interest to both professional and retail investors. Third, the 
study examines not only the risk adjusted average performance of portfolios of past 
winner/loser funds but also the distribution of final wealth from this ex-ante strategy, 
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taking account of `luck' across all funds and transactions costs of rebalancing. Here 
`luck' is represented by the empirical distribution of all funds' idiosyncratic risks and 
hence picks up any non-normality and contemporaneous cross-correlations in 
idiosyncratic risks. As far as can be ascertained, this approach to an analysis of final 
wealth has not been developed in any previous studies. Since most saving in mutual funds 
(as a whole) is long-term, investors are interested in the distribution of final wealth (e. g. 
mean, skewness, kurtosis) from an active strategy, relative to that from alternative 
strategies such as holding index trackers. These alternatives are examined with respect to 
the distribution of final wealth, taking account of `luck' and transactions costs for both 
strategies. The methodology adopted in this study moves the debate on persistence closer 
to the practical issues surrounding the implementation of ex-ante investment strategies by 
fund investors. Fourthly, persistence is examined using a wide variety of alternative 
sorting rules in an attempt to find repeat winners (and losers). Finally, a survivorship bias 
free and more comprehensive UK data base of mutual funds over a long data period is 
used. This has not always been the case in earlier persistence studies. 
The third major contribution of this study lies in the area of mutual fund market 
timing. The question of market timing has attracted little attention among UK studies of 
fund performance. Treatment has been limited to the rather basic regression based tests of 
Treynor-Mazuy (1966), (TM), and Henrikkson-Merton (1981), (HM) as applied by 
Fletcher (1995), for example. In this study, a nonparametric test procedure is applied to 
UK funds for the first time. This procedure has been applied to US mutual funds by Jiang 
(2003). The nonparametric procedure has several advantages: the technique isolates the 
quality of a fund manager's timing information from the aggressiveness of his response 
while the TM and HM methods do not. Here, the quality of the manager's timing signals 
is of more interest to the investor. In addition, the nonparametric method is more robust 
to the frequency at which the manager times the market unlike the TM and HM tests 
which assume the fund's timing frequency is the same as the frequency of the sample data, 
as discussed in Bollen and Busse (2001) and Goetzmann et at (2000) in the US case. The 
nonparametric approach is also based on less restrictive underlying assumptions than the 
TM and HM approaches. 
Furthermore, this study then examines whether mutual fund managers are able to 
add market timing value to investors by the quality of the manager's private market timing 
information (timing signals) in excess of the information quality contained in publicly 
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available information as examined by Becker et al (1999) and Ferson and Khang (2001) in 
the case of the US. The latter information is already available to the investor and as such 
may reduce the necessity of availing of mutual fund services. 
Finally, the study of fund market timing here evaluates timing skill against a 
number of alternative benchmark market indices as information on precisely which market 
index funds attempt to time, if any, is not available. 
The findings of this study make important contributions to the academic literature 
in terms of measuring abnormal performance, persistence and market timing. These 
findings are clearly useful for investors in search of profitable portfolio strategies in equity 
mutual funds and have obvious implications for the wider debate on market efficiency. 
The findings of this study also make an important contribution to current policy issues. 
The absolute performance of mutual (and pension) funds and the relative 
performance of active versus passive (index) funds are central to recent policy debates, 
particularly in Europe. With increasing longevity and given projected state pensions, a 
`savings gap' is predicted for many European countries in 20 years (Turner 2004, OECD 
2003). An important question is whether voluntary saving in mutual and pension funds 
over the next 20 years will be sufficient to fill this gap so that those reaching retirement 
age have sufficient savings to provide an adequate standard of living. 
In recent theoretical and empirical work, the allocation across different asset 
classes (mainly bonds versus stocks, but in principal across all asset classes) has been 
examined in an intertemporal framework. The `rule of thumb' that the percentage 
investment in risky assets (stocks) should equal `100 minus your age' is not robust either 
in the face of uncertain income (which gives rise to hedging demands 
- 
Bodie, Merton and 
Samuelson 1992, Campbell and Viceira 1999, Viceira 2001) or when return predictability 
is present (Brennan et al 1997, Campbell et al 2003) or when there is uncertainty about 
parameters in the prediction equation for returns (Barberis 2000, Xia 2001). In practice, 
the lack of a consensus `model' of asset allocation at both the `strategic' and `tactical' 
level is starkly illustrated by Boots (the UK chemist) switching all its pension fund assets 
into bonds in 2001 (for strategic not market timing reasons), while most UK pension funds 
continue to hold around 70% of their assets in stocks. In the US, participants in 401(K) 
retirement plans (Benartzi and Thaler 2001), when faced with the choice between several 
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funds each of which has alternative proportions of stocks and bonds, tend to use a simple 
1/n allocation rule 
- 
so the actual allocation to each asset class is not determined by any 
sophisticated optimization problem and is changed infrequently. Such naive asset 
allocation decisions may carry over to investment in UK mutual funds (and even trustees' 
decisions for UK pension fund asset allocations), so that poor funds survive and 
exacerbate the savings gap. 
The Presidential Commission on Social Security Reform (2001) and the State of 
the Union Address (2005) envisage the part-privatization of US Social Security. This will 
increase debate on all aspects of the fund management industry, particularly in the light of 
the `market timing' abuses uncovered in the US by New York Attorney General Elliot 
Spitzer (see also Goetzmann, Ivkovic and Rouwenhorst 2001) - which has reduced 
confidence in the financial service sector's ability to provide adequate and fair treatment 
of retail investors. In the UK, the continuing switch from defined benefit to defined 
contribution pension schemes will strengthen the argument for a closer analysis of active 
versus passive strategies (as well as the competence and independence of trustee 
governance arrangements-Myners 2001). 
The Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK is concerned that (retail) 
investors may be misled by mutual fund advertising. In its `comparative tables' it currently 
does not enter a fund's ranking vis-a-vis competitor funds, in terms of (raw) returns. The 
FSA believes this could encourage more investment in funds which may simply have high 
returns because they are more risky (Blake and Timmermann 1998 and 2003 and Charles 
River Associates 2002). 
Therefore a key element in these policy debates is the attractiveness of savings 
products such as mutual funds and in particular the choice between actively managed and 
passive (or index/tracker) funds. It is important to evaluate the relative performance of 
actively managed funds to determine the extent to which such funds truly add value to 
investors/savers as a means of efficiently allocating their scarce resources to saving 
instruments for the future. To the extent that any `savings gap' is to be filled by 
investment in mutual funds, the need to evaluate risk adjusted performance in a tractable 
and intuitive way, while taking account of the inherent uncertainty in performance 
measures, will be of increasing importance. 
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This study proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 presents a review of the existing 
literature in the areas of mutual fund performance in security selection, persistence and in 
market timing. It also reviews literature findings in relation to the role of momentum, fund 
capital flow, fund expenses and other fund characteristics in performance. Chapter 3 
presents detailed descriptive statistics of the data used in this study along with information 
on data sources. It also provides a description of the UK mutual fund industry generally in 
terms of its size, asset allocation, client type etc. Chapter 4 describes different classes of 
models of fund performance measurement. It then applies all of these models to the data 
set of this study. Estimation diagnostics are used to select `best fit' models from within 
each class of model for use in subsequent chapters in applying the bootstrap and 
persistence testing methodologies of the study. The remainder of the study may be 
sectioned into three parts: Part 1 relates to the bootstrap evaluation of fund performance. 
Here chapter 5 describes the bootstrap methodology while chapter 6 presents empirical 
findings from the implementation of the methodology to the data set of UK mutual funds. 
Part 2 relates to evaluating persistence in fund performance. Here chapter 7 outlines the 
persistence testing methodology while chapter 8 reports empirical findings from its 
implementation. Finally, part 3 examines the market timing performance of funds. Here 
chapter 9 describes the nonparametric market timing tests to be applied while chapter 10 
presents the empirical findings. Chapter 11 concludes. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter presents a review of the existing literature in the area of mutual fund 
performance in relation to stock picking ability, persistence and market timing. It also 
reviews literature findings in relation to the role of momentum, fund capital flow, fund 
expenses, fund size and fund turnover in performance. Data issues and methodological 
issues such as survivorship bias and look-ahead bias are also discussed. While 
performance is usually thought of as stock picking ability, ie security selection or 
`selectivity', this study also examines market timing ability and the extant literature on this 
subject is also discussed here. One of the core questions to be evaluated in this research is 
whether stock picking ability exists after correctly controlling for sampling variability in 
the performance measures at each point in the performance distribution and this recent 
development in the literature is also presented. 
2.1 Survivorship and Look-ahead Bias in Evaluating Mutual Fund Performance 
There are two types of bias that have the potential to obscure the findings of performance 
analyses, ie survivorship bias and look-ahead bias. Survivorship bias is a property of the 
sample selected. Conditioning performance results on funds which are in existence at the 
end of the sample period ignores the attrition effect, i. e. to incorporate the performance of 
funds which disappear at some point prior to the end of the sample period. This sample 
property commonly arises because many (particularly commercial) mutual fund databases 
fail to include the returns of `dead' funds. If poor performance is a cause of 
nonsurvivorship then conditioning findings on surviving funds may induce an upward bias 
in average performance findings and in the persistence of performance. 
Look-ahead bias arises even when the sample of funds includes nonsurviving 
funds but where the methodology requires funds to have existed for a minimum length of 
time in order to be included in the analysis. This restriction improves the statistical 
properties of estimated performance measures but may bias performance findings upwards 
as only funds which have been skilled enough to survive for the minimum length of time 
are included. 
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Literature findings in relation to survivorship and look-ahead bias are reported 
where relevant in the discussion to follow. 
However, this study employs a database which contains the performance records of 
both surviving and nonsurviving funds. Hence this study provides a full performance 
analysis of the UK mutual fund industry and controls for survivorship bias. In testing for 
persistence, look-ahead bias is also mitigated by the selected methodology, (see chapter 
7). 
2.2 Performance and Persistence Among UK Equity Mutual Funds 
An important contribution to the literature on UK equity mutual fund performance is that 
of Quigley and Sinquefield (1999). The study examines the monthly performance of all 
UK unit trusts in existence at any time between 1978 and 1997, a total of 752 funds 
including nonsurviving funds. The study uses returns calculated bid price to bid price, i. e. 
gross of load fees and other transactions costs such as stamp duty, dealing commissions, 
and the bid/offer spreads of the underlying securities but returns are net of annual charges 
to customers. However, the authors later refer to whether out-performance by customers 
would have been possible gross of annual charges). 
Forming an equal weighted portfolio of the unit trusts (surviving and 
nonsurviving) and estimating a single factor CAPM the authors report an aggregate alpha 
performance measure of 
-0.04 basis points per month. This indicates that overall the 
mutual fund industry under-performed the benchmark market index. This under- 
performance is worsened when the size and value exposures are taken into account in a 
Fama and French three-factor model where the alpha measure falls to a statistically 
significant 
-0.09 basis points per month. The deterioration in performance on moving to 
the three-factor model is consistent across all four investment objective classes of funds 
examined. These investment objectives are growth stock, income stock, general equity and 
smaller companies funds. Equal weighted portfolios of unit trusts within each of these 
classes all exhibit negative alphas. The deterioration is most notable among small 
company funds and income stock funds. 
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Quigley and Sinquefield (1999) examine both surviving and nonsurviving funds 
and report the extent of the survivor premium and survivor bias. They report a survivor 
premium of 2.31%. This is the difference between the annual compound raw returns of 
equal weighted portfolios of surviving and nonsurviving funds. The reported survivor bias 
of 0.7% is the difference between the annual compound returns of the surviving funds and 
the full set of both surviving and nonsurviving funds. This substantial difference 
highlights the dangers of survivorship bias described above. 
Quigley and Sinquefield (1999) examine persistence in fund performance by 
replicating the methodology of Carhart (1997) and Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser 
(1993). Each year, they form ten equal weighted portfolios of unit trusts based on the 
decile rankings of the funds' raw returns over the previous year. Each decile portfolios is 
then held for one year. The procedure is repeated recursively each year. This generates the 
holding period returns of the ranking period's decile portfolios. The spread in the annual 
compound raw return between the best and worst portfolio is 3.54%. While this initially 
seems to point to an easy `beat the market' strategy, in fact pursuing this strategy involves 
an annual turnover of 80% in the composition of the top portfolio and with a bid/offer 
spread of up to 5% in many cases gains would be eliminated. In addition, when these 
portfolios are adjusted for risk in a three-factor model, the alphas of the ten portfolios do 
not suggest significant persistence in (abnormal) risk adjusted performance. The alphas 
from the top two portfolios, while positive, are statistically insignificant at the 5% level. 
By contrast the negative alphas of the bottom four portfolios are all statistically 
significant. This finding echoes that of a number of US studies (Carhart 1997 and Malkiel 
1995) in that first, pursuing persistence strategies involves high turnover and second, in 
risk adjusted terms poor performance persists but good performance does not. 
Quigley and Sinquefield (1999) further explore persistence in risk adjusted 
performance using a similar procedure to above where they sort unit trusts each year into 
decile portfolios by the three-factor alphas estimated over the previous three years and 
hold portfolios for one year. The spread in the annual compound raw return between the 
top and bottom portfolios is 2.95% while the spread in the three-factor alphas is 0.27% per 
month. The ten post-formation alpha measures continue, for the most part, to descend in 
size. However, only the top two have positive alphas, neither of which is statistically 
significant at 5%. The remaining eight three-factor alphas are negative and the bottom two 
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are significantly so. Once again this leads to the conclusion that poor (risk adjusted) 
performance persists but good performance does not. 
Interestingly, the authors go on to investigate the patterns of persistence beyond 
one year. That is, they compare the performance of the above ten portfolios, ranked by 
three-factor alpha, for different holding periods post formation. By year 3 the pattern of 
persistence has almost entirely disappeared where the rank correlation between pre and 
post formation alphas falls to 0.12. 
The paper also undertakes a closer examination of the size effect. The authors rank 
all unit trusts by the loading on the size risk factor in a three-factor model based on the 
prior three years and divide this ranking into three groups. Within each size group they 
rank unit trusts into three further subgroups ranked by the three-factor alpha, form equal 
weighted portfolios and repeat recursively annually to test whether there is a relationship 
between persistence and size. The authors find that within the category of unit trusts with 
the highest exposure to size risk, i. e. unit trusts investing in small stocks, the top two 
portfolios ranked by three-factor alpha continue to have positive and statistically 
significant alphas in the year after formation. However, the bid/offer spread in these unit 
trusts is almost three times the size of the alpha measures. Therefore, while the finding 
provides some modest evidence against market efficiency at the level of the fund manager 
it is not exploitable by the fund customer. However, this analysis revealed persistence in 
poor performance irrespective of size exposure. This indicates once again a stronger 
tendency for losers rather than winners to repeat. 
The study also involved tests of the hypothesis that the market for small stocks is 
less efficient. Unit trusts are again ranked by the loading on the size factor from 
regressions over the previous three years of data and decile portfolios are formed based on 
this ranking. These portfolios are held for one year and re-formed. In the case of all ten 
portfolios ranked by size exposure, the alpha performance estimate is negative. If the 
market for small company stocks is less efficient it was not exploited. As the authors 
remark "if the small-company unit trusts were horses, they'd be glue", [p5]. 
Quigley and Sinquefield (1999) highlights an important point in relation to the 
specification of the value versus growth risk factor in the three-factor model when applied 
to UK mutual fund data. The paper ranks trusts by the loading on the value factor from 
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regressions over the previous three years. Ten portfolios are formed based on this ranking. 
These portfolios are held for one year and this process is repeated. The authors show that 
the persistence in the relative exposure to the value factor is weak. This suggests that UK 
unit trusts do not have a consistent exposure to value stocks. 
Blake and Timmermann (1998) is a further important contribution to the literature 
on UK mutual fund performance. The study examines a total of 2,375 mutual funds, not 
all of which are restricted to investing in UK equity. Nonsurviving funds constitute 973 of 
the total number of funds. Returns are measured gross of transactions costs and 
management fees. The research focuses on the sample period February 1972 to June 1995, 
a slightly earlier sample period than Quigley and Sinquefield (1999). 
Blake and Timmermann (1998) report a substantial survivor bias of 0.8% per 
annum. This is the difference between the monthly return on surviving funds and the 
weighted mean monthly return on surviving and nonsurviving funds, weighted by the 
numbers of survivors and nonsurvivors. The average of this monthly time series is taken 
and then annualized to yield 0.8% per annum. This is broadly consistent with the figure of 
0.7% reported by Quigley and Sinquefield (1999), notwithstanding a slight difference in 
definition and again highlights the danger of survivor bias, particularly in the UK case. 
However, on the question of performance persistence the findings of Blake and 
Timmermann (1998) differ in a number of respects from those of Quigley and Sinquefield 
(1999). The methodological approaches also differ. First, the risk adjusted return is the a, 
coefficient estimated by regressing the fund's excess return (relative to the Tbill rate) on a 
constant, excess returns on the (broad) stock market index, excess return on a small 
capitalization stock index over the broad market index and excess returns on a five-year 
UK government bond: 
(2.1) r; t - rft = a; + ßm,; (rm, t - rft) + ßs,; (rs, t - rm, t) + ßs,; (rs, t -r ft) + s;, t 
Blake and Timmermann restrict their analysis of performance persistence to the UK equity 
and balanced sectors, ie 855 funds, for which the right hand side variables in (2.1) are 
good benchmarks. Second, Blake and Timmerman (1998) follow the procedure of 
Hendricks et al (1993) and sort the funds each month into quartiles based on the abnormal 
performance from (2.1) over the previous 24 months. They form two equal weighted 
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portfolios of funds from among the top and bottom quartiles and hold these portfolios for 
one month. This recursive procedure generates the holding period returns of the top and 
bottom quartile of funds ranked by abnormal performance. The abnormal performance 
from these two portfolios are in turn derived from (2.1). The authors also analyze 
performance persistence by forming portfolios of the top and bottom quartiles of funds 
with the weights suggested by modern portfolio theory, rather than equally weighted. The 
paper also carries out this procedure separately for funds investing in five sectors: equity 
growth, equity income, general equity, smaller companies and a balanced sector. 
With the exception of the balanced sector, the recursive portfolios derived from the 
top quartile of funds in all sectors produced positive abnormal returns over the holding 
period. The recursively formed portfolios of the bottom quartile of funds produced 
negative abnormal returns over the holding period. (This finding was robust with respect 
to how the portfolios were weighted). This indicates persistence in performance among 
both the top and bottom performing funds. This finding of persistence was found to be 
statistically significant among funds investing in growth stocks and smaller company 
stocks. 
The persistence finding among top performers is in contrast to Quigley and 
Sinquefield (1999) while the finding of persistence among the worst performing funds is 
consistent between the two studies. Comparisons between these two studies is complicated 
by both differing measures of abnormal return and differing frequencies of reforming 
portfolios. For an investor to exploit this apparent persistence anomaly may require 
considerable portfolio rebalancing thus incurring significant transactions costs which may 
eliminate the abnormal return. As Blake and Timmermann (1998) carry out their analysis 
using returns on a bid to bid basis the returns exclude some transactions costs. 
The measure of performance (risk adjusted or otherwise), as a possible source of 
difference in persistence findings between studies is picked up in Fletcher and Forbes 
(2002). The authors apply the contingency table testing procedure of Brown and 
Goetzmann (1995). This involves designating funds as winners or losers according to 
whether their annual excess returns rank above/below the sample median ranking and 
testing whether fund rankings are then independent over consecutive periods. The paper 
finds significant persistence. When returns are measured as excess returns over a market 
index, however, persistence is driven primarily by repeat underperformance. Switching 
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testing methodologies to the Carhart (1997) procedure and estimating abnormal 
performance from the CAPM or APT, Fletcher and Forbes (2002) report significant 
persistence. However, this persistence disappears when performance is evaluated by the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model which, in addition to market, controls for size, value and 
momentum risk attributes. Furthermore, measuring performance by a conditional model, 
ie time varying betas, suggests a reversal, rather than persistence, in performance. 
Blake and Timmermann (1998) highlight a further interesting feature regarding 
performance: underperformance intensifies as the fund approaches its termination date 
while the authors find some (weaker) evidence that funds outperform their sector peer 
groups during their first year of existence. In each month prior to the death of all 
nonsurviving funds within each sector' Blake and Timmermann calculate abnormal return 
as the difference between the nonsurviving fund's return and the return on an equal 
weighted portfolio of all funds in existence at that time within the same sector. Abnormal 
returns are therefore measured relative to the returns of the fund's peer group. Assuming 
an alignment in time, the authors form equal weighted portfolios of these nonsurviving 
funds in the months preceding their death and calculate the average return on the 
portfolios 6,12 and 24 months prior to the death of the funds. Underperformance is seen 
to intensify as the termination of the fund approaches and negative returns of 
-30 basis 
points per month are common to many sectors. During the final year of a fund's existence 
it underperforms relative to the universe of funds in existence at the same time by an 
average of 
-3.3% per annum. Using a similar method to examine the performance of 
funds in the months after their launch, the authors report an average abnormal 
performance (across all sectors) of 0.8% per month in the first year after the launch of new 
funds. 
Fletcher (1997) is a slightly earlier study of the UK unit trust industry which 
focuses on performance between 1980 and 1989. This paper limits its analysis to funds 
which have survived for two years or more. The methodology followed by Fletcher in 
testing for persistence is similar to that of Quigley and Sinquefield (1999) and Blake and 
Timmermann (1998). However, Fletcher applies a different measure of risk adjusted 
performance in testing persistence, using Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT) benchmark 
portfolios estimated by an asymptotic principal components technique as outlined in 
1 The authors carry out this analysis on 20 separate sectors, some of which include mutual funds investing in 
foreign assets. 
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Connor and Korajczyk (1986). Connor and Korajczyk show that that the k factors in an 
APT framework can be proxied by the first k eigenvectors (corresponding to the largest k 
eigenvalues) of the cross-product matrix of excess returns fl' = (1/n)R°'R° where R" is a 
(n *Y) matrix of n assets with T observations. This is asymptotically valid as n 
--º co where 
assets may be all securities in the market. The link to principal components analysis lies in 
the fact that the first k eigenvalues and their corresponding eigenvectors correspond to the 
variances and parameters respectively of the first k principal components. 
Fletcher (1997) first categorizes a sample of 101 unit trusts by the following 
characteristics in 1980, (i) market value, (ii) CAPM beta 
- 
based on the past five years (iii) 
skewness 
- 
the coefficient on the squared market excess returns in a regression of unit trust 
excess returns over the previous five years, (iv) the sum of unit trust returns over the 
previous five years and (v) the variances of unit trust returns over the previous five years. 
This stems from the intuition of Grinblatt and Titman (1989a) that a stock's factor 
loadings are correlated with these characteristics of the firm. Within each of these five 
categories Fletcher sorts all of the unit trusts into ten equal sized portfolios of trusts based 
on the ranking in ascending order. (the lowest ranking portfolio contains one additional 
fund). Thus 50 portfolios are created. These portfolios are held for five years and a time 
series of returns are generated. The process is repeated in 1985 and the resulting portfolios 
are held for a further 5 years. The first five eigenvectors from the cross product matrix of 
the returns of these 50 portfolios are taken as the risk factors in a multi-factor model. The 
constant term in a regression of unit trusts on these factors is taken as the risk adjusted 
measure of return, ie a multi-factor alpha. 
Using this risk adjusted return measure, Fletcher (1997) assesses the performance 
of funds with investment objectives of growth, income and general equity. Equal weighted 
portfolios of unit trusts within each investment style were constructed and the alpha 
measure estimated. None of the alpha measures proved to be significantly different from 
zero while a chi-square multivariate test also rejected the hypothesis that the performance 
of the three investment styles were significantly different from one another. Fletcher also 
tests the hypothesis that performance may be affected by factors such as size, annual 
charges of the fund and initial charges of the fund. In the case of the latter two factors the 
hypothesis under examination is that if performance is assessed using gross returns (as is 
the case in Fletcher's study) then we would expect funds with higher initial and annual 
charges to earn higher returns to compensate investors. That is, do charges provide a 
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reliable indication to the investor as to the `quality' of the fund's management. At the 
beginning of the sample period (1980), within each of the categories of size, annual 
charges and initial charges five equal weighted portfolios are formed based on a ranking 
according to these criteria and these portfolios are maintained throughout the entire sample 
period. None of the risk adjusted return measures of these portfolios proved to be 
significantly different from zero or significantly different from one another. 
To test persistence in performance Fletcher (1997) carries out a battery of tests. All 
unit trusts are ranked into quintiles according to the risk adjusted return measure described 
previously and equal sized portfolios of trusts are created within each quintile. Portfolios 
are formed and evaluated based on five-year and two-year ranking and evaluation periods. 
Performance is evaluated by the same risk adjusted measure as used for the ranking. 
Fletcher finds very little evidence to suggest that past performance provides an indication 
of future performance. None of the portfolios exhibit statistically significant performance 
persistence regardless of the length of the ranking period. Likewise the chi-square tests of 
joint equality in performance usually fails to reject the null hypothesis. 
The finding by Fletcher (1997) that superior performance does not persist is largely 
consistent with the findings of Quigley and Sinquefield (1999). However, Fletcher also 
fails to find evidence of persistence among poor performers. There are two possible 
explanations for this: first, Fletcher's study is limited to the 1980s while Quigley and 
Sinquefield's study spans a longer time period including parts of the 1970s and 1990s. 
Second, Fletcher's measure of risk adjusted return differs considerably from that adopted 
by Quigley and Sinquefield (1999). Therefore, direct comparisons are complicated. 
However, Fletcher (1997) does test the robustness of his findings by repeating the 
performance persistence tests described above using a Jensen's alpha performance 
measure. Once again, however, none of the Jensen alpha estimates are significantly 
different from zero irrespective of the length of the ranking period. Overall, Fletcher's 
study suggests there is little economic significance in the predictive power of past UK unit 
trust performance. 
A difficulty with the performance persistence tests described above in Quigley and 
Sinquefield (1999), Blake and Timmermann (1998) and Fletcher (1997), i. e. assessing 
persistence through a recursive portfolio formation scheme, is that it aggregates the data 
considerably rather than looking at persistence at the individual fund level. This question 
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is picked up in Lunde, Timmermann and Blake (1999) and is also examined by Allen and 
Tan (1999), the latter evaluating UK investment trusts rather than unit trusts. Lunde et al 
(1999) first sort the set of UK equity mutual fund returns into quartiles by a peer-group 
adjusted return measure similar to that used by Blake and Timmermann (1998) above. 
Funds are sorted based on the previous 36 months of returns. For each quartile, the 
proportion of funds that fall into a given quartile over the following 36 months is recorded 
and a contingency table of transitional probabilities is constructed. Under a null hypothesis 
of no persistence, all of the transitional probabilities should equal 0.25. Lunde at al report 
that this null is clearly rejected when looking at the full set of both surviving and 
nonsurviving funds. The probability that the worst performing (bottom quartile) funds will 
remain in the bottom quartile is reported as 0.332 while the probability of repeated top 
performance is 0.355. When surviving funds are examined in isolation, ie a more 
homogenous group, these probabilities fall to 0.284 and 0.317 respectively. 
Allen and Tan (1999) examine performance and performance persistence among 
the (weekly) returns of 131 investment trusts over the period 1989 
- 
1995. Although Allen 
and Tan concentrate exclusively on investment trusts, rather than unit trusts and OEICs as 
in this study, a brief discussion of their findings is nevertheless helpful as the literature on 
UK fund performance generally is relatively small. Allen and Tan evaluate persistence at 
the individual fund level. The authors rank funds over a one year period by both raw 
(cumulative) returns and risk adjusted returns (Jensen's alpha from a CAPM estimation) 
and select `winners' and `losers' according to the median ranking. They then perform a 
number of tests of persistence in ranking over the following one year period: a 
contingency table analysis of winners and losers from one period to the next and a number 
of rank correlation tests. Both sets of tests reject the null hypothesis of no persistence at a 
5% significance regardless of whether returns are measured on a raw or risk adjusted 
basis. The authors provide some weak evidence of negative or reverse persistence if 
returns are measured over shorter time periods. 
Allen and Tan (1999) restrict their analysis to funds which survive for more than 
one year. This has the disadvantage that it may induce a slight look-ahead bias in the 
results. However, it has the advantage that it excludes funds with a low number of 
observations and consequently excludes those funds which may exhibit high sampling 
variability in the Jensen's alpha estimate. Such high sampling variability makes the 
conclusions regarding performance and performance persistence less reliable. In an 
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attempt to control for this possible look-ahead bias, however, Allen and Tan postulate that 
funds with higher variances of returns are less likely to survive but that among surviving 
funds higher variance funds are likely to be the top performers. To control for this the 
study ranks funds according to the variance of returns over the entire sample period and 
sorts funds into high and low variability according to the median. The tests described 
previously are repeated for the high and low variance sub-groups. The repeat winner 
phenomenon is found to exist equally among both high and low variance funds leading the 
authors to conclude that the look-ahead is not a significant weakness. 
Leger (1997) examines the performance persistence, inter alia, of 72 UK 
investment trusts in four non-overlapping five-year samples between 1974 and 1993. 
Without adjusting for survivorship bias in the sample of funds, Leger estimates Jensen's 
alpha in the four separate sub-samples. Some evidence, albeit relatively weak, is found in 
support of abnormal performance in the first half of the sample period up to 1984 but this 
subsequently disappears. Persistence is assessed by calculating the number of funds with 
positive or negative abnormal performance in two, three and four consecutive sub-periods 
but is not restricted to looking at performance in the successive period only. 2 Of the 72 
funds in the study, none of the funds records a positive abnormal performance in all four 
consecutive periods, 2 (4) of the funds report positive performance in 3 (2) consecutive 
periods. No fund records negative abnormal performance in two or more consecutive 
periods. This represents quite a robust finding against the existence of performance 
persistence and is at variance with the results reported by Allen and Tan (1999) which also 
looked at investment trusts but over the shorter time period of 1989 
- 
1995. This may 
suggest that the relatively strong findings of persistence in the Allen and Tan study may 
simply be specific to the shorter sample period. However, direct comparison between the 
two sets of findings is complicated by different measures of abnormal performance. 
The contingency table tests of Lunde at al (1999) and Allen and Tan examine 
persistence at a more disaggregated level. However, tests based on contingency tables (e. g. 
log-odds ratio, Wilcox test) involve a `frequency count' of fractiles of repeat winners WW 
and losers LL (relative to the number of WL and LW's) in two different periods. But any 
s Leger (1997) measures abnormal performance in a model which also specifies a market timing variable. 
Hence the performance measure is not strictly comparable with that of Allen and Tan (1999) as abnormal 
performance in terms of stock picking and market timing are not necessarily independent: Henriksson (1984). 
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measured `persistence' only involves relative frequencies, so we cannot directly assess 
the economic significance of the results (e. g. in terms of the risk adjusted returns to the 
persistent winner/loser portfolios) and it is often not clear how this may be exploited by 
investors. Also, in the contingency table (and rank regression/correlation approaches), 
measured persistence may be due mainly to repeat losers rather than repeat winners. In 
addition (Spearman) rank correlations treat each point in the ranking equally and lack 
power against the hypothesis that predictability in performance is concentrated in the tails 
of fund performance 
- 
an issue taken up in this study. Further, rank correlations or a 
regression of pre- and post-sort alphas can be used to establish predictability. However, 
although there may be a high correlation between the alphas of past fractile ranked funds 
and their subsequent alphas, nevertheless all of the post-sort alphas may be negative, 
indicating predictability but poor future abnormal performance for all fractile portfolios. 
The above approaches can be used to establish statistical predictability but investors are 
presumably more interested in the future absolute performance of both winners and losers 
(taken separately). 
In an unusual approach not commonly seen in this literature, Rhodes (2000) 
addresses this issue of examining persistence over consecutive periods only. Rhodes 
examines UK equity unit trusts between 1980 and 1998 with returns measured before 
costs. Each year Rhodes sorts all the unit trusts into quintiles ranked by raw returns and 
assigns a score to each quintile. For example, quintile 5 (lowest performance) may be 
assigned a score of 2 while quintile 1 may be assigned a score of 10, with linear scaling in 
between. The study relies on a framework where it is assumed that the investor's utility 
each period is directly related to this score. A utility function provides a utility measure. 
This utility function is assumed to exhibit diminishing marginal utility. Therefore, higher 
relative performance increases utility but at a diminishing rate, possibly reflecting the 
increased risk associated with high relative performance. The concave shape of the utility 
function implies that the average utility over two periods from a score of say 2 in period 1 
and 6 in period 2 is less than the average utility from a score of 4 in both periods even 
though the average performance is the same in both scenarios. That is, given the same 
average performance outcome less volatility is preferred to more. For each fund the 
average utility may be calculated across all the years for which returns are available. 
3 Note there is a simplification in the scoring system in Rhodes (2000). The scoring system implies that the 
gap in performance between neighbouring quintiles is equal and constant over time. This is not necessarily 
what we would observe if actual raw returns within the quintiles were examined. 
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Funds which consistently remain in the higher(est) quintiles will produce the highest 
average utility. Rhodes demonstrates that if relative performance is random then the cross 
sectional distribution of average utilities is normal. Hence the null hypothesis of no 
persistency can be tested by the Jarque- Bera test of normality. 
Rhodes (2000) finds that the distribution of average utilities is strongly leptokurtic 
and rejects normality at 1%. The bunched nature of the utilities suggests that there is less 
movement by funds in and out of quintiles than would be expected by random relative 
performance alone. 
Rhodes (2000) identifies a change in cross-sectional performance after the stock 
market turbulence of 1987. In particular, each year Rhodes calculates the relative 
performance of each fund by dividing its average monthly return by the average return of 
all funds that year. For a selection of years both pre-1987 and post-1987 the author plots 
histograms of this relative performance measure. The pre-1987 histograms have wider 
right tails, ie they exhibit a far greater number of funds with high relative performance 
compared to the post-1987 histograms. Since more recent persistence information is used 
by investors to decide which funds to invest in, Rhodes repeats the above normality tests 
on the average utilities in the post-1987 period only. In this case, the Jarque-Bera test fails 
to reject normality indicating a lack of evidence of persistence post-1987. 
Rhodes (2000) carries out the normality tests with a number of alternative utility 
function specifications to change the level of risk aversion. The study's conclusions are 
generally found to be quite robust. 
A further issue in the area of performance measurement relates to the choice of 
benchmark portfolio in a single factor (market) model. Roll (1977 and 1978) argued that 
the CAPM equilibrium model is untestable since the market portfolio is unobservable. 
Fletcher (1995) evaluates both selectivity and market timing performance of 101 UK unit 
trusts over the period 1980 
- 
1989 employing four separate benchmark portfolios: the 
Financial Times All Share (FTA) index, Financial Times 100 index, (FT 100), an equally 
weighted index of securities and the size index of Huberman and Kandel (1985). Fletcher 
(1995) reports that the selectivity measure is on average positive and almost always 
significant for all benchmark portfolios. Once again, however, this is a relatively short 
sample period. 
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The question of conditional versus unconditional models of performance is 
addressed by Black, Fraser and Power (1992) in their study of 30 UK unit trusts during the 
1980s. The authors cast the single factor CAPM in `state space' form and examine the 
time varying characteristics of the market factor loading and performance by applying the 
Kalman Filter. Only 3 of the 30 funds under consideration are statistically significantly 
found to have time varying market betas. However, the extent of abnormal performance 
among the 30 unit trusts is found to be considerably higher (21 out of 30 funds). Also of 
interest is that among the three funds which are found to have time varying betas, the betas 
are nonstationary, ie there is no tendency towards mean reversion. 
The studies described above encompass the main issues and results that arise in the 
literature on performance, abnormal performance and performance persistence among UK 
mutual funds. There is a small number of additional studies which also examine the UK 
mutual fund industry using similar procedures to those already described and these report 
broadly similar results. A brief description of these is provided below. 
The WM company (1999) examined surviving funds in the UK income and growth 
sector over the period 1979 
- 
1998. Using only raw returns the study analysed the 
persistence of the top quartile of funds over five year periods. Not surprisingly the 
proportion of funds remaining in the top quartile in subsequent periods quickly declines. 
When there was no overlap in the sample periods the study indicates that the proportion of 
funds retaining a top quartile ranking is no more than would be expected by chance alone. 
The conclusion is that historic relative performance is not a good guide for investors to 
picking funds. 
In addition to unit and investment trusts, the performance of pension funds has also 
been examined. Blake, Lehman and Timmermann (1998) examined over 306 pension 
funds over the period 1986 
- 
1994. This study indicates that persistence inferences are 
more difficult among pension funds: investment policy is more restricted and performance 
is determined by the asset mix rather than by stock selection or by market timing. Blake et 
al report surprisingly little cross sectional variation in (raw) returns to strategic asset 
allocation, security selection or market timing. Brown, Draper and Mckenzie (1997) and 
Thomas and Tonks (2001) report broadly similar findings although the latter study does 
report findings of over and underperformance during sub-periods. In a persistence testing 
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methodology similar to Carhart (1997), Tonks (2004) finds evidence of persistence among 
UK pension fund managers where a zero net investment portfolio yielded statistically 
significant abnormal performance. 
Comparing the results of UK mutual fund studies regarding performance 
persistence is complicated by a number of factors: differing sample periods of various 
lengths, differing measures of risk adjusted return, differing fund ranking schemes 
(deciles, quartiles, etc), differing ranking and evaluation periods, differing levels of data 
aggregation, survivorship bias and return measures (gross/net of costs). This 
notwithstanding, a reasonable characterisation of performance seems to be that repeat 
performance among top performers is small in effect and relatively short lived. It is 
doubtful that a significant exploitable persistence anomaly exists at the level of the fund 
investor net of the charges imposed by the fund. In comparison, the evidence is stronger 
that poor performance persists. Overall, an analysis of persistence may provide insight into 
some funds that are best avoided but says less about which funds to select. 
Table 2.1 provides an overall summary of findings among studies of the UK 
mutual fund industry regarding performance persistence. 
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2.3 Studies of the US Mutual Fund Industry 
Studies of the US mutual fund industry are far greater in number relative to the UK and 
Europe. The main issues to emerge from the US literature include (i) survivorship bias, (ii) 
different performance models including different measures of benchmark portfolios 
representing risk factors, (iii) different persistence testing methodologies including 
examining persistence from a conditional performance estimate, (iv) whether persistence 
is attributable to a momentum effect among the stock holdings of funds or whether it is 
due to persistent selectivity, (v) the changing nature of persistence over time, (vi) market 
timing and (vii) the relationship between fund performance and fund charges and other 
fund characteristics. This sections aims to provide a review of these issues from the 
research on US equity mutual funds. 
2.3.1 Survivorship and Look ahead Bias in Studies of US Mutual Funds. 
Some US studies which find evidence of survivorhip bias and look-ahead bias include 
Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992), Brown and Goetzmann (1995), Malkiel 
(1995), Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996a) and Shukla and Trzcinka (1992). These studies 
suggest that the degree of survivor bias can increase the evidence of persistence in 
performance significantly. 
Malkiel (1995) examines a full data set of both surviving and nonsurviving funds 
between 1982-1990. The attrition rate among funds averages 14% per year. Malkiel 
records significant differences between the average returns (weighted by fund size) of 
surviving funds and the full set of funds. The annual average difference is 1.4%. The 
difference between the annual average returns (equally weighted) of surviving funds and 
nonsurviving funds is 6.15%. 
Similarly, Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996a) examine the bias of presenting 
performance results based only on surviving funds by tracking all funds that would be 
classified as nonsurvivor funds between 1977 and 1993 due to name changes, investment 
policy changes or mergers. Specifically, Elton et al (1996a) apply two definitions of 
survival: first, that the fund is not merged during the sample period and second that the 
fund neither merges nor undergoes a change in investment policy during the period. The 
authors report performance results for both the group of survivor funds and the entire 
group of funds and reveal substantially higher average fund performance among survivor 
25 
funds by both definitions of survival. The study also focuses on funds that merge by 
calculating a weighted average of the performance pre and post merger, weighted by the 
lengths of time in each state. One can then compare the average performance among this 
group of funds with the group of exclusively surviving funds. Once again, surviving funds 
substantially outperform merged funds leading to the conclusion that survivorship bias is 
present. Briefly, Elton et al (1996a) also estimate the extent of survivorship bias within 
different fund attributes. The paper finds the bias is particularly large among small stock 
funds which is consistent with the fact that a larger percentage of small stocks fail to 
survive relative to large stocks. Similarly, the paper also reports a large bias among growth 
stocks where the average performance estimate switches from positive to negative when 
switching from a survivor biased to unbiased estimate. 
Brown, Goetzmann, Ibbotson and Ross (1992) examine survivorship bias and 
persistence using simulated returns. Monthly returns are generated for a four year period 
(using an assumed return generating process). A single period survival rule is applied, i. e. 
in each of the four years the worst performing funds are dropped from the sample where 
`worst performing' varies from the lowest 5% to lowest 20% (under different scenarios 
examined). Estimating Jensen's alpha from two equal sub-periods and denoting funds as 
winners and losers according to the sample median ranking the authors test for persistence 
using a contingency table. Regression tests of the cross section of fund rankings in both 
sub-periods are also used. The simulation tests demonstrate that if fund returns are 
independently, but not identically distributed, and if a single period survival rule is applied 
then conditioning on survivorship induces spurious persistence. 
However, in another simulation study, Carpenter and Lynch (1999) continue this 
line of investigation and conclude that when survival depends on performance over several 
periods, and with cross-sectional variation in fund volatility, a reversal effect (where funds 
revert from winner to loser status and vice-versa) dominates the spurious persistence effect 
found by Brown et at (1992). In the multi-period rule the authors drop the worst 
performing 3.6% of funds each year based on the funds' average four-factor alpha from 
the previous five years. (This figure is suggested by Carhart (1997) who finds that 3.6% of 
funds disappear from his sample in an average year). The paper applies a number of 
persistence tests including contingency tables, rank correlation tests and the recursive 
portfolio formation test of Carhart (1997), see section 2.3.2. 
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Carhart et al (2002) also examine the effects of a singe period and a number of 
multi-period survival rules imposed on a real data set of returns. The authors show that 
their survival rules (similar to those of the studies above) cause estimates of average 
annual performance to increase with sample length but at a diminishing rate. The study 
confirms the existence of performance persistence using raw returns, though this is 
lessened using a four-factor alpha, but shows that the evidence of persistence is weakened 
by conditioning on both survivorship and look-ahead bias. (The Carhart (1997) persistence 
test is used, see section 2.3.2). Carhart et al (2002) rationalize this by noting that a multi- 
period survival rule removes losers-losers in greater proportion than funds which revert 
from winner to loser or loser to winner and winner-winner funds. This leaves the sample 
more heavily comprised of `reversers'. Grinblatt and Titman (1992a) and Hendricks et al 
(1993) argued a similar point earlier noting that when survival depends on several periods 
it will point to reversals because losers must revert to being winners in order to remain in 
the sample in the first instance. 
The discussion of survivorship bias presented here is limited to the above as 
generally the findings in relation to the effects and extent of survivorship bias are quite 
consistent across the surveyed studies of the US mutual fund industry. Conditioning on 
survivorship in mutual fund data sets may lead to spurious findings in support of 
persistence though this finding is reversed if a longer term survival rule is examined. 
Critically, however, it should be noted that the above studies implicitly assume that 
survivorship is directly linked to performance. As was noted previously by Blake and 
Timmermann (1998), the majority of UK funds labeled `nonsurvivors' are merged or 
taken over 
. 
In this study, `nonsurviving' funds as a group are not shown to underperform 
surviving funds. 
2.3.2 Performance and Persistence in the US Mutual Fund Industry 
As is the case with studies of the UK mutual fund industry, the question of performance 
persistence attracts a great deal of attention among studies of the US mutual fund industry. 
In general there is stronger evidence in support of persistence among US equity funds 
compared to UK equity funds. (Volkman and Wohar 1994; Elton, Gruber and Blake 
1996b; Goetzmann and Ibbotson 1994). However, positive persistence may be relatively 
short lived (Bollen and Busse 2002) and persistence tends to be more evident among poor 
performers than among top performers. (Hendricks et al 1993, Christopherson, Ferson and 
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Glassman 1998; Carhart 1997). However, persistent outperformance may have been more 
achievable during some time periods more than others, Malkiel (1995), while the source of 
persistence may lie in stock momentum rather than persistent selectivity, Carhart (1997), 
Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000). This section describes these discussions. 
The Carhart (1997) study is an important, comprehensive and widely cited 
contribution to the literature and consequently is discussed in some detail here. Carhart 
applies the recursive portfolio formation methodology (similar to Hendricks et at, 1993) in 
his survivor bias free examination of US mutual fund monthly returns during the 1963 
- 
1993 period. All mutual funds are sorted into deciles based on lagged one-year raw 
returns, equal weighted portfolios of funds in each decile are formed and held for one 
year. This procedure is repeated recursively thus generating holding period returns for the 
decile portfolios. Carhart's fund returns are net of all operating expenses and security level 
transaction costs. Carhart first applies the CAPM to the above decile portfolios but it is 
clear that this does not explain the cross-section of returns. The CAPM betas on the top 
and bottom decile portfolios are almost identical and therefore the resulting Jensen's 
alphas exhibit as much dispersion as the simple returns. 
Carhart (1997) goes on to apply a four-factor model (see chapter 4) to the ranked 
portfolios. The four-factor model explains much of the spread in performance among the 
portfolios with size (SMB) and momentum (PR1YR) explaining most of the variation. The 
top decile portfolios in particular are sensitive to the size factor suggesting that top 
performers hold more small stocks. The author reports that the momentum factor explains 
half of the spread between the top and bottom decile portfolios. However, the alpha 
measures from the four-factor models are negative for all portfolios and are significantly 
so for all portfolios ranked decile 3 or lower, (where decile 1 represents the top 
performance portfolio). This leads to the conclusion that on a risk adjusted and net return 
basis the only evidence that performance persists is concentrated in underperformance and 
the results do not support the existence of skilled fund managers. 
Carhart (1997) also examines persistence ranking funds into deciles by four-factor 
alphas estimated over the previous three years and holding the resulting portfolios for one 
year and repeating recursively. The four-factor model is then applied to the decile 
portfolios of holding period returns. Again, evidence of persistence among top performing 
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funds is not found to be statistically significant while in contrast underperformance is 
found to persist. 
Elton et al (1996b) highlight a caveat in interpreting the persistence results from 
this recursive portfolio formation procedure. The composition of the top and bottom 
portfolios will change over time. Indeed Carhart's 1997 study revealed this to be strongly 
the case. Therefore using unconditional (constant parameter) models to measure risk 
adjusted performance may be inaccurate. 
Carhart (1997) also applies a contingency table approach to test the persistence of 
one-year mutual fund ranking. This provides some weak evidence that the top and bottom 
decile funds persist. However, Carhart reports an 80% annual turnover in the composition 
of the top decile of funds while last year's winning funds frequently become next year's 
losing funds. However, Carhart demonstrates that whatever performance persistence might 
exist it is short lived. The returns on the decile portfolios plotted over the subsequent five 
years quickly converge. (That is where portfolios are not rebalanced annually). Similarly, 
Bollen and Busse (2002) apply a similar recursive portfolio formation approach using 
daily data and quarterly ranking and holding periods. Their findings suggest that post- 
ranking abnormal returns disappear for holding periods longer than one quarter and that 
superior performance is observable only when funds are evaluated several times per year. 
Following evidence from earlier studies that momentum trading strategies can 
yield abnormal returns (see Jegadeesh and Titman 1993; Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers 
1995), Carhart (1997) further investigates the momentum effect in mutual funds. As 
described, Carhart finds that the momentum factor explains half of the spread between the 
top and bottom performing portfolios as sorted on one-year lagged returns. This suggests 
that funds which pursue a momentum strategy may earn above average returns even if the 
four-factor model alpha is not abnormal. To test this Carhart ranks all funds based on the 
coefficient on the momentum variable but finds, in fact, that one-year momentum funds do 
not earn substantially higher returns than contrarian funds4. This suggests that the 
statistically significant coefficients on the momentum variable in the four-factor model 
does not necessarily imply that funds actively pursue a momentum strategy but rather that 
funds tend to hold many of the same stocks for a number of consecutive periods. The fact 
4 It is not clear whether this ranking is done recursively each year with resulting portfolios held for one year 
or whether it is done once over the full sample period. 
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that the momentum explains some of the cross-section in the ranked portfolios is picking 
up on a momentum effect in the underlying stocks themselves, which funds may either 
purposefully or accidentally hold over consecutive periods. This momentum effect in the 
fund's stock holdings rather than an actively pursued momentum strategy each period as a 
source of higher fund returns is further supported by the fact that the latter would incur 
substantial transaction costs which one would expect to detract from returns. 
Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000) pick up this question of persistence and 
momentum. Their data set includes information on constituent stocks and the buy and sell 
trades of winning and losing mutual funds between 1975-1995, where winners and losers 
are defined as the top and bottom quintile of funds as ranked quarterly by past one-year 
raw returns. 
The paper examines the past returns of the current constituent stock holdings of 
winning and losing funds and finds that stocks currently held by winning funds have 
higher past returns, or momentum, than stocks held by losing funds. The raw returns of the 
winning funds go on to outperform the returns of losing funds for the subsequent two 
quarters. The risk adjusted returns of winning funds go on to outperform those of losing 
funds for the subsequent (one) quarter. (Returns are adjusted here by the application of the 
benchmarks in Daniel et al (1997) discussed further below). 
However, Chen et al (2000) also show that the past returns of winning funds' 
`buys' are substantially higher than the past returns of losing funds' buys. This indicates 
that winning funds, relative to losing funds, tend to add past winning stocks to their 
portfolios. However, Chen at al point out that the buys of winning funds do not 
outperform the buys of losing funds in subsequent quarters by a statistically significant 
amount. So while winning funds do appear to pursue a momentum strategy, this does not 
appear to be the source of their success. These findings differ slightly with the assertion in 
Carhart (1997) above that winning funds do not actively pursue a strategy of buying past 
winning stocks but supports Carhart's assertion that a momentum effect in stocks already 
held contributes to the outperformance of winning funds. On the other hand in the case of 
losing funds, stocks bought exhibit higher past and future returns than the full set of losing 
funds' stock holdings. Indirectly, this indicates that losing funds are stuck with past losers 
which supports Carhart's argument that this hurts their future returns by a momentum 
effect. 
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Wermers (2003) also deals extensively with the momentum question but reports 
strong evidence that fund flow-related buying pushes up stock prices. The stock buys of 
winning funds, in response to persistent inflows, go on to yield returns which beat their 
risk characteristics in the subsequent four years. Cross-sectional regressions indicate that 
these abnormal returns are strongly related to the fund inflows. 
The Chen at al (2000) paper also draws some other interesting conclusions from its 
extensive data base. First, the stocks most widely held by the mutual fund industry 
generally do not outperform the stocks least widely held. Second, stocks which are newly 
bought tend to outperform stocks newly sold. This is true of both winning and losing 
funds and is not unique to particular stock characteristics such as size (market 
capitalization) or value (book to market equity ratio). Third, stocks actively traded by 
funds tend to outperform those passively held from prior periods but funds that trade more 
frequently exhibit at best only marginally better stock selection skills which is clearly 
linked to associated transactions costs. Finally, the evidence of persistence at the level of 
raw returns tends to be more concentrated among growth funds rather than income funds. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) evaluate the various explanations for the profitability 
of momentum trading strategies previously identified in the literature. The authors offer 
evidence to refute the criticism that the momentum anomaly is a product of data mining by 
demonstrating that profitable momentum strategies persisted in the 1990s after initially 
being identified in the 1980s (Jegadeesh and Titman 1993). Conrad and Kaul (1998) 
argue that the apparent momentum arises because of cross-sectional variation in expected 
returns in adjacent time periods and is simply a compensation for risk. In direct contrast, 
others such as Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998), Barberis, Shleifer and 
Vishny (1998) and Hong and Stein (1999) present behavioural models (see Barberis and 
Thaler 2003 for expanded survey) which argue that the momentum effect arises because of 
a delayed over-reaction to information that pushes the prices of winners (losers) above 
(below) their long term values and in subsequent periods the returns of losers should 
exceed that of winners as prices re-adjust to the over-reaction. Hence such models predict 
that in the `postholding' period returns to a momentum strategy should be negative. 
Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) do indeed find evidence that the performance of a 
momentum portfolio in the 13 to 60 month postholding period is negative. 
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The Fama and French (1993) three-factor and the Carhart (1997) four-factor 
models discussed in chapter 4 examine portfolio performance by controlling for additional 
risk factors due to size, value versus growth and momentum strategies on the part of the 
fund. Wermers (2000) provides an alternative approach to decomposing returns 
attributable to investment style versus stock picking ability. Looking at the 1975-1994 
period, Wermers' methodology, which in turn is based on Daniel et al (1997), is to first 
construct characteristic-based benchmark portfolios based on size, book-to-market equity 
and momentum characteristics of the underlying stock holdings of the funds. For all stocks 
listed on the NYSE, AMEX or NASDEQ indices for which data on the characteristics are 
available, Wermers ranks all stocks into quintiles according to market capitalization. Each 
quintile is then further subdivided into quintiles sorted by book-to-market equity. Finally, 
within each of these 25 fractile portfolios, stocks are sorted into quintiles ranked by past 
12 month returns. This results in 125 benchmark portfolios with distinct size, book-to- 
market and momentum attributes. Portfolios are reconstructed recursively each year and 
value weighted quarterly returns are computed for each of the 125 portfolios. The data set 
used by Wermers (2000) includes data on the stock holdings of the individual mutual 
funds under consideration. This enables Wermers to calculate an investment style adjusted 
selectivity performance measure ("Characteristic Selectivity" (CS)) for each fund as 
(2.2) CS ý_ýWý, ý-i iR f. ý - R, " ) 
where Wj, t_1 is the portfolio weight on stock j at the end of quarter t-1, Rj, t is the return on 
stock j in quarter t and Rb't is the return on the benchmark portfolio in quarter t to which 
stock j is matched. 
Wermers (2000) reports that over the universe of funds the cross sectional 
weighted average, weighted by funds' total net assets, CS performance measure 
(annualized) is 0.71% and is significantly different from zero at the 95% confidence level. 
Wermers also finds that over the same period the average mutual fund outperforms a 
broad market index (the CRSP value-weighted index) by 1.3% per annum in terms of raw 
returns. Therefore, about 60 basis points of this outperformance is attributable to the style 
characteristics of the stocks held by the funds while 70 basis points is due to the stock 
picking skills of the managers in excess of the fund's chosen long term investment style. 
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Wermers (2000) also examines performance with returns net of the transaction 
costs incurred by the fund and expenses charged by the fund. The paper applies the 
Carhart (1997) four-factor model to these net returns and reports an average alpha measure 
across funds of 
-1.16% per annum which is significant at the 99% confidence level. To 
the extent that the two procedures are comparable, the results show that while return 
anomalies may have existed at the level of the fund manager these were not exploitable by 
investors. This comparison is complicated, however, by the fact that the CS measure is 
based exclusively on the funds' stock holdings while the Carhart's alpha measure includes 
the effect on fund returns of a certain proportion of nonstock holdings within funds, ie 
primarily cash and bonds. 
One of the earliest studies of persistence among US equity mutual funds is that of 
Grinblatt and Titman (1992a). This study introduces a simple persistence testing 
methodology and investigates whether its finding of persistence arises from a momentum 
effect in stock returns or from persistent stock picking ability on the part of the fund. 
Grinblatt and Titman (1992a) split their 10 year sample period (1974 To 1984) into two 5 
year sub-periods, estimate a, (the intercept in a regression against eight factor portfolios, 
see Grinblatt and Titman, 1989a) for each fund in each sub-period and performe a cross- 
section regression of abnormal performance from the second period on those in the first 
period. A positive and significant t-statistic on the slope coefficient would reject the null 
hypothesis of no persistence. They also check for possible bias by repeating the above 
with a control sample of 109 funds which they construct themselves to exhibit a variety of 
characteristics based on firm size, dividend yield, past returns, beta, interest rate sensitivity 
and co-skewness with the CRSP market index. These are passive funds rebalanced 
monthly, i. e. they are constructed `mechanically' to exhibit the above characteristics but 
do not involve stock picking. The authors find significant evidence of predictability in 
alphas for actual funds, while the control sample fails to show persistence. 
The sensitivity of performance and persistence findings to the choice of benchmark 
portfolio for market risk is taken up by Hendricks, Patel and Zeckhauser (1993) in their 
persistence study. This is important because benchmarks during the 1970s have been 
shown to be mean variance inefficient with respect to portfolios based on firm size and 
dividend yield (see De Bondt and Thaler 1989 and Fama 1991). Hendricks et al (1993) 
provide yet another procedure for testing persistence based on Fama and McBeth (1993) 
and applied similarly in Jegadeesh (1990). They estimate the equation 
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where r; t is the return on fund i in period t, Et_i(rit) is the expected return on fund i in 
period t based on the information set at period t-l. The authors estimate the left hand side 
of (2.3) as the residual from a market model. Under the null hypothesis of market 
efficiency and no persistence the aj should be zero. In order to address the mean variance 
inefficiency question above Hendricks et al test the robustness of findings by using three 
separate market indices in the market model estimation. Based on all three, F tests reject 
the null hypothesis of no positive persistence for approx one year but indicate a reversal to 
negative persistence thereafter. (Of course there remains a joint-hypothesis problem of 
regarding whether the model of equilibrium security returns is correct). 
Hendricks et al (1993) also test persistence using the recursive portfolio formation 
procedure as in Carhart (1997) and others. Mutual funds are ranked into octile portfolios 
based on raw returns over the past 1,2,4, and 8 quarters, reconstituted quarterly and 
evaluated by Jensen's alpha. This is carried out for a number of market portfolio 
benchmarks in the single factor model. Overall, there is persistence in the relative rankings 
of the octile ranked mutual funds but the Jensen's alpha for the top ranked funds is 
statistically insignificant. The evidence point to stronger persistence among poorer 
performing funds. 
Malkiel (1995) examines performance and persistence in a longer sample period 
from 1971 
- 
1991 using a contingency table approach ranking returns into winners and 
losers by the median ranking each quarter, Malkiel identifies significant patterns of 
persistence during the 1970s but not during the 1980s. This is the case for both raw returns 
and risk adjusted returns. The author finds that an investment strategy based on persistence 
would have yielded considerable excess returns relative to the S&P 500 index and relative 
to the mutual fund industry as a whole during the period 1972 
- 
1981. However, even 
ignoring load fees, persistence strategies would not have provided an economically 
significant abnormal return during the 1980s. The paper highlights the importance of 
examining sufficiently long sample periods to avoid identifying short term anomalies 
which do not represent long run exploitable trading strategies. 
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Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996b) further examine persistence among a 
survivorship bias free sample of equity mutual funds between 1977 and 1993 by applying 
a recursive portfolio formation procedure and a four-factor model. Ranking funds into 
deciles by three-year and one-year ranking periods and evaluating decile performance also 
over three-year and one-year evaluation periods, the authors find evidence of persistence. 
They find that portfolios based on optimal weights have a significantly higher return than 
returns provided by equal weighted portfolios. 
In a further assessment of persistence Blake and Morey (2000) study the 
Morningstar five-star rating service as a predictor of US domestic equity mutual fund 
performance (where a five-star rating is the best and a one star rating is the worst). As an 
indicator of the importance of the Morningstar rating service the authors cite that at one 
time (January 
- 
August 1995) 97% of all capital flowing into no load equity funds were 
invested in funds with a four or five star rating by Morningstar while funds with a less 
than 3 star rating suffered net outflows over the same period. Blake and Morey report that 
low ratings by Morningstar generally predict poor future performance but there is little 
evidence that high to medium ranked funds perform well in the future. Once again this is 
consistent with previous findings that poor performance persists while good performance 
does not. These findings are robust to fund age and fund investment styles. Blake and 
Morey also report that the Morningstar ratings perform, at best, only marginally better 
than the alternative performance measures as predictors of future performance. 
Carhart (1997) and Chen, Jegadeesh and Werners (2000) as discussed above 
address the question of whether mutual funds actively pursue momentum strategies or 
whether they "accidentally" already hold and retain previous period winning stocks in the 
fund. A closely related question is whether apparent persistence is being driven by `pure' 
selectivity skills or whether it is due, at least in part, to `timing selectivity'. This question 
in the literature is now discussed. 
2.3.3 The Source of Persistence 
Grinblat and Titman (1992a) also investigate whether the source of the persistence found 
in their study lies in a momentum effect in the fund's stock holdings or whether persistent 
stock picking ability exists. This is done by randomly sorting the 120 monthly 
observations in their sample period into two 60 observation sub-periods and repeating 
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their persistence testing methodology as described above (see section 2.3.2). This 
procedure tests whether a fund's performance is relatively consistent at each point in time 
or whether the persistence finding is capturing momentum in consecutive sub-periods. The 
findings of persistence from among the randomly ordered time series of return 
observations are even more significant than from among the chronologically ordered fund 
returns. This supports `genuine' persistence. 
Hendricks et at (1993) also pursue this question. As described section 2.3.2, every 
quarter the authors rank mutual fund quarterly returns into octiles and hold for one quarter. 
They then perform a bootstrap simulation procedure where every quarter the cross-section 
of fund returns are assigned to octiles randomly but with probability equal to the relative 
frequency at which the fund ranks in that octile over the entire sample period. (i. e. the 
frequency with which a particular fund ranks in a particular octile in the actual sample of 
mutual fund returns equals the frequency with which it ranks in that octile in the simulated 
data but in any given quarter the fund's assignment to a particular octile varies randomly 
between simulations). By randomizing the time ordering of fund rankings the bootstrap 
simulation enables the derivation of the distribution of performance statistics such as the 
octile alphas from the recursive portfolio formation procedure having controlled for 
timing. If timing or momentum is an important feature driving persistence then the octile 
alphas from the actual mutual fund data will lie in the tails of the bootstrap simulated 
distributions. Hendricks et al record ap value of 0.04 for the `actual' top octile. This 
indicates that there is only a 4% chance of observing the level of persistence observed in 
the top octile if timing or momentum was not a factor in driving persistence. In contrast 
the significant and persistent underperformance of the bottom octile portfolio appears to 
be driven by relatively consistent poor stock picking ability through time. 
Notwithstanding different methodological approaches, Grinblatt and Titman 
(1992a) and Hendricks et al (1993) arrive at broadly similar conclusions in citing 
persistently poor stock picking ability, as opposed to a negative momentum or timing 
effect, as the main determinant of persistently poor performance. 
In a related study of the mutual fund industry between 1976 
- 
1988 Goetzmann 
and Ibbotson (1994) also question whether a fund's monthly rank is related to last month's 
rank or just overall long term rank (perhaps due to risk not adequately captured by the 
performance model). The authors bootstrap the joint distribution of fund returns where 
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they preserve the cross sectional relationship each month but destroy the time series 
relationship. For both the actual data and each of the 100 bootstrap simulations the study 
performs a pooled cross sectional and time series regression of monthly rankings on their 
one period lagged values. By comparing the regression results of the actual return data 
against the bootstrap simulated regression results the study concludes that the preceding 
period's rank has power to predict next month's rank in excess of the effects caused by 
long term mean rankings. 
Before proceeding further- it is worth noting an important caveat reported by 
Kothari and Warner (2001). The numerous performance measures described here 
including Jensen's alpha, Carhart's alpha and the characteristic selectivity measure applied 
in Wermers (2000) are used extensively in the literature. However, Kothari and Warner 
(2001) question the power of these models to detect abnormal performance, particularly 
performance of large magnitude. The study simulates 348 portfolios of funds which are 
designed to mimic the characteristics of actual US equity funds. (one portfolio is 
constructed each month between January 1966 and December 1994). For example, among 
actual (real) funds, the authors note that the median fund based on the median market 
capitalization of funds' equity holdings is tilted towards large stocks. Consequently in 
simulating the 348 funds, stocks are selected into each fund with probability equal to the 
weight of the stock in the NYSE-AMEX stock index. However, the simulation procedure 
is repeated for a number of other characteristics including book to market ratio 
characteristics. Although simulated funds mimic actual equity mutual funds, they are 
nevertheless random stratified samples of NYSE-AMEX securities. Therefore, a well 
specified performance model using the NYSE-AMEX index as a benchmark market 
portfolio should not systematically indicate abnormal performance among the 348 
simulated funds. The authors also repeat the simulation procedure where in each set of 348 
simulations they supplement returns in order to generate various levels of abnormal 
performance by design. With these simulated portfolios Kothari and Warner (2001) test 
whether the performance models typically applied in the literature can in fact detect the 
abnormal performance in the simulated portfolios. In fact both the regression based 
performance measure of Jensen (1968) and Carhart (1997) along with the characteristic 
style measure applied by Wermers (2000) have low power, although the Wermers method 
is marginally better than the others. Kothari and Warner (2001) recommend an event study 
type evaluation of funds' actual performance using the techniques applied in Chen, 
Jegadeesh and Wermers (2000) and Wermers (2000) where portfolio holdings data for 
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each fund permit an evaluation not only of overall return but also of the fund's buy and 
sell trades. 
However, the Kothari and Warner (2001) study does not evaluate the ability of 
conditional models to describe performance and this discussion of the literature now turns 
to this class of models. 
2.3.4 Performance Persistence under Conditional Models of Performance 
The discussion of performance persistence among US equity mutual funds presented so far 
is based on studies which apply unconditional models of performance measurement. 
Fletcher (1999) and Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998) re-examine the 
persistence question employing both unconditional and conditional (or time varying) 
measures of risk and abnormal performance. Both studies apply the conditional models of 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) discussed in chapter 4. Although Christopherson et al examine 
persistence among pension funds it is one of few conditional persistence studies and so is 
mentioned here. Furthermore, Christopherson et al introduce yet a further persistence 
testing methodology. 
Fletcher (1999) evaluates the performance of UK based unit trusts investing in US 
equity during the period 1985 
- 
1996. Fletcher measures performance based on an 
unconditional market model (CAPM), a conditional market model and conditional multi- 
factor models where the excess returns of trusts are regressed on the excess returns of the 
factor portfolios and on the product of each factor portfolio and each public information 
variable. (The public information variables used by Fletcher are (i) 3 month US Treasury 
Bill return, (ii) dividend yield on the S&P 500, (iii) US Treasury yield spread and (iv) 
January dummy variable). Fletcher examines persistence using the recursive portfolio 
formation methodology similar to Hendricks et al (1993) above using quartile rankings. 
Overall, Fletcher (1997) finds little evidence in support of time varying abnormal 
performance. ` Winner' portfolios earn slightly more than `loser' portfolios in the holding 
period based on unconditional performance measurements but this is reversed for 
conditional measures. In both cases, the differences in performance between winner and 
loser funds is not found to be statistically significant. 
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The Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998) approach to measuring 
persistence is based on cross sectional regressions of future fund excess returns on a past 
performance measure of abnormal returns. ie the authors apply regressions of the form 
(2.4) r, (t, t+a)=yo,,, r+y,,,, r(a;, )+u, (t, t+z), i=1, ..... n 
where r; (t, t+ti) is the (compounded) excess return from period t to t+r for manager i. t 
denotes the return horizon and is examined for values i=1,3,6,12,24 and 36. The 
regressor, a; t, is a measure of return estimated up to month t. u; (t, t+i) is the regression 
disturbance term. The authors apply a number of measures of past return including 
conditional and unconditional alpha measures. The hypothesis that the past value of a; t 
cannot be used to predict future return (ie Ho: no persistence) implies that the expected 
value of the coefficient yl, t, t is zero. 
Christopherson et al outline a number of caveats including that the regressions do 
not account for differences in the risk of future returns and consequently if the alphas are 
related to risk due to a misspecification in the model then evidence of persistence may 
reflect persistence in the expected compensation for this risk. This aside, the paper finds 
stronger evidence of persistence when conditional performance models are used to 
estimate alpha in (2.4) than when unconditional methods are applied. This finding is 
robust with respect to investment horizons. Finally, once again predicting future 
performance is more reliable among negative alpha funds, ie poor performance tends to 
persist to a greater extent than good performance. 
On a related issue Mamaysky, Spiegel and Zhang (2005) question the use of a 
single model of security returns applied to measure abnormal performance across a wide 
cross-section of mutual funds, i. e. a `one model fits all' approach, as is the case in almost 
all studies of mutual fund performance and persistence. The authors argue that one model 
cannot capture the risks arising from the wide range of trading strategies pursued by 
mutual funds. Therefore sorting on estimated alphas may mean sorting on misspecification 
error, i. e. extreme performers may be those with extreme estimation error. Mamaysky, 
Spiegel and Zhang apply a variety of different models. They implement a recursive 
procedure where for a given model a fund is dropped if the model fails a filter rule. Filter 
rules are that the estimated alphas and betas must lie within specified ranges and the 
model must correctly predict the sign of a fund's excess return in the previous period. The 
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authors argue that if one wishes to use a model to select winning funds in the future it 
should demonstrate such success in the past. The authors demonstrate in the case of the 
Carhart four-factor model that following this trading strategy it was possible to earn 
abnormal returns of between 3.5% and 7.0% per annum. This study indicates that the 
failure to find supporting evidence of persistence in the extant literature may be related to 
estimation error in the model. 
Once again, drawing conclusions from the body of US studies regarding 
performance and persistence is complicated by differing methodologies and sample 
periods etc. Nevertheless, overall there are some results which show managers 
outperforming benchmark portfolios in risk adjusted terms with some short term 
persistence. Consistent with findings from studies of UK mutual funds is the evidence that 
poor performance has a stronger tendency to persist than good performance. Table 2.2 
provides a summary of the main findings from US studies. 
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2.4 Testing Portfolio Performance: Skill Versus Luck 
Many of the asset pricing models widely applied in the literature to assess abnormal 
performance rely on the iid-normality assumption for their (asymptotic) validity. 
However, empirically, the normality assumption is often violated as asset returns exhibit 
non-normal characteristics, ie skewness and kurtosis, as well as conditional 
heteroscedasticity and temporal dependence. 
Kosowski et al (2004) introduce a new methodology to test portfolio performance 
and in particular to distinguish skill from luck in performance. In part, the motivation for 
this technique is based on the authors' findings of non-normally distributed residuals 
across a range of both unconditional and conditional performance models. Such findings 
question the inferences of standard t-tests and F-tests. 
For a given model, the study first estimates the model over the entire sample 
period for each fund. It then applies a bootstrap procedure. For each fund, using a random 
draw from the fund's regression residuals and using the estimated factor loadings, the 
authors simulate fund returns under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance, i. e. 
set the fund's alpha to zero in the simulation. This is done for every fund in the sample. 
The authors then re-estimate each fund's alpha using the simulated returns. These alphas 
measure random sampling variation around zero - by construction. Repeating this 
bootstrap procedure 1,000 times for each fund and within each simulation ranking the 
cross-section of fund alphas from highest to lowest generates a distribution of luck at each 
point in the cross-sectional distribution of performance. For example, the highest 1,000 
alphas from each simulation represent a distribution which describes the highest level of 
performance which may be attributable to luck alone 
- 
as each alpha has been generated 
under the null hypothesis. This luck distribution can then be compared to the actual alpha 
of the best fund to see how this fund performs relative to luck. This can be repeated for the 
2°d highest 1,000 bootstrap alphas and compared to the second highest actual alpha and so 
on across the cross-section distribution to the worst alpha. 
This methodology generates an empirical distribution of performance under the 
null hypothesis but requires no restrictive assumptions regarding the shape of the 
distribution, in particular normality. This is critical because the deviation from normality 
is found to be greatest among the top and bottom funds leading to incorrect inferences 
concerning the funds of greatest interest to investors. 
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This study applies the bootstrap procedure of Kosowski et al (2004) to the UK 
mutual fund industry. As such, a fuller discussion of the methodology is deferred until 
chapter 5. 
Rather than apply the bootstrap procedure to all performance models Kosowski et 
at (2004) first select representative `best fit' models within the classes of unconditional 
and conditional beta models, see chapter 4. A Carhart four-factor model is chosen within 
each class. The results of the bootstrap technique applied to funds across all investment 
objectives taken together indicates an empirical p value for the top ranked actual fund of 
0.02: the probability of observing this level of performance in the top fund due simply to 
sampling variability in alpha around a true alpha of zero is only 2%. This is indicates that 
the top fund has genuine stock picking skill. This finding is largely unchanged using the 
conditional beta model. The paper also presents bootstrap results at several points and 
percentiles in the left and right tails of the alpha distribution. However, lower ranked funds 
around the 80th percentile have performance within the boundary of luck. Towards the 
extreme low end of the distribution, poor performance is worse than that which may be 
attributed to bad luck. 
The breakdown of bootstrap results by investment style strongly indicates stock- 
picking ability among growth stock funds but not among growth & income funds, 
balanced funds and income funds. 
A further method to distinguish skill from luck is to compare the performance of 
actual funds with that of simulated or randomly generated portfolios. Burns (2004) uses 
randomly generated portfolios to demonstrate, inter alia, the sensitivity of performance 
findings to the construction of benchmarks. Using a database of 191 large and small 
capitalization US stocks between 1996 and 2004, the author uses the set of stocks to 
generate both 1,000 random portfolios and three alternative benchmarks. (The random 
portfolios are created subject to some constrains concerning the weights in which 
individual and groups of stocks are held and no short sales are permitted). The 
benchmarks are an equally weighted portfolio of all stocks and two randomly weighted 
(within certain parameters) portfolios of all stocks. Using information ratios, the study 
then evaluates the performance of the random portfolios against the three benchmarks. In 
each quarter, the author compares the out-performance of the random portfolios across the 
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three benchmarks to reveal that performance is highly sensitive to even slight differences 
in benchmark returns. That such differences exist is not surprising: a benchmark will be 
hard to beat during periods when heavily weighted constituents perform well and vice- 
versa. However, the extent of the differences is high. It is clear that the more unequal the 
weights in the benchmark portfolio the greater the dispersion in over- and under- 
performance through time in the simulated portfolios 
- 
which of course are generated 
under the null of no out-performance. Given that Burns (2004) applies weights in the 
randomly weighted benchmarks which are not extreme relative to the weights in 
benchmarks commonly used in practice, the study highlights the sensitivity of findings to 
the selected benchmark and demonstrate an alternative means via random portfolios by 
which to assess investment skill. (See Dawson and Young 2003 for further discussion on 
stochastically generated portfolios). 
Randomly generated portfolios have also been put forward as a useful alternative 
to peer group evaluation, i. e. ranking funds of similar investment styles, as a method of 
assessing relative fund performance. Surz (1998) outlines numerous disadvantages 
associated with peer group evaluation: (i) a classification bias arises when some funds are 
pigeonholed into investment style classifications such as growth or value which are too 
broadly defined and misrepresent the `true' objective of the fund, (ii) a composition bias 
arises in fund databases where there are too few funds in certain classifications to 
implement a reliable peer group comparison and (iii) a survivorship bias arises due to the 
attrition of funds in some classifications. Surz (1998) advocates the use of random 
portfolios, or "cyberclone peer groups" as a means of constructing portfolio opportunity 
distributions (PODs) to evaluate individual fund performance. Given the precise 
investment style of a particular `actual' or `real' fund, multiple (sayl, 000) random 
portfolios are generated by selecting from the relevant defined universe of stocks. The 
performance measure of these random portfolios are used to construct the POD (under the 
null hypothesis of no out-performance) and the performance of the actual fund is 
evaluated relative to this distribution. Composition bias is eliminated as there is no limit to 
the number of `peer group' random portfolios one can construct to evaluate the 
performance of any fund, irrespective of its investment style. In addition, survivorship bias 
is eliminated as performance comparison is made with a simulated peer group rather than 
a surviorship biased actual peer group. 
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The use of random portfolios has also been applied in the discussion on the relative 
importance of investment choices as determinants of fund returns, see Kritzman and Page 
(2003,2002). The former evaluates the relative importance of five investment choices: 
asset allocation, country allocation, global sector allocation, country sector allocation and 
security selection. The received doctrine is that asset allocation is the chief determinant of 
performance. Using a bootstrap simulation procedure to construct random portfolios, 
Kritzman and Page present findings to the contrary. For example, the data set includes a 
sample that is weighted 60% stocks, 30% bonds and 10% cash. To examine the 
importance of global asset allocation the authors generate 10,000 portfolios of 100 assets 
whose composition vary randomly around a mean asset mix of 60%, 30% and 10% stocks, 
bonds and cash respectively. As a control all other investment choices are fixed across the 
simulated portfolios and consequently variation in portfolio return arises purely from 
variation in asset mix. Similar procedures are followed to examine the importance of the 
other investment choices. The authors report that dispersion around average performance 
arising from security selection is substantially greater than for all other investment choices 
while asset allocation produces the least dispersion. The paper also presents evidence that 
the apparent emergence of global sector allocation over country allocation as the more 
important investment choice may be an artifact of the `tech-stock' bubble as there is little 
evidence for this outside the 1996-2000 period. 
Kritzman and Page (2002) is a very similar study and uses the same bootstrap 
simulation procedure to assess the relative importance of security selection versus asset 
allocation investment decisions in Austria, Germany, Japan, the UK and the US. Similar to 
the authors' 2003 study, this study supports the relative importance of security selection 
over asset allocation, reporting significantly higher dispersion around average 
performance arising from the former. Broadly similar simulation procedures are outlined 
in Bridgeland (2001,2000) to examine performance attribution and value added arising 
from alternative portfolio construction strategies such as stock size (capitalization), 
portfolio size etc. 
2.5 Market Timing 
In addition to stock picking or security selection skill (or `selectivity'), a further aspect of 
fund performance is that of market timing. One form of market timing is the tactical asset 
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allocation approach which keeps the composition of a portfolio of risky assets constant but 
alters the proportion of the portfolio held in cash (non risky assets) according to the 
expected future direction of the market. Alternatively, market timing may be practiced by 
adjusting the beta of a portfolio, i. e. the portfolio's sensitivity to the market, in response to 
the expected market return. Beta is increased (decreased) in response to an expected bull 
(bear) market. To test tactical asset allocation requires information on the portfolio's 
composition over time which is often not available. However, tests of whether the 
portfolio beta is conditional on a benchmark market return may be conducted with widely 
available ex post fund and market returns. 
Two `classic' conditional beta models of market timing are Treynor and Mazuy 
(1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981). In this study both these models are described 
in more detail and are estimated for UK mutual funds in chapter 4. However, a brief 
description is provided here. 
Treynor and Mazuy (1966) specify a quadratic regression of the form 
(2.8) 
ri, t+l = ai + e, 
(rm, t+l) + Yiu[rm, t+1]2 + £i, t+1 
where the coefficient y;,, measures market timing ability. r;, t+i and rm, t+t are the fund and 
market excess returns respectively. Admati et al (1986) demonstrate that the model is 
consistent with a manager with constant absolute risk aversion who adjusts the portfolio 
beta at time t according to a private linear signal of the form 
(2.9) Pit = ei + Yiu[rm. t+1] + 'It 
where rlt is random noise. The hypothesis of no abnormal timing performance implies y;,, = 
0. 
Henriksson and Merton (1981) propose a model in which the conditional portfolio 
beta has two target values in a binary response function depending on the manager's 
forecast of whether market return will exceed the risk free rate. The authors show that if 
the manager can successfully time the market then the coefficient yju in the following 
regression will be positive. 
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(2.10) ri, t+l - ai + ei(rm, t+l) + yiuýrm, t+1ý + Ei, t+l 
where [rmt+t]+is defined as max(O, rmt+i). Here max(O, rmt+i) may also be interpreted as the 
payoff to an option on the market portfolio with a strike price equal to the risk free rate. 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) further develop the above models by also specifying the 
portfolio beta to be a function of public information variables thus controlling for timing 
skills which may be attributable to public information. The test is then a test of the quality 
of the fund manager's private timing signal. (The Ferson and Schadt (1996) models are 
discussed and estimated in chapter 4). See also Becker et al (1999) and Ferson and Khang 
(2001) for further discussion on the effects of conditioning information on timing 
performance measures. Of course, a fund manager may also vary the fund's exposure to 
risk factors other than the market or indeed to other benchmark indices according to their 
year-to-date performance in response to incentives s/he may face (Chevalier and Ellison, 
1997; Brown, Harlow and Starks, 1996). 
Other issues in the literature on market timing include the question of spurious 
timing arising from employing an incorrect benchmark (Jagannathan and Korajczyk, 
1986; Breen et al, 1986), distinguishing timing from selectivity in abnormal performance 
(Admati et al, 1986; Grinblatt and Titman, 1989b) and the power of a test when actual 
fund timing frequencies differ from data sampling frequencies (Goetzmann et al, 2000; 
Bollen and Busse, 2001). Many of these issues arise because of the parametric model 
nature of market timing tests such as, or based upon, Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and 
Henriksson and Merton (1981). These issues are now discussed. 
Breen et al (1986) discuss the issue of heteroscedasticty in the Henriksson and 
Merton test and demonstrate that the portfolio return of a market timer will exhibit 
conditional heterscedasticity, (see pp587-588). Using simulation techniques Breen et at 
(1986) demonstrate that ignoring heteroscedasticity falsely rejects the true null hypothesis 
too often while the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is not true 
also increases significantly. The authors suggest that their conclusions will also apply to 
the Treynor-Mazuy method. 
A further parametric or specification issue that can affect the consistency and 
power of market timing tests is the separation of market timing skills from security 
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selection skills in performance. (Admati et al, 1986; Grinblatt and Titman, 1989b, Coggin 
et al, 1993). The bulk of the empirical evidence on timing suggests that statistically 
significant timing is rare and where it exists it is more likely to be negative, though this is 
not necessarily irrational for investors with increasing absolute risk aversion. (Kon 1983, 
Chang and Lewellen 1984, Henriksson 1984, Lockwood and Kadiyala 1985). However, 
many of these studies also find evidence of a negative cross-sectional correlation between 
the market timing and selectivity measures of performance. Henriksson (1984) suggests 
that this may be caused by error-in-variables bias, misspecification of the market portfolio 
or the use of a single rather than multi-factor asset pricing model. However, Jagannathan 
and Korajczyk (1986) suggest that this empirical finding arises from the nonlinear pay-off 
structure of options and option-like securities (such as the common stock of highly levered 
firms) in portfolios. The authors demonstrate that a portfolio strategy of buying call 
options on the market portfolio will exhibit positive timing performance and negative 
security selection performance even where no market or stock picking is being 
undertaken. Clearly, a long position in call options on the market will provide a high pay- 
off in a rising market thus exhibiting apparent market timing but in a relatively steady or 
falling market the reduction in return caused by the option premium appears as negative 
security selection. A similar rationale applies to holding the common stock of highly 
levered firms where there is little or no return to equity holders unless there is a high stock 
return associated with a rising market. As such, funds which hold highly levered stocks, 
such as perhaps small firm stocks, may show positive timing performance. 
Further evidence of specification biases are provided by Kothari and Warner 
(2001). The authors simulate portfolios by randomly picking stocks, controlling for size 
and value effects, and periodically adjust the portfolio composition to mimic typical fund 
turnover. While the portfolios are generated under the null hypothesis of neither market 
timing nor security selection skills, standard performance measures nevertheless detect 
abnormal performance. Kothari and Warner conclude the performance measures 
(including market timing measures) are misspecified. 
As noted by Bollen and Busse (2001), spurious poor or even negative market 
timing may also arise from the cash-flow hypothesis described by Edelen (1999), Warther 
(1995) and Ferson and Warther (1996). This hypothesis suggests that investors increase 
subscriptions to mutual funds during periods when the market return in relatively high 
which results in a high cash position for funds causing a lower portfolio return. For the 
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Henriksson-Merton (1981) model the market timing coefficient is estimated only when the 
market (excess) return is positive and so the cash-flow hypothesis is asymmetric: it can 
bias the coefficient downwards but not upwards. Bollen and Busse (2001) also argue the 
timing coefficient in the Treynor-Mazuy method is similarly biased downward. 
Bollen and Busse (2001) and Goetzmann et al (2000) address the bias that may 
arise in tests of market timing when the frequency of the researcher's observed return data 
differs from the frequency of the manager's timing strategy (where the latter may not itself 
be of a uniform frequency). For example, the standard parametric tests above, typically 
applied to monthly fund return data, may underestimate the timing skills of daily or 
weekly market timers. Using a bootstrap simulation technique Bollen and Busse (2001) 
generate synthetic fund returns which mimic the holdings of actual funds using both daily 
and monthly data. Treynor-Mazuy and Henriksson-Merton models augmented by multiple 
risk factors are used. Under the null hypothesis of no market timing in the simulated 
returns the authors demonstrate that the size of the daily tests are correct in generating the 
expected number of positive, negative, significant and insignificant timing coefficients. 
The tests on monthly data, however, are biased. Simulating fund returns under the 
alternative hypothesis the authors demonstrate a significant increase in the power of the 
test to detect daily relative to monthly timing. Furthermore, using bootstrap standard 
errors Bollen and Busse provide evidence of greater market timing ability among actual 
fund managers, using daily return data, than was previously thought to exist using monthly 
frequency. Goetzmann et al (2000) similarly demonstrate that the Henriksson-Merton 
method is weak and biased downwards when applied to the monthly returns of daily 
timers, and proposes an adjustment without requiring daily data. 
A final specification issue which may complicate the assessment of market timing 
ability arises if/when fund managers attempt to time market volatilities as well as market 
returns. Busse (1999) shows that funds attempt to reduce market exposure when market 
volatility is high, although Laplante (2001) questions whether funds are successful in this 
attempt. If a manager tries to time market volatility s/he may reduce the fund's market 
exposure even when expected return is high. Thus if market volatility and market return 
are positively correlated, the market timing measure may under-estimate the manager's 
market timing ability, ie the quality of his/her timing information. If market volatility and 
return are uncorrelated then the timing measure remains consistent in the presence of 
volatility timing. Breen et al 1989, Glosten et al 1993 and Busse 1999 provide evidence 
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that the relation between market return and volatility is weak so this effect should not 
seriously distort the results of market timing tests. 
Jiang (2003) proposes a nonparametric test of market timing in order to address 
some of the specification issues described above that arise in the parametric approaches. 
The methodology of Jiang (2003) is described in detail and is implemented empirically for 
the UK mutual fund industry in chapter 9 and chapter 10 in this study. As such the 
discussion here is limited to a brief description. For any triplet of market return 
observations {rm, ti, rm, t2, rm, t3} sampled from any three time periods (not necessarily in 
consecutive chronological order) with rm, tl < rm, t2 < rm, t3 the approach suggests that an 
informed timer will maintain a higher exposure to the market in the [rm, t2, rm, t3 ] range than 
in the [rm, tl, rm, a] range. For a fund i with non-increasing absolute risk aversion and 
independent timing and selectivity information this implies that 
(2.11) ri, 
t, 
- 
ri, t2 
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ri, t2- ri, t, 
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Assigning a sign function that assumes a value of 1(-1) if the argument is positive 
(negative) and equals zero if the argument equals zero, the average sign across all triplets 
taken from n observations is given by 
-1 
Ln 
rr, r3 - r"t 2 rV2 - ri, rl (2.12) 6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Jiang (2003) reports the asymptotic distribution of 0n enabling the statistical significance 
of a fund's market timing performance measure to be determined. 
The Jiang (2003) methodology has several advantages over the specifications of 
Treynor-Mazuy and Henriksson-Merton and is more robust to some of the problems 
described above. First, the procedure requires the fund's market exposure simply to be a 
non-decreasing function of the expected market return which in turn requires non- 
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increasing absolute risk aversion. However, this is less restrictive than the linear and 
binary response functions required by Treynor-Mazuy and Henriksson-Merton 
respectively. Second, both the Treynor-Mazuy and Henriksson-Mertson methods 
incorporate two aspects of timing: (i) the quality of the manager's timing information and 
(ii) the aggressiveness of the response. The nonparametric method, however, measures 
how often a manager correctly forecasts a market movement and acts on it but is 
independent of the aggressiveness of the response. Third, Jiang (2003) reports that 
simulation results indicate that the nonparametric measure is more robust to the difference 
between actual manager timing frequency and observed sample data frequency. This is 
because, unlike the standard regression based approaches, it is less reliant on the `correct' 
timing frequency as it examines timing between all pairwise triplets of fund and market 
returns and not just monthly consecutive pairs. Finally, the asymptotic distribution of the 
nonparametric timing measure is unaffected by heteroscedasticity in fund returns. 
However, the nonparametric measure, like the standard parametric tests, is less robust 
when managers are volatility timing as well as market timing and similarly cannot 
distinguish between market timing and option related spurious timing. 
The empirical findings described here relate to studies of the US mutual fund 
industry. There has been relatively little research carried out on the market timing skills of 
UK equity unit and investment trusts. Fletcher (1995) applies both the Chen and Stockum 
(1986) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) models to test for market timing performance. 
(The Chen and Stockum (1986) approach is similar to that of Treynor and Mazuy (1966) 
but embodies a conditional coefficient on the market variable). Evaluating 101 unit trusts 
between 1980 and 1989, Fletcher reports the cross sectional average timing measures to be 
negative and strongly significant. This is found to be the case for both models of market 
timing and alternative market benchmark indices. These results suggest that funds on 
average reduced their market exposures when market returns were high and vice-versa. 
Leger (1997) also examines the issue of market timing among UK equity investment trusts 
between 1974 and 1993. Leger produces broadly similar results to Fletcher (1995) where 
he finds negative and statistically significant timing measures. As indicated previously, 
negative market timing may be consistent with (i) the cashflow hypothesis, (ii) volatility 
timing and/or (iii) increasing absolute risk aversion. 
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2.6 Fund Performance and Other Fund Characteristics 
Another issue examined in the literature is the claim by fund managers that expenses, 
turnover and load charges do not reduce performance since they reflect the quality of the 
manager's information, which is collated at a cost, and since managers trade only in 
anticipation of earning returns net of transaction costs. There is also a question regarding 
whether fund performance is related to the size of the find, as measured by its total net 
assets. 
Transaction costs are trading costs incurred by the fund and typically include 
spread costs, brokerage fees and in some studies include a market impact effect on the 
stock price arising from the trade, Wermers (2000). Annual charges imposed by the fund 
on its investors, expressed as a percentage of the net asset value of the investment and 
hence often called the expense ratio, is to cover administration fees, audit fees and other 
annual expenses but does not typically include the load (initial) charge. 
Ippolito (1989) finds evidence that mutual funds earn returns sufficient to cover 
expenses during the period 1965 
- 
1984. These results are in contrast with many earlier 
studies (Friend, Blume and Crockett 1970; Jensen 1968; Sharpe 1966). However, Elton, 
Gruber, Das and Hlavka (1993) suggest that Ippolito's findings may result from an 
insufficient benchmark indices used to estimate risk adjusted return, ie the S&P 500. They 
show that correcting for non-S&P 500 stocks in the benchmark market index positive 
alphas disappear. Malkiel (1995) finds similarly: a small number of mutual fund managers 
outperform a broad market index at the gross return level but not net of costs. Volkman 
and Wohar (1995) confirm that high management fee funds do not demonstrate abnormal 
performance but their study does find positive persistence in some low management fee 
funds. Droms and Walker (1994) examine international equity mutual funds and find no 
link between returns and expenses and also find no higher return reward to investors 
arising from paying a load fee. 
To examine the link between performance and size, charges and turnover, Carhart 
(1997) estimates monthly abnormal performance by the four-factor model where the 
model loadings are estimated over the prior three years, i. e. 
(2.5) at = R; t - Re - bu, t-1`1`mt-Rf) - b2,, t-1(SMBt) - b3i, t-1(HMLt) - bat, t-1(PR1YRt) 
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and each month estimates the cross-section regression 
(2.6) a; t = S, + 52(Xit) + Fit 
where Xit are fund characteristics: size (in logs), expenses, turnover and load fees for that 
month. As in Fama and McBeth (1993), each month Carhart (1997) estimates the cross 
sectional relation in (2.6) and then averages the coefficients across the time series sample 
period. His results indicate a statistically significant negative relation between 
performance and all characteristics except size. Of particular interest are the coefficients 
on the expense ratio and turnover: for every 100 basis point increase in expense ratios and 
turnover, abnormal return (annualized) drops by 1.54% and 0.95% respectively. This 
suggests that on average mutual funds do not recoup their investment costs through higher 
abnormal returns. Carhart also notes that the negative coefficient on the load fees variable 
contradicts the claim by load funds that the load fee is a charge for skill. These additional 
fund characteristics appear to further explain abnormal performance, and the persistence 
therein among poor performers. 
Wermers (2000) also examines the link between stock turnover in a fund and 
performance. The study applies a recursive portfolio formation methodology described 
previously for Carhart (1997) and others. However, Wermers recursively forms portfolios 
of funds by ranking funds into deciles (repeated for quintiles) by their levels of turnover 
during the previous year and holding these portfolios for one year. This enables an 
analysis of whether top decile turnover funds are persistently top performers. 
Examining gross returns, ie gross of transaction costs incurred and expenses 
imposed by the fund, Wermers reveals that the top turnover decile of funds on average 
outperforms the bottom decile by 4.3% per annum between 1975 
- 
1993. This is 
significant at the 10% level. Wermers also investigates the attribution of this difference 
and reports that the difference is attributable, in descending order of importance, to funds' 
investment styles, stock selection ability and market timing ability. In terms of net returns, 
the difference between top and bottom turnover deciles falls to a statistically insignificant 
2.1% while the difference between top and bottom turnover quintiles is 2.7% (significant 
at the 5% level). In terms of risk adjusted net returns (Carhart's alpha) there is no 
difference between the performance of high and low turnover funds. 
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Chalmers, Edelen and Kadlec (1999) is a further comprehensive examination of 
the costs/performance question. This study evaluates the relationship between trading 
costs, expense ratio and turnover on the one hand and a number of fund performance 
measures (raw returns net of expenses and a CAPM and four-factor adjusted return) on the 
other during the period 1984-1991. Each quarter the authors rank funds by total fund costs 
into quintiles and calculate the average performance of funds in each quintile. Figures are 
then averaged over the sample period. This procedure is repeated ranking by (i) trading 
costs, (ii) expense ratio, and (iii) turnover. In the case of all three costs ranking criteria, 
there is a strong negative (and statistically significant) relationship between the costs and 
the performance measures tested. The relationship between turnover and performance is 
also found to be negative, though not significant. The findings in Chalmers et al (1999) are 
broadly in line with those of Carhart (1997). 
The issue of the relative performance between load and no-load funds is examined 
in Ippolito and Richard (1989), Elton et al (1993), Grinblatt and Titman (1994), Droms 
and Walker (1994), Gruber (1996) and Fortin and Michelson (1995). With the exception 
of Ippolito and Richard (1989), who find that load funds earn rates of return that plausibly 
offset the load charge, other studies find no significant difference between the 
performance of load and no-load funds. However, Morey (2003) is perhaps the most 
comprehensive paper to address this question as Morey is the only paper in the area to 
examine the load adjusted performances of load and no-load funds. In addition, Morey 
(2003) examines relative performance within load funds between relatively high load and 
low load funds. The study evaluates these relative performances using raw returns as well 
as single and four-factor model alphas. Morey fords that after adjusting for loads in the 
return data, no-load funds outperform load funds for almost all performance measures 
examined while within load funds themselves there is little significant difference in 
performance between high load funds and low load funds. 
Elton, Gruber and Blake (1996b) also examine the performance/expenses question. 
As indicated previously, the fund's fee is almost always stated as a fraction of the fund's 
total net assets (unitised) and is referred to as the expense ratio. Therefore, managers can 
increase revenue by increasing either the percentage fee or the total net assets of the fund. 
The difficulty with the former is that higher expense ratios reduce the post-expense 
performance possibly leading to some capital outflow and a reduction in total net assets. 
The authors find a strong negative cross sectional relationship between fund size (total net 
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assets) and expense ratios, although expense ratios are found to rise over the time period in 
question (1997 
- 
1991). In particular, Blake et al (1996) examine whether top performing 
funds (top decile funds) increase their revenues by increasing the fee or by aiming to 
increase the total net assets of the fund. The study examines fees for up to five years after 
a fund's top decile ranking and demonstrates that top performing funds increase their fees 
by no more than the average fund. 
Until recently lack of available data has made it difficult to evaluate these 
questions in the UK case. However, Fletcher and Forbes (2002) examine whether fund 
attributes such as annual charges, load charges, size and percentage cash flow (percentage 
change in total net assets) are related to fund performance (net raw returns). Ranking 
funds into quartiles annually based on past year raw returns, the authors calculate the 
cross-sectional and then time series average of the characteristics in each quartile. They 
report little cross-sectional variation in these characteristics and hence they do not explain 
persistence in performance. 
2.7 Mutual Fund Investment Flows and Performance 
A further area of investigation in the mutual fund performance literature is that of the 
relation between fund performance and the capital investment flows in and out of the fund. 
The direction of causation between fund flows and performance is a matter of debate. 
Many studies test for a positive relationship in which performance influences subsequent 
flows, Gruber 1996, Zheng (1999) and Lynch and Musto (2002). However, Edelen (1999) 
and Berk and Green (2004) examine the reverse causation. 
Gruber (1996) defines cash flows as the change in the fund's total net assets minus 
the appreciation in the fund's assets held at the beginning of the period. The study 
examines the fund flows in period t of deciles of funds ranked by performance in period t- 
1. This is performed recursively for various values of t. The study reports a strong and 
significant correlation between performance and subsequent capital flows. Interestingly, 
this procedure also provides insight into which performance measures investors use to 
evaluate funds. While many performance measures prove significant in causing capital 
inflows/outflows, perhaps surprisingly Gruber (1996) determines that a four factor alpha 
measure proves particularly significant and robust. This would seem to indicate that 
investors are quite sophisticated in accounting for market, size, value and momentum 
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attributes in choosing where to invest capital. Equally, however, it may simply reflect that 
fund rating companies rank funds by this or similar criteria and this is the cause of 
investors selecting such high alpha funds. Del Guercio and Tkac (2000) also find a 
significant relation between a fund's Jensen's alpha measure and subsequent fund flow. 
The authors find this to be the case for both mutual funds and pension funds although in 
the latter case tracking error is also important in influencing flows. Tracking error is a 
measure of diversifiable risk and is often measured as the volatility of a portfolio's 
deviation from a benchmark index. 
Having found evidence that good (bad) performance gives rise to subsequent 
capital inflows (outflows), Gruber (1996) proceeds to evaluate whether investors improve 
their performance as result of re-directing their capital. Inflows to a fund in quarter t are 
multiplied by the risk adjusted return of the fund in (a number of) subsequent periods. 
Aggregated over all funds and all time periods and expressed as a percentage of total 
capital inflows to all funds, the average risk adjusted return on `new cash' was 29 basis 
points per annum. A similar procedure applied to fund outflows to measure how much 
money an investor saves by removing their capital from a fund indicates a saving of 22 
basis points per annum. 
Lynch and Musto (2002) find in support of a convex relationship between past 
returns and fund flows, i. e. fund flows are less sensitive to past performance when past 
performance is low. This is because, intuitively, one might expect less persistence in poor 
performance rather than high performance because low past returns contain less 
information about future returns as poor performing funds are more likely to change 
strategy. Lynch and Musto (2002) find (i) fund strategy changes occur only after poor 
performance and (ii) poor performers who change strategy enjoy a greater performance 
improvement relative to poor performers who do not. 
In a broadly similar study Zheng (1999) investigates whether "new money flows" 
predict future returns: does fund flow information represent a smart money signal? Zheng 
(1999) implements a number of trading strategies based on money flows and tests whether 
these strategies earn abnormal returns. For example, one investment strategy is to hold a 
portfolio of funds which exhibit positive fund flow. The portfolio is updated recursively 
each quarter. Another strategy is to hold funds exhibiting negative fund flow. Another 
portfolio holds above median cash flow funds while yet another holds below median cash 
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flow funds. In all cases portfolios are reconstituted each quarter. This generates a time 
series of returns for each portfolio. A single factor and multi-factor performance alpha can 
then be estimated for these money flow based portfolios. Money flow or cash flow is as 
defined in Gruber (1996). During the 1970 
- 
1993 sample period under investigation, 
Zheng (1999) reports that funds that receive new money significantly outperform those 
that lose capital. However, the outperformance is relatively short lived. In addition, new 
money funds are not found to significantly beat the market as a whole. 
In the case of the Gruber (1996) and Zheng (1999) studies, the apparent 
relationship between fund flow and performance may simply be picking up on persistence 
(if it exists) in fund returns, i. e. positive fund performance attracts capital or `new money' 
which in turn earns a high return for investors by benefiting from performance persistence 
in the fund. Sirri and Tufano (1993) is a further study to look at flows into individual 
funds. The study broadly finds that money flows into funds with the best past performance 
but does not flow out of funds with the worst past performance. This is likely to reflect (i) 
the huge growth in the mutual fund industry generally which means that a large proportion 
of fund flow is from `new' capital rather than capital moving between funds and this new 
capital is attracted to high past return funds and (ii) that there is a cost for existing 
investors to leave one fund to join another. 
Berk and Green (2004) present a model in which persistence in performance is 
diminished by fund inflow since managers are likely to have decreasing returns to scale in 
their talents. Edelen (1999) picks up on a similar theme in the fund-flow/performance 
relationship. Edelen hypothesizes a reverse direction of causation in this relationship to 
that of Gruber (1996). Specifically, that fund flow has a negative effect on subsequent 
fund performance. This study distinguishes two functions of a mutual fund: to undertake 
discretionary trades which will lead to a positive risk adjusted return and to satisfy its 
investors' equity liquidity demands. Edelen (1999) argues that fund flows, or flow shocks, 
force the manager to engage in "liquidity motivated trading" which is nondiscretionary. 
An inward flow shock immediately alters a fund's relative cash/equity holdings and moves 
the fund from its target portfolio. Sufficiently high fund flow magnitudes would increase 
the variability of the fund's cash position. First, this complicates the investor's task of 
making risk/return choices and second it compromises the manager's objective of tracking 
or beating a benchmark index. Consequently, providing a liquid equity position for the 
investor triggers marginal trading by the fund. Edelen argues that this liquidity component 
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of the fund's trading plays the role of noise trading and since noise traders face expected 
losses the fund should experience negative return performance in proportion to the volume 
of fund flow. 
Edelen (1999) partitions a mutual fund's abnormal return between return 
attributable to liquidity motivated trading and information motivated (discretionary) 
trading. The paper first estimates liquidity motivated trading as ft= cI. f 1t + c°. f° t, where 
f jt and f° t denote the volumes of inflows and outflows respectively for fund j in time t and 
c, c are the estimated coefficients in separate bivariate regressions of the volume of fund I° 
stock purchases on f;;, and the volume of fund stock sales on f° t respectively, i. e. cl and 
co are flow-trade response coefficients. The author then constructs a regression of the 
form 
(2.7) ARj, = A. J,, + 8. d,, + s,, 
where ARjt is the abnormal return on fund j in period t, ft is the estimated liquidity 
motivated trading and dot is the estimated information (discretionary) motivated trading 
estimated as the combined volume of stock purchases and sales minus ft, Eft is a random 
disturbance term. In order to incorporate persistence the author supplements the right hand 
side of (2.7) with lagged values of ARjt. Finally, in an attempt to avoid inference 
problems arising from the possible reverse causation between ARRt and ft cited by Gruber 
(1996), the author instruments ft by its lagged value. 
Overall, the empirical results in Edelen (1999) provide some evidence in support 
of the author's hypothesis that fund flow negatively impacts on fund performance. 
One overall possible conclusion from combining the findings of Gruber (1996), 
Zheng (1999) and Sirri and Tufano (1993) on the one hand and Edelen (1999) on the other 
is that high relative performance attracts capital inflow. However, under pressure to 
provide a liquid equity investment for investors the fund makes, at least some, poor equity 
trades. With a higher proportion of the fund now in equity this detracts from subsequent 
performance. 
A further avenue of investigation in examining mutual fund capital flows is to 
evaluate whether fund flows in aggregate affect stock market returns. This question is 
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taken up by Warther (1995) and is briefly addressed here. Warther (1995) divides fund 
flows into anticipated and unanticipated flows, using Box-Jenkins procedures to estimate 
anticipated flows. Monthly unanticipated fund flows are found to strongly correlate with 
concurrent stock market returns in a regression of the latter on the former. Anticipated 
fund flows are uncorrelated with stock market returns which is consistent with 
informationally efficient markets where anticipated flows are `pre-contemporaneously' 
discounted in returns. Warther (1995) also tests the feedback hypothesis by reversing the 
direction of the regression and hypothesizing that fund flows are, at least in part, 
determined by lagged stock market returns. The author finds no empirical evidence in 
support of the feedback trader hypothesis, however. Remolona, Kleiman and Gruenstein 
(1997) also examine both directions of causality in the aggregate fund flow - aggregate 
stock market returns relationship in order to determine if in a declining stock market the 
positive feedback theory could lead to a self-sustaining decline in stock prices. However, 
their analysis suggests that over the 1986 - 1996 period the effect of short term stock 
market returns on mutual fund flows were weak 
Once again, the difficulty in obtaining data in the UK means that the relationship 
between fund performance and fund flow is comparatively unexplored. However, Fletcher 
and Forbes (2002) do examine whether the degree of fund flow varies across quartile 
ranked portfolios of funds and as such whether it is linked to persistence in performance. 
The authors find that the winning quartile of funds experience the highest degree of cash 
flows while the worst quartile experience the least cash flow, suggesting little penalty for 
the relatively poor performance. 
Due to paucity of data, Keswani and Stolin (2005) is the only UK study to link 
new cash inflows and outflows to future performance (as measured by the four-factor 
alpha over the period 1992-2000, using around 500 funds. With monthly portfolio 
rebalancing they find that new money earns a higher abnormal return than old money but 
in each case the abnormal return is negative. 
2.8 Mutual Funds versus Mutual Fund Managers 
It is also important to note that the findings relating to performance throughout this review 
of the literature relate to the mutual fund as the entity rather than specifically to the fund 
manager, i. e. the fund manager is likely to change over the return history of the fund. As 
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such it is also useful to examine the relationship between fund performance and the cross- 
sectional characteristics of fund managers. This issue is pursued by Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999) who evaluate whether mutual fund performance is related to fund manager `skill' 
as measured by the manager's age, the average SAT score of the manager's undergraduate 
institution, whether or not the manager held an MBA and the manager's tenure (how long 
he has been in the position). The performance evaluation is carried out both before and 
after controlling for other fund risk characteristics. Using a sample of 492 mutual fund 
managers who had sole responsibility for a fund for at least some part of the 1988 - 1994 
period and raw returns, they report that managers with MBAs outperform managers 
without an MBA by 63 basis points per year. However, controlling for systematic risk 
(using a single factor alpha as the performance measure), the differential in performance is 
zero, i. e. managers with an MBA tend to hold more market risk. The authors also find a 
small risk adjusted performance differential among younger versus older fund managers 
and suggest this is due to a stronger work ethic among young mangers, who are still 
establishing their careers and who face a higher probability of dismissal. Finally, the most 
robust performance differential identified is that managers from universities with higher 
undergraduate SAT scores obtain higher (risk adjusted) returns. While some of this return 
is attributable to expense characteristics, the SAT score remains highly significant. They 
attribute this outperformance to better natural ability, education and professional networks 
associated with having attended a higher SAT score undergraduate institution. 
Unfortunately data on UK equity mutual fund characteristics such as expenses, 
load charges, turnover and fund size are not available historically in sufficient number of 
observations to carry out reliable tests of the relationships between performance and such 
characteristics. Data on Total Expense Ratios by fund are available from Fitzrovia but not 
before 1997 and no fund provides an expense figure more than twice per annum. Data on 
fund size are available from Micropal but again not before 1997. Similarly, data on the 
characteristics of the individual fund managers operating UK equity mutual funds are also 
unavailable thus ruling out the type of analysis undertaken by Chevalier and Ellison 
(1999) above. 
2.9 European Studies of Mutual Fund Performance 
In order to provide a picture of some of the results to emerge from studies of the European 
mutual fund industry a brief discussion of a study by Otten and Barns (2000) is provided 
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here. This is one of very few comprehensive studies of the European mutual fund industry 
and is selected here because of its methodological similarities to many UK studies. 
Otten and Barns (2000) focus on the mutual fund industries of France, Germany, 
Italy and the Netherlands and the UK. In the case of each country only mutual funds 
which invest exclusively in their domestic equity market are examined. Performance is 
evaluated on local currency returns over the period 1991-1998 and is limited to funds with 
two or more years of data. Otten and Barns (2000) report a large volume of results, 
estimating separately for each country both a single and four-factor model applied to funds 
of alternative investment objectives. A summary of results is provided here. 
Mutual funds in all regions are found to have a high sensitivity to the returns of 
small company stocks and value stocks. Only funds in the German domestic market 
generally underperform but this is not significant at 5%. The bulk of the evidence points to 
outperformance among the UK and Italian funds (at 5% significance) and outperformance 
among the French and Dutch funds (at 10% significance). Otten and Barris (2000) also 
carry out the performance tests on fund returns net of annual charges. In this case, most 
German funds are now found to produce significantly negative alpha measures. While risk 
adjusted performance in all other regions is positive, it is only significantly so in the UK 
and furthermore this is found for the most part among funds investing in UK small 
company stocks. 
In terms of performance persistence, Otten and Bams (2000) employ a recursive 
portfolio formation procedure. The only significant result is observed for UK funds which 
exhibit a 7.28% annual spread between the top and bottom portfolios. The evidence of 
persistence is qualitatively similar to that of Blake and Timmerman (1998) who examined 
the longer sample period 1972 -1995. 
This concludes the review of the literature. The next chapter describes the UK 
mutual fund industry generally and in particular the data set employed in this study. 
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CHAPTER 3 
DATA DESCRIPTION 
This chapter first provides a brief background description of the UK asset management 
industry as a whole in terms of size, client structure, asset allocation and current industry 
trends. The chapter then provides a detailed description of the data employed in this study 
as well as data definitions and sources. Some simple descriptive statistics of the mutual 
fund returns, benchmark factor portfolios and public information conditioning variables 
(see chapter 4) are presented. While some basic performance statistics are reported, this 
chapter is not intended as a rigorous performance analysis. 
3.1 The UK Asset Management Industry 
This section describes the aggregate UK asset management industry in terms of size, client 
structure, asset allocation and current trends. This discussion draws heavily from the 
findings of the Investment Management Association (IMA) Asset Management Survey 
2004. 
3.1.1 Industry Size 
By June 2003 the UK fund management industry managed a total of almost £7 trillion in 
assets. Of that, almost £2 trillion was under management within the UK, i. e. in UK assets, 
while a further £5 trillion was managed globally. Industry concentration is high but has 
fallen slightly in recent years. The five largest operators (Legal & General Investment 
Management, Barclays Global Investors, M&G Investment Managements, Morley Fund 
Management and Standard Life Investments), with UK assets ranging from £122bn to 
£77bn each, manage 28% of the UK market while the ten largest groups account for 46%. 
In terms of global assets, investment banks account for the largest proportion of 
assets under management at 28% followed by insurance companies at 22%, stand alone 
fund managers at 18% and retail banks at 14% with the remainder comprised of custodians 
1 Fornerly known as Municipal & General Securities 
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and other diversified financial services. In terms of assets managed in the UK, insurance 
companies dominate managing 39%, with investment and retail banks at 19% and 18% 
respectively. 
3.1.2 Client Type and Client Mandate 
Almost 40% of assets managed in the UK are invested in insurance funds, followed 
closely by 37% managed in pension funds while the third largest source of clients is the 
retail fund sector at 15%. The relatively small remainder is made up largely of central 
banks and private clients. The IMA survey does not filter out unit trusts as a separate 
category. Many unit trusts are sold to both the retail and institutional sectors, although 
generally at different unit prices. 
The majority of assets managed in the UK (54%) are actively managed against a 
customized benchmark. Funds holding these assets are mandated to perform relative to a 
blend of (or single) indexes. 18% of all assets managed in the UK are passively managed, 
ie are mandated to track an index to within 50 basis points or less. Specialist sectors 
comprise 16% of assets under management, ie specific asset class or geographic exposure. 
8% of assets managed in the UK are held by peer group mandated funds, ie are managed 
in relation to a group of comparable funds. Finally, absolute return mandated funds make 
up 4% of assets managed in the UK. These are managed according to a target level of 
return, for example LIBOR + 2%. 
Among retail funds and pension funds there is the broadest spread of mandates but 
all client types utilize customized benchmarking more than any other type of mandate. 
This emphasizes the importance in this study of establishing whether such funds have 
genuine ability to beat a benchmark. 
3.1.3 Asset Allocation 
Of the entire asset value under management in the UK, equities represents 46%, followed 
by bonds at 37% and money market investments at 8%. The remainder is in property and 
venture capital2. Of the 46% invested in equities (approx £460bn), 60% is invested in UK 
2 At the time of writing the IMA has 29 separate asset classifications under 3 subheadings as follows. 
Income Funds: UK Gilts, UK Index Linked Gilts, UK Corporate Bond, UK Other Bond, Global Bonds, UK 
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domestic equity. Therefore, UK domestic equity is dominant in both total asset allocation 
and equity allocation which highlights the importance and relevance of examining UK 
domestic equity mutual funds in this study. 
Of total assets managed in the UK, the fixed income allocation of £366bn is 
dominated by government debt (51%) and investment grade debt (48%). In terms of asset 
allocation by fund type, bonds dominate over equity among insurance funds but the 
opposite is true of pension funds. At over 70%, retail funds hold the highest proportion of 
equity. 
3.1.4 Current Industry Trends 
In the IMA Asset Management Survey 2004, the majority of respondents reported 
increased interest from private clients, some pension funds and other institutional 
investors in absolute return mandates and high alpha products. This demand for high alpha 
products in particular again emphasizes the relevance of establishing whether such fund 
managers can reliably deliver such a mandate. 
The survey also noted an emergence of liability benchmarking among pension 
funds. This aims to predict a fund's future liabilities and invest in assets with matched 
characteristics. The impetus comes from companies who are increasingly concerned by 
the liability represented by their pension schemes. The results is a continued decline in 
Defined Benefit pension schemes and a shift towards fixed income rather than equity 
investments. However, a large number of survey respondents continue to expect open 
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution Schemes along with open life assurance 
schemes to continue to generate demand for equities. 
3.2 The Mutual Fund Data Set: Definitions and Sources 
The mutual fund data set in this study is comprised of 1,620 Unit Trusts and Open Ended 
Investment Companies (OEICs). These are UK domestic equity funds, i. e. by definition at 
Equity & Bond Income, UK Equity Income. Growth Funds: Money Market, Protected/Guaranteed Funds, 
UK All Companies, UK Smaller Companies, Japan, Japanese Smaller Companies, Asia Pacific Including 
Japan, Asia Pacific Excluding Japan, North America, North American Smaller Companies, Europe 
Including UK, Europe Excluding UK, European Smaller Companies, Cautious Managed, Balanced 
Managed, Active Managed, Global Growth, Global Emerging Markets, UK Zeros. Specialist: Specialist, 
Technology & Telecommunications, Personal Pension. 
64 
least 80% of the fund is invested in UK domestic equity. The data set in this study 
represents almost the entire set of UK domestic equity funds which have existed at any 
point during the sample period under consideration, April 1975 
- 
December 2002. Unit 
trusts are pooled investments which enable their investors to enjoy economies of scale in 
gaining access to well diversified portfolios of securities. However, unit trusts often have 
different investment objectives as laid down in the trust deed. Unit trusts are `open ended' 
mutual funds in the sense that investors can purchase new units in the fund at the going 
market price per unit, ie the demand for units does not increase the unit price. Unit trusts 
can only be traded between the investor and the trust manager, there is no secondary 
market. Unit trusts differ from investment trusts in that the latter may be described as a 
`closed end' fund. Although they are still pooled investments, investment trusts are, in 
effect, companies which are quoted on the stock exchange in their own right whose 
business it is to trade in securities. Investment trusts have a fixed number of units, just as 
there are a fixed number of shares in a company. Unlike in the case of unit trusts, demand 
for investment trusts may push up the price of the trust. Here, it is possible for the price of 
the investment trust to trade at a premium (discount) where the price is higher (lower) than 
the value of the underlying assets of the investment trust. A premium, for example, may 
reflect investor demand for the skills of the investment trust manager. OEICs are 
constituted as companies so that investors buy shares but the number of shares in issue 
varies according to demand, again hence the term open ended. This implies that the share 
price always reflects the underlying asset value and, unlike investment trusts, is not 
affected by market sentiment towards the OEIC itself. Hence the risk profiles of OEICs 
are more in line with that of unit trusts than investment trusts. The data set of funds 
examined in this study includes OEIC's. 
The mutual fund returns data have been obtained from Fenchurch Corporate 
Services using Standard & Poor's Analytical Software and Data. Returns are measured 
monthly between April 1975 and December 2002. All fund returns are fully contiguous. 
The analysis is restricted to funds investing in UK domestic equity so that accurate 
benchmark factor portfolios may be constructed to estimate fund risk adjusted or abnormal 
performance. UK equity funds are defined by the Investment Management Association 
(IMA), formerly the Association of Unit Trusts and Investment Funds (AUTIF), as having 
at least 80% of the fund invested in UK equity. 
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Among the database of 1,620 funds, many funds are referred to as `second units'. 
Second units arise for the most part when a single fund is sold under different pricing 
structures to different groups of investors such as retail and institutional. Furthermore, in 
addition to being offered directly by the fund managers, some funds are also sold under 
agreed but slightly different pricing structures by life assurance companies etc. Second 
units do not represent separate independent portfolios and they are not included in the 
analysis in this study. 
Furthermore, 112 of the funds in the database are market tracker funds. As this 
study is interested in stock selection ability, the performance of tracker funds is of little 
interest and such funds are also excluded. 
Concentrating on independent and non-tracker funds leaves a sample of 842 funds 
for the analysis. 
All equity funds are classified by the investment objective/style of the fund. For 
example, funds which specialise in investing in small company stocks, funds which invest 
in income stocks etc. These investment classes (styles) are declared by the funds 
themselves but are certified initially and subsequently monitored monthly by the IMA in 
the UK. The IMA classifications for the UK domestic equity funds in this study are (i) 
Equity Income, (ii) Equity and (iii) Smaller Company. The IMA defines Equity Income 
funds as aiming to have a dividend yield in excess of 110% of the yield of the FT A All 
Share Index. Equity funds are defined as those having 80% of the fund invested in UK 
equity but are not restricted to a particular type of equity. Smaller Company funds have at 
least 80% of the fund invested in UK equities which form the bottom 10% of all equities 
by market capitalisation. Pre-1999 many Equity funds were subcategorized as either 
"Growth" funds or "Growth and Income" funds but these classes were merged in April 
1999. Funds failing to remain within their stated investment objective for a period of 
three months are required by the IMA to either realign the fund or change the stated 
investment objective. 
Within these classes of Equity Income funds, Equity funds and Smaller Company 
funds, more specialised IMA sub-classifications exist. These include funds investing in: 
Special Situations and Recovery, Funds of Funds, Mid-Cap stocks, Blue Chip stocks, 
Ethical stocks (eg non-tobacco related etc), Technology stocks, Finance stocks and 
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Ecology stocks (environmentally-friendly). These also include some capital protected 
investments. However, in many cases there are too few funds within each of these more 
specialised subcategories for them to be treated separately in a comparison between fund 
styles. Therefore this study uses the three broader classifications. There are 162 equity 
income funds, 553 equity funds and 127 small stock funds. 
As of August 2005, the total value of unit trusts and OEICs under management in 
the UK was £277bn and is growing quickly. Sales in 2004 amounted to £54.5bn up from 
£l8bn in 1995. Sales are approximately evenly divided between institutional and retail 
investors. Funds under management in the UK domestic equity sector total £117bn. 
In order to control for survivorship bias, the data set includes both surviving funds 
(626) and nonsurviving funds (216). A nonsurviving fund is one which has existed for 
some time during the sample period but has not `survived' until the end of the sample 
period. Nonsurviving funds may cease to exist because they were merged with (or taken 
over by) other funds or they may have been forced to close due to bad performance. 
Because of the latter scenario, it is critical to include nonsurviving funds in any 
performance analysis of the mutual fund industry as failure to do so may bias performance 
findings upwards. The inclusion of nonsurviving funds, which represent 25% of the total 
sample of funds examined, is a significant strength of this study. 
Standard and Poors assign a unique identification number to all funds: the S&P ID. 
The S&P ID is helpful in tracing a fund's history through name changes and mergers with 
other funds etc. Name changes can be problematic in this type of research as it can lead to 
the inadvertent inclusion of the same fund twice. In this study, the S&P ID code of every 
fund was examined and name changes and mergers were identified in order to avoid this 
error. Examination of the S&P ID codes reveals that many funds whose history cease 
before the end of the sample period, ie `nonsurvivors', were in fact taken over by other 
funds. The reason for the takeover may well be due to a fund's strong performance and 
therefore it would be wrong to assume that all nonsurvivors die due to poor performance. 
This is examined further in later chapters. 
In addition, funds are also categorized by the location from where the fund is 
domiciled: onshore UK operated funds (662) and offshore funds (180). Offshore funds are 
comprised mainly of those operated from Dublin, Luxembourg, the Channel Islands, the 
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Isle of Man and some other European locations. In this study, all offshore fund returns are 
denominated in sterling for comparability with onshore funds. 
All fund returns are calculated bid price to bid price with (gross) income 
reinvested. As the bid/offer spread captures the initial charge or load fee, as well as stamp 
duty, dealing charges, other commissions and bid/offer spreads of the underlying 
securities, the returns are gross of, or before, the load fee. However, returns are net of the 
annual management fees imposed. Fund returns are measured gross of taxes on dividends 
and capital gains. This is appropriate as the returns on the benchmark factor portfolios (for 
market, size, value and momentum) against which funds are measured are also gross of 
such taxes. 
3.3 A Breakdown of the Data Set 
In this section, a description of the data set of mutual funds used in this study is provided. 
The numbers of funds in various categories and some preliminary descriptive statistics of 
the fund returns are also presented. All fund returns discussed here are excess returns (ie 
are measured in excess of the one-month UK TBill rate) and are raw returns (not risk 
adjusted). Unless otherwise stated, the statistics presented in this section are not restricted 
to funds with a minimum number of observations 
3.3.1 Number of Funds by Various Categories 
This section presents breakdowns and cross-tabulations of the numbers of funds by 
investment objective, by survivorship and by location. Table 3.1 presents a contingency 
table of funds by investment objective and survivorship. Equity funds represent the largest 
single investment class with 553 funds in total and this is also the largest sub-class of 
funds among both surviving and nonsurvivng funds. A chi-square test of independence of 
the contingency table rejects the null hypothesis of independence between investment 
style and survivorship at 5% significance. This lends some support to the hypothesis that 
the survival status of funds is dependent on investment style. For example, nonsurviving 
funds comprise the highest proportion (33%) of equity income funds but a smaller 22% of 
equity funds. While the chi-square test does not reveal the cause of the dependence 
between survivorship and investment style, one obvious hypothesis is that performance 
differs between investment styles and in turn this alters the probability of a fund dying and 
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becoming a nonsurvivor. To anticipate the results of later chapters, there is strong 
evidence to suggest that `luck-adjusted' performance differs significantly between 
investment styles but poor performance is not the cause of many funds becoming 
nonsurvivors. 
Table 3.1 Contingency Table of Investment Objective and Survivorship 
Equity Equity Small Stock Total 
Income 
Survivor 
Nonsurvivor 
Total 
109 427 90 626 
53 126 37 216 
162 553 127 842 
In Table 3.2 another contingency table is presented which reports the breakdown 
of the numbers of funds by investment objective and location: onshore/offshore domicile. 
180 (21%) of the funds are operated offshore. A chi-square test of independence between 
fund location and fund investment style is strongly rejected at 1% significance. This may 
be the result, for example, of a perceived informational asymmetry by offshore fund 
managers in certain investment objectives. From Table 3.2, offshore funds represent a 
relatively large 26% of the investment in equity funds compared to only 10% and 13% in 
equity income and small stock funds respectively. This may reflect a preference by 
offshore fund managers to invest in broadly defined fund objectives rather than more 
specialized (and therefore possibly more informationally asymmetric) funds. The 
hypothesis that offshore funds may underperform relative to onshore funds, because of 
informational asymmetry or other factors, is examined in later chapters. 
Table 3.2 Contingency Table of Investment Objective and Location 
Onshore 
Offshore 
Total 
Equity Equity Small Stock Total 
Income 
146 406 110 662 
16 147 17 180 
162 553 127 842 
3.3.2 Numbers of Funds and Performance Through Time 
This section presents a breakdown of the numbers of funds and average fund performance, 
firstly by length of fund history and secondly over time throughout the sample period. The 
number of funds (excluding second units) in existence grew consistently over the sample 
period: In the month of December of 1975,1985,1995 and 2002, for example, there were 
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65,233,542 and 631 funds in existence respectively. Table 3.3 shows the numbers of 
funds, average returns and average standard deviation of returns by length of fund history. 
For example, 842 funds exist for at least one month and have an average return of 
- 
0.142% per month, 405 funds exist for at least 10 years (120 obs) while 61 funds exist for 
the full sample period (333 obs). 
Table 3.3 Breakdown of Funds by Length of Fund Histories. 
Minimum 
Observations 
No. Funds 
Mean 
Return 
Mean Stand. 
Dev. 
1 36 60 120 333 
842 675 573 405 61 
-0.142 0.172 0.279 0.360 0.522 
4.916 4.824 4.817 4.967 5.217 
Table 3.3 suggests that average performance rises with fund longevity. This might 
be partly explained by a higher concentration of poor performing nonsurviving funds 
among the shorter-lived funds. A more detailed picture of the relationship between 
performance and fund history is provided in Figure 3.1. Here funds are grouped by their 
number of observations and the average performance is plotted for each group. In Panel A, 
separate groups are formed of funds which existed for up to 1 year, between 1 year and 2 
years, between 2 and 3 years and so on. In Panel B, similar groupings are formed by 
months rather than by years. 
From Panel A, with the exception of very short-lived funds (up to 1 year), 
generally performance is relatively poor among shorter-lived funds up to approx 5 years 
but rises gradually in longer-lived funds. Again, this may be partly due to the higher 
concentration of some poor performing nonsurvivors in this category. However, short- 
lived funds here are not all nonsurvivors. They include funds which came into existence 
towards the end of the sample period and have relatively few observations but continue to 
exist at the end of the sample period. Therefore, some of these short-lived funds are 
recently launched and may be `star' performers while others will be earlier shorter-lived 
poor performing nonsurvivor funds. This partly explains the higher cross sectional 
variation in returns among shorter versus longer-lived funds in Panel B of Figure 3.2. 
However, this relatively high cross-sectional variation is also explained by the fact that 
short-lived funds existed at different time periods within the full sample period, some of 
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which were bull periods and some of which were bear periods, while longer-lived funds 
produce a smoother average return over time. 
Figure 3.1 Performance and Fund Longevity 
Panel A: Performance and Longevity (Years) 
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To further investigate whether poorer performance among short-lived funds is due 
to nonsurvivorship, Panel A of Figure 3.1 is plotted for both survivor and nonsurvivor 
funds separately in Figure 3.2. It is clear that nonsurviving funds with 2 to 3 years of 
observations or less underperform similar surviving funds. This tends to suggest that many 
of the nonsurvivng funds of this age which close do so because of poor performance. 
However, Figure 3.2 also demonstrates that longer-lived `nonsurviving' funds outperform 
their age-counterpart surviving funds. This raises an important issue regarding funds 
labeled as "nonsurvivors": many such funds are not closed down because of poor 
performance. On the contrary, it may be their good performance and consequent 
attractiveness that causes them to be merged with, or taken over by, other funds. 
In Figure 3.2 nonsurviving and surviving funds are grouped and compared 
according to the length of the fund history. Of course, in this comparison nonsurviving 
and surviving funds are not necessarily being compared at the same points in time. To 
provide further insight into the relative performance, Figure 3.3 charts the difference in 
71 
returns between these two classes of funds through time. For each month the cross- 
sectional average return for nonsurvivors and survivors is calculated, this is then averaged 
within each year and the difference between the two (nonsurvivors minus survivors) is 
observed For the most part nonsurvivors outperform survivors through time further 
emphasizing the caveat above that it would be incorrect to conclude generally that 
nonsurvivors close due to poor performance. 
Figure 3.2 Relative Performance by Number of Observations: Surviving and 
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The cross-sectional distribution of (time series) average fund returns within each 
group of surviving and nonsurviving funds is plotted in Figure 3.4. The graph reveals a 
considerably higher degree of variation in (time series) average returns among surviving 
funds. In addition, the relative underperformance of surviving funds as a group reported 
previously is concentrated largely in the negative tails of the distributions. 
The sensitivity of fund performance to length of fund history is examined in more 
detail chapter 6 where a distinction between look-ahead bias and survivorship bias is 
discussed. 
Figure 3.4 Distribution of Fund Average Returns by Survival 
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Further insight into the level of cross sectional variation in fund returns is provided 
by Figure 3.5 which charts selected decile performance over time. Each month over the 
full sample period funds were ranked and sorted into decile portfolios and average returns 
in each decile were calculated. Monthly averages for each year were then calculated. For 
ease of graphical illustration, time series of selected deciles 1,4,7 and 10 are plotted. The 
graph reveals substantial differences between the top and bottom decile performance 
which was often as wide as an average 10% per month. The difference between top and 
bottom decile performance peaks between 1998 and 2000 where stock sectors related to 
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technology performed particularly well while more traditional stocks performed poorly in 
relative terms. Note, the gap between top and bottom decile performance narrows post- 
2000 in line with a revision in market views regarding `technology stock' valuations. The 
breakdown in performance between funds of different investment objectives around this 
time is discussed in the next section. 
Figure 3.5 Average Performance by Decile 
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3.3.3 Performance by Sector 
This section further describes the relative performance of sub-classes of funds such as 
funds of different investment objectives and onshore versus offshore funds. Figure 3.6 
charts the performance over time of the three investment objective categories. Within each 
class of funds, each month the cross-sectional average return is calculated and then 
monthly averages are taken for each year. The graph suggests that small stock funds 
outperform the other investment classes during a market-wide upswing. However, this 
class of funds also exhibits a higher degree of volatility through time and often yields a 
worse performance on average during a market-wide downswing. Indeed small stock 
funds have the highest average monthly return of 0.5% per month and the highest standard 
deviation of returns of 1.68%. For equity income funds and general equity funds the 
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average return per month and standard deviation of returns are (0.47,1.22) and (0.42, 
1.21) respectively. 
Note from Figure 3.6 that small stock funds outperform the other classes in the late 
1990s while income stock funds underperform over the same period. Post 2000 these 
relative rankings are reversed. As alluded to previously, this reflects the rapid growth in 
the value of stock associated with information technology (IT) during the earlier period 
many of which were small and often new companies established to operate either directly 
in the IT industry or associated service industries. Well established income stocks were 
comparatively `out of favour' during this period. Relative performances between these 
sub-classes of funds were reversed from around the first quarter of 2000 following a 
significant correction in market views regarding the valuation of many technology stocks. 
Figure 3.7 provides further detail on the distribution of returns by investment 
objective. In each class, the time series average return of each fund is calculated. Each 
histogram shows the distribution of these averages. Again, the high variability in the 
returns of small stock funds is clear. 
Figure 3.6 Performance by Investment Objective Over Time 
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Figure 3.7 Distribution of Fund Averages by Investment Objective 
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It is also of interest to examine the relative performance of onshore and offshore 
funds over time. Figure 3.8 graphs these time series. In each sub-class, each month the 
cross-sectional average return is calculated. Monthly averages are taken for each year. Not 
surprisingly, both subgroups produce a similar pattern of returns over time as they select 
from the same population of UK equity. However, onshore funds, on average, do appear to 
yield a marginally higher return and seldom underperfom. Over the sample period as a 
whole, onshore funds yield a cross-sectional and time series average return of 0.45% per 
month against 0.28% for offshore funds. 
Figure 3.9 provides a similar insight and also shows the cross-sectional variability 
in returns in both subgroups. The histograms show the distribution of the time series 
averages of fund returns. It is apparent that the distribution of onshore fund returns lies 
generally to the right of that of offshore funds and with wider tails it exhibits a higher 
degree of fund return variability. 
76 
Figure 3.8 Performance by Fund Location Over Time 
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Figures 3.8 and 3.9 suggests that there may be differences in the stock selection 
ability between onshore versus offshore funds. This is also investigated in later chapters. 
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3.4 Normality of Fund Returns 
In chapter 4 many equilibrium models of security returns are described. In these models, 
the intercept term, alpha, is a measure of risk adjusted or abnormal fund return. Typically, 
its significance is determined by a standard t-test which in turn requires normally 
distributed fund returns for its validity. Chapter 4 provides evidence that this is not the 
case among UK equity mutual funds. Furthermore, there is evidence that the degree of 
non-normality is greater among top and bottom funds which are the funds of greatest 
interest to investors. 
This pattern is illustrated in Figure 3.10. First, all funds were ranked by the time 
series average return. Figure 3.10 then plots the monthly returns of selected ranked funds. 
The upper left panel plots the distribution of the monthly return observations of the 
highest ranked fund. The upper middle panel plots the return observations of the 10th best 
fund and so on as indicated. Similarly, the lower panels plot the distributions of returns of 
funds ranked at selected points at the lower end of the cross-sectional performance 
distribution. It is notable that funds at the top and bottom ends of the spectrum exhibit a 
higher variance and a greater non-normality in returns than funds ranked even slightly 
closer to the centre of the distribution. Therefore standard t-tests are particularly unreliable 
in assessing the performance of funds in the performance tails. 
This finding largely motivates the use of the bootstrap methodology, described in 
chapter 5. This is a nonparametric procedure to construct `empirical' distributions of 
abnormal (risk adjusted) return under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal return at all 
points in the performance distribution including in the extreme tails. 
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3.5 The Benchmark Factor Portfolios. 
In this section the construction of the benchmark factor portfolios and conditioning 
variables as well as their data sources are described and summary statistics are presented. 
A detailed discussion of the theory underpinning these variables in performance modes is 
presented in chapter 4. In this study, excess mutual fund returns and excess market 
returns are calculated using the one-month UK TBILL rate taken from Datastream. 
3.5.1 The Market Factor 
The market index is the FT A All Share Index (The Financial Times Actuaries All Share 
Index) taken from Datastream. This is the most comprehensive UK stock market index. 
The index is an arithmetic mean of 800 shares and fixed income stocks which comprise 
more than 90% of the market capitalization of all listed companies on the London Stock 
Exchange. The FT A All Share Index is available as a price index and as an index of total 
returns. The latter also incorporates reinvested dividends and is more appropriate for use 
in this study because of its comparability with the mutual fund total returns. 
Unfortunately, however, the FT A All Share index of total returns is unavailable pre- 
January 1986. As a `second-best' approach in this study in order to construct a consistent 
market index of total returns for the full sample period, one-twelfth of the monthly FT A 
All Share dividend yield is added to the FT A All Share Price index each month between 
April 1975 
- 
December 2002. Using the FTSE A All Share Index as the benchmark 
market factor implicitly assumes that this is the universe of stocks from which fund 
managers select and it is the benchmark against which fund performance is measured. 
Recall that in this study only UK domestic equity mutual funds are examined. 
3 
3 This index excludes the Alternative Investment Market (AIM), which replaced the Unlisted Securities 
Market (which operated between 1980-1996), the Third Market (which operated between 1987-1990) and 
an earlier London Stock Exchange Market known as the section 4.2 market. The AIM includes shares not 
suitable for a listing such as some small cap stocks, some management buy-outs and closely-held shares (ie 
held by few people such as family members). (See Blake 2000 for further details). These are likely to form 
a very small proportion, if any, of most mutual 
funds' stock holdings. Furthermore, as these stocks are 
likely to be among the more risky assets, to include them in the benchmark market factor may be 
misleading. 
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3.5.2 The Size Factor 
The factor mimicking portfolio for the size effect, SMB, is the difference between the 
monthly returns on the Hoare Govett Small Companies (HGSC) total return index and the 
returns on the FTSE 100 total return index. The HGSC index is an index of the total 
returns of the lowest 10% of stocks by market capitalization of the main UK equity 
market. It is a widely used index of small cap stocks. It is produced by Professors Elroy 
Dimson and Paul Marsh of London Business School. The FTSE 100 index is an index of 
the total returns of the UK's largest 100 companies by market capitalization. It is 
compiled by the Financial Times, the Institute and the Faculty of Actuaries and the 
London Stock Exchange. It covers approximately 75% by value of all UK shares. As 
total return indices, both the HGSC and FTSE indices incorporate a measure for 
reinvested dividends. 
3.5.3 The Value Factor 
The factor mimicking portfolio to model the value premium, HML, is the difference 
between the monthly returns of the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) UK 
value index and the returns on the MSCI UK growth index. Both indices are total return 
indices. To construct these indices Morgan Stanley ranks all the stocks in their UK 
national index by the book-to-market ratio. Starting with the highest book-to-market ratio 
stocks are attributed to the value index until 50% of the market capitalization of the 
national index is reached. The remaining stocks are attributed to the growth index. The 
MSCI national indices have a market representation of at least 60% (more recently this 
has been increased to 85%). The national indices are designed to represent a broad range 
of sectors rather than simply representing the highest market capitalization stocks. 
3.5.4 The Momentum Factor 
The factor mimicking portfolio to capture the momentum effect, PR1YR, is constructed 
from the London Share Price Database (LSPD) and this section should be read in 
conjunction with section 3.7 below. Each month all stocks in the LSPD are ranked based 
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on their cumulative return over the previous 11 months (ranking period). Equal weighted 
portfolios of the top 30% of the stocks and the lowest 30% of the stocks are formed and 
held for one month (holding period). PRIYR is the difference in the holding period 
between the portfolio of past winners and past losers. The procedure is carried out in a 
rolling window moving the ranking and holding periods forward one month at-a-time. 
This definition of momentum is as equivalent as possible to that in Carhart's 
(1997) US study. As a sensitivity analysis, in this study the momentum variable is 
constructed based only on (i) FTSE A All Share Index constituent stocks and (ii) FTSE 
350 Index constituent stocks and in each case for permutations of six, three and one 
month ranking and holding periods. See also section 4.2.1, chapter 4. 
In the construction of the momentum factor each month, the variable is based on 
the LSPD constituent stocks as they existed at that point in time not based on the 
historical returns of the LSPD constituent stocks' at the end of the sample period 
(December 2002). The latter case would risk imposing a survivorship bias by limiting the 
analysis to stocks which had survived. 
As the construction of the momentum factor relies on the LSPD, the variable can 
only be generated from December 1979 onwards. The LSPD Archive (see below) begins 
in January 1979. After the first holding period of 11 months the first observation of the 
momentum variable is then December 1979. 
3.6 The Conditioning Variables 
The instruments used in this study in the conditional beta and conditional alpha-beta 
models (see chapter 4) are sourced as follows: the one-month Mill rate is taken from 
Datastream. The dividend yield of the market factor is the dividend yield on the FT A All 
Share index taken from Datastream. The slope of the term structure is the yield on the 
UK 10 year gilt minus the yield on the UK one-month TB ill, both taken from Datastream. 
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3.6.1 Descriptive Statistics: Benchmark Factors and Conditioning Variables 
Table 3.4 reports summary statistics of the factor portfolios. The high standard deviations 
indicate that the factor portfolios may be able to explain considerable variation in returns. 
The t-statistics to test whether the means of the factors equal zero strongly reject the 
hypothesis for the size factor suggesting that of the three deviation variables (SMB, 
HML, PRIYR) size could account for much of the cross-sectional variation in the mean 
returns of funds. In addition, the low cross-correlations imply that multi-collinearity does 
not affect the estimated factor loadings. 
Table 3.4 Summary Statistics of the Benchmark Factor Portfolios 
Factor Means Std. Dev. t-stat for Cross-Correlations 
Portfolios mean =0 Rm-Rf SMB HML PRIYR 
Rm-Rf 0.228 5.149 0.817 1.000 
-0.270 0.009 -0.101 
SMB 0.518 3.469 2.756 
-0.270 1.000 0.135 
-0.088 
HML 0.133 2.852 0.860 0.009 0.135 1.000 
-0.296 
PR1YR 0.122 4.147 0.543 
-0.101 -0.088 -0.296 1.000 
Figure 3.11 and Figure 3.12 chart the time series of the benchmark factor portfolios. 
Figure 3.11 charts the series in levels. Figure 3.12 charts the benchmark portfolios in 
index form. (This is provided as it may illustrate a clearer picture of the relative trends in 
the variables over time). Figure 3.12 indicates that small stocks have generally 
outperformed large stocks over the period but differences between value and growth 
stocks and between past winners and losers is much less discernable. Figure 3.13 charts 
the time series of the conditioning variables. 
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3.7 The London Share Price Database 
The London Share Price Database (LSPD) is operated by the Institute of Finance and 
Accounting at London Business School. The LSPD consists of a vast amount of company 
specific information on over 7,000 stocks with information dating from 1955. At the time 
of writing the database covers the period to the end of 2003. Briefly, it includes data on 
(i) general descriptives (number of capital changes, number of dividend payments, 
number of units of share types etc), (ii) capital change (share issues, repayments, types of 
share in issue etc), (iii) dividends (types of dividends payments, ex-dividend dates, tax 
credit details, announcement dates etc), (iv) prices (highs, lows, transaction prices, 
number of transactions etc), (v) returns (monthly returns, P/E ratios, stock exchange 
industrial classifications, trading velocity etc), (vi) industry indices and (vii) an archive 
(stock index constituents through time and other variables). It is not the intention to 
describe the LSPD in full here as much of its content is not directly relevant to this study. 
Instead, the relevant sections used in this study are described. 
In this study, three LSPD files are used: the General Descriptive, Returns and 
Archive files. These are used in the construction of the momentum risk factor. The 
returns file contains monthly returns, inter alia, on all stocks which existed at any time 
since 1955. Each stock is uniquely identified by an ID number4. The General Descriptive 
file contains information on which stock indices the individual stocks were constituents 
of at the end of 2003. This information is coded as a binary field and it is possible for the 
user to indirectly determine (by a separate calculation) whether a stock was a constituent 
of a particular index, such as FTSE All Share index, FTSE 100 index etc, as of end - 
2003. However, the Archive file contains similar index constituent information 
historically. That is, it is possible to ascertain from the Archive file whether a given stock 
was a constituent of a given index at a given point in time historically - not just at the end 
of 2003. However, the Archive file begins in 1979, not 1955. Furthermore, in the case of 
a number of stocks at a number of points in time information exists in the returns file but 
not in the Archive file and vice-versa. 
° If a company is merged/acquired its return record ceases in the database at that point. The returns of the 
acquiring firm remain in the database from that point unless it's a foreign acquirer in which case the series 
is terminated. 
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In this study, a separate programme was written in Gauss in order to match each 
stock's return in the returns file with its index constituency in the Archive file for each 
month for over 7,000 stocks. In the LSPD the time series of returns and index 
constituencies on stocks are stacked in columns, ie the time series for each stock are 
stacked and listed in a single column. In this study, the data were reorganized in matrices 
where in a matrix of stock returns cell [t, i] is the return at time ton stock i, t=1,2 
... 
333, 
i=1 
,2... > 7000. A corresponding matrix of index constituent information was 
constructed where cell [t, i] =1 if at time t stock i was a constituent of the index (say 
FTSE A All Share Index, or FTSE 350) and cell [t, i] =0 otherwise. Three separate such 
matrices of index constituent information were constructed for the FTSE All Share index, 
FTSE 350 index and the FTSE 100 index. In the case of the FTSE 100 index the data 
cover the period from 1986. 
In a separate programme these matrices then enable the user to limit the 
calculation of the momentum variable to constituent stocks of the FTSE A All Share 
Index or the FTSE 350 Index etc. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT AND MODEL SELECTION 
4.1 Performance Measurement 
Evaluating and comparing mutual fund performance based on raw returns fails to take 
account of the levels of risk borne by funds: high raw returns may be associated with 
higher risk. For this reason it is necessary to evaluate fund performance based on a risk 
adjusted or abnormal return measure. This performance measure depends on the asset 
pricing model chosen to explain the cross-section of expected returns. This chapter first 
describes the most common performance models to appear in the literature and the models 
that will be applied in this study. These models fall into three classes: unconditional, 
conditional beta and conditional alpha-beta models. Then all models are estimated for the 
entire set of UK equity mutual funds and estimation diagnostics are used to select one 
`best-fit' model within each of the three classes. These selected models are used in the 
computationally intensive bootstrap procedure in chapter 6. 
4.1.1 Jensen's Alpha 
The Jensen (1968) measure represents abnormal performance based on a single risk factor 
model, ie the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) specification 
(4.1) (R; 
-Rr)t = a; + R, (Rm Rc)t + Fit 
where Rit is the expected return on fund i in period t, Rmt is the expected return on a 
market factor mimicking portfolio, Rf is a risk free rate, typically proxied in empirical 
work by the return on a treasury bill. If the CAPM is the correct model of equilibrium 
returns then the portfolio should lie on the Security Market Line and the value of alpha 
should be zero. Therefore, a positive and statistically significant value of alpha is 
hypothesised to indicate superior risk adjusted performance or stock picking skills 
(selectivity) on the part of the fund manager. That is, a positive alpha indicates that the 
portfolio has performed better than a random selection buy-and-hold strategy. Alpha may 
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be estimated empirically from least squares regression of (4.1). Similarly, a statistically 
significant negative value of alpha is taken to indicate inferior risk adjusted performance. 
4.1.2 Carhart's Alpha 
The Carhart (1997) measure is the alpha estimate from a four-factor model which is an 
extension of (4.1) and controls for fund exposure to size risk, value risk as well as 
momentum strategies in modeling expected fund returns: 
(4.2) (R; Rr)c = a; + ßli(Rm-Rf)c + ß2; (SMBc) + ßsi(FIMLc) + ß4i(PR1YRt)+ £ic 
where SMBt, HMLt and PR1YRt are risk factor mimicking portfolios for size, value versus 
growth and one-year momentum effects respectively in the stock holdings of the mutual 
funds. Carhart's alpha may be estimated empirically as the intercept term in (4.2). 
The four-factor model is largely based on the empirical findings of Fama and 
French (1992 and 1993) and Carhart (1995). Fama and French (1992 and 1993) find that a 
three-factor model including market, size and book-to-market value risk factors provides 
significantly greater power than the CAPM alone in explaining common variation in stock 
returns. Fama and French (1992) report a strong negative relationship between stock 
returns and size: smaller firms tend to have higher average returns (the authors report a 
spread of 0.74% per month on average based on their size rankings). The size factor, SMB 
('small minus big'), is a measure of the difference between the returns on small versus big 
stocks so 32i measures a fund's sensitivity to the relative performance of small stocks'. 
The hypotheses underpinning the specification of a size risk factor are as follows: The 
earnings prospects of small firms may be more sensitive to economic conditions and small 
firms may be less likely to survive a period of financial distress during economic 
downturns. There is also the concern that small firms embody greater information 
asymmetry for investors than large firms. Finally, the ownership of small firm stock is 
generally less diluted making the stock less liquid and consequently subject to higher 
volatility arising from thin trading. All these factors imply a risk loading for size and a 
higher required return by investors. 
1 The calculation of SMB and the other risk factors in (4.2) in this study is described in chapter 3. 
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Fama and French (1992) also report a strong positive relationship between stock 
returns and the book-to-market value ratio: stocks with relatively high book-to-market 
ratios have higher average returns (the authors report a spread of 1.5% per month between 
the highest and lowest book-to market stocks in their study). The book-to-market value 
factor, HML ('high minus low'), is a measure of the difference between the returns on 
high versus low book-to-market stocks. As Fama and French outline, if stock prices are 
rational the book-to-market value ratio should reflect firms' relative prospects. A high 
book-to-market ratio firm indicates relatively low earnings on assets. Consequently, there 
is a high book-to-market or `value' premium. Alternatively, if stock prices are irrational 
the cross-section of book-to-market ratios may be the result of market overreaction to the 
relative prospects of firms. High (low) book-to-market ratios represent firms whose prices 
have ` overshot' on the downside (upside) and therefore the ratio predicts the cross-section 
of stock returns. 
Alternative explanations for the outperformance of value stocks, particularly in the 
U. S., have appeared in the literature. Chan and Lakonishok (2004) suggest that the value 
premium arises because investors extrapolate past information on company performance 
too far into the future. For example, value stocks tend to have a relatively poor history 
with respect to growth in earnings, cashflow and sales. Notwithstanding the lack of 
evidence of persistence in such relative growth rates, the authors maintain that analysts 
project past growth into the future leading to an under (over)-pricing of value (growth) 
stocks relative to their fundamentals. This misspricing generates higher returns for value 
stocks. (See also Chan et at 2000). LaPorta et al (1997) attribute the value premium to 
earnings surprises, which the authors find are systematically more positive for value 
stocks. These alternative hypotheses are based more on a market inefficiency rather than 
risk-based explanation of the value-growth return differential. 
The fourth risk factor, PRIYR, in (4.2) is an additional factor capturing Jegadeesh 
and Titman's (1993) one year momentum anomaly. The PR1YR variable is the difference 
in returns in period t between a portfolio of past high performing stocks and past poor 
performing stocks. Its specification in (4.2) captures a fund's sensitivity to following a 
zero-investment strategy of investing in past strong performing `momentum' stocks and 
short-selling stocks with low past returns. Carhart's main motivation for examining 
momentum effects is due to the inability of the Fama and French three-factor model to 
explain cross-sectional variation in ranked portfolio returns. The momentum factor is 
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statistically well determined where Carhart finds that it explains almost half of the spread 
in returns between the top and bottom decile portfolios of funds ranked by raw return and 
therefore appears to mimic a risk factor which accounts for variation in fund returns. 
Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok (1996) suggest that the momentum anomaly is a market 
inefficiency caused by slow reaction to information. If the intercept (alpha) is to represent 
skill, the performance model should control for momentum strategies which, even if they 
do contribute to higher returns, do not represent skill as such strategies are 
easily/mechanically implemented. 
Carhart's four-factor model in (4.2) may be interpreted as a performance 
attribution model where the coefficients and premia on the risk factors indicate the 
proportion of mean returns attributable to four investment strategies: high versus low beta 
stocks, small versus large capitalisation stocks, value versus growth stocks and one-year 
momentum versus contrarian stocks. 
4.1.3 Conditional Performance Measures 
The Jensen and Carhart measures described above are unconditional measures of 
performance: fund alphas are calculated as the past average excess return minus a fixed 
factor loading(s) times the average excess return on a benchmark portfolio(s). However, 
unconditional performance measures do not incorporate changing market information 
about the expected returns and risk of individual securities. As an example of changing 
market information, Chan (1988) and Ball and Kothari (1989) highlight, using US data, 
that as the market corrects for the under-pricing (over-pricing) of `loser' ('winner') shares 
a significant shift in the Beta of these shares can occur. Also a number of studies have 
shown that the risk of a share can change through time as the financial characteristics of 
the company change, ie gearing, earnings variability and dividend policy (Foster (1986), 
Mandelker and Rhee (1984), Hochman (1983), Bildersee (1975)). Therefore, even if the 
manager follows a buy-and-hold investment strategy, the risk of the portfolio may vary 
over time in line with the changing risk of the underlying securities. In addition, the 
weights in a passive buy-and-hold strategy will vary in line with the relative values of the 
underlying assets. Finally, in actively managed funds, the manager will manipulate 
portfolio weights and consequently the portfolio beta. These points taken together indicate 
that there may well be time variation in the portfolio beta(s). 
91 
Similarly, suppose as in Merton (1980), that a fund manager believes that expected 
market excess return and its volatility move together proportionately over time with 
economic conditions. Based on economic conditions a fund manager wishing to keep the 
fund volatility constant will lower the fund beta when market conditions are volatile and 
vice-versa. Because, as a result, the fund beta will be negatively correlated with the market 
premium, the average excess return of the fund will be less than the average beta of the 
fund applied to the average market premium. In this case the use of an unconditional beta 
would lead us to conclude that the fund has a negative alpha. In this example, this does not 
necessarily reflect poor stock-picking ability but the fact that in order to maintain constant 
volatility the fund reduces its risk when the premium for risk is high and vice versa. (see 
also Ferson and Schadt, 1996). 
4.1.3.1 Conditional Beta Models 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) extend the CAPM specification to a conditional performance 
measurement model by allowing the factor loading on the market risk factor at time t to be 
linearly related to a vector of instruments for the economic information set Zt as follows 
(4.3) pit = boi + B'; (Zc) 
where zt is the vector of deviations of Zt from unconditional means. Therefore, bo; is the 
unconditional mean of the conditional beta. Subbing (4.3) into (4.1) and generalising the 
notation to let rb, t+1 denote the expected excess return on a benchmark portfolio (market 
portfolio in this case) the expected excess portfolio return in the conditional beta CAPM 
can be written as 
(4.4) ri, t+1= ai + boi(rb t+1) + B'i(Zt*rb, t+l) + Ei, t+1 
where ri, t+I is the expected excess return on fund i. As before under the null hypothesis of 
zero abnormal performance ai = 0. Note, zt is in deviations from mean so that the mean 
value of this variable is zero. Therefore, its impact on a; arises due to the time varying 
nature of existing risk factor loadings. To specify Zt in levels would be to specify this 
variable as an additional risk factor. The model in (4.4) can be extended to the Carhart 
four-factor model where the additional factor loadings are each modeled as conditional 
betas and as linear functions of an economic information set Zt. For L instruments in Zt the 
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conditional four-factor model involves estimating (L+1)4 +1 parameters. This Ferson and 
Schadt performance measure computes the alpha of a managed portfolio controlling for 
investment strategies that use publicly available economic information, which it is 
hypothesized predicts factor returns, to dynamically adjust the portfolio's risk factor 
sensitivities. 
4.1.3.2 Conditional Alpha-Beta Models 
The model in (4.4) specifies the abnormal performance measure, a;, as a constant. 
However, it may be the case that abnormal returns are also time varying. Christopherson, 
Ferson and Glassman (1998) extend the analysis of Ferson and Schadt (1996) to estimate 
conditional alphas as well as betas. They also assume a linear specification for the 
conditional alpha as a function of the instruments in Zt as 
(4.5) a; = ao; + A'; (zt) 
Using (4.5) to modify (4.4) yields 
(4.6) ri, t+l = aoi + A'i(zt) + boi(rb, t+1) + B'i(zt*rb, t+1) + £i, t+l 
The conditional alpha approach can also be applied to the Carhart four-factor model and is 
a simple extension of the four-factor model with conditional betas described above. 
To further examine how conditional alpha and beta models arise, assume a general 
linear factor model of the form 
(4.7) Rtc+t = ai + ßi (Fc+i) + Eic+l 
where Ft+1 represents a vector of the expected values of risk factors and R; t+1 is the 
expected excess return on asset i. A mutual fund expected excess return is then given by 
(4.8) 
N 
R+, 
. 
for N assets in the fund 
where W1 +I is time varying and is given by 
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(4.9) Wic+t = Wio + Wi (ZC) 
where W; o, W; are constants. For example, W; o may represent long run strategic asset 
allocation weights while W; represents stock picking (or market timing) based on known 
information at time t. 
Subbing (4.9) and (4.7) in (4.8) yields a model of the form in (4.6), which may 
have heteroscedastic errors. 
The performance measure from this conditional alpha-beta model is the alpha of a 
managed portfolio, controlling for investment strategies that use publicly available 
economic information to (i) add stocks with abnormally high expected excess returns 
conditional on the information and (ii) dynamically adjust the portfolio risk factor 
sensitivities conditional on the information. 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Christopherson, Ferson and Glassman (1998) use 
instruments for economic information, Zt, that previous studies have shown are useful for 
predicting security returns and risk over time. These include: the lagged level of the one- 
month TBill yield, the lagged dividend yield of the market factor, a lagged measure of the 
slope of the term structure, a lagged quality spread in the corporate bond market and a 
dummy variable to capture the January effect 2 Of course, all conditional models may also 
be examined by applying subsets of the information set, Zt. The findings from such tests in 
this study are reported later in this chapter. 
4.1.4 Models of Market Timing 
In addition to stock selection skills, models of portfolio performance should also examine 
a fund's market timing skill. This is, can fund managers successfully predict the future 
direction of the market in aggregate and increase or decrease the portfolio sensitivity 
(Beta) accordingly? Treynor and Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson and Merton (1981) are 
two commonly applied market timing models in the literature while Ferson and Schadt 
(1996) also estimate conditional versions of both these models. 
2A more detailed description of the conditioning variables as adopted in this study is provided in chapter 3. 
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4.1.4.1 The Treynor-Mazuy Model 
The Treynor and Mazuy (1966) models is a quadratic extension of the single factor CAPM 
in (4.1), see also Admati et al 1986. The model permits ß; in (4.1) at time t to be expressed 
as a linear function of the expected future market excess return: 
(4.10) pit = ei + yiu[rm, t+1] 
Replacing pi in (4.1) with (4.10) yields a quadratic of the form 
2 (4.11) ri, t+l = ai + 0i(rm, t+1) + yiu[rm, t+l] + Ei, t+1 
where ri, t+l and rm, t+l measure expected excess returns over the risk free rate. 'y is the 
unconditional measure of market timing ability. The quadratic specification in (4.11) 
implies that during a up (down) market the market timer has a higher (lower) than normal 
fund Beta and the fund performs better than it would otherwise. 
Ferson and Schadt (1996) conditionalise the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model by 
specifying ß; in (4.1) at time t as a linear function of both the expected future market 
excess return and the public information set (in deviations), zt. Substituting for ß; in (4.1) 
with this linear response function yields a model of the form 
(4.12) ri, t+i = ai + e, (rm, tl) + Ci (Zt*rm, t+l)+ Yic[rm, t+1]2 + Ei, t+l 
where the coefficient y; c measures the sensitivity of the manager's Beta to a private market 
timing signal. The term C; (zt*rmt+t) in (4.12) controls for the public information effect, ie 
it captures the part of the quadratic term in (4.11) which is attributable to public 
information variables, Zt. Therefore, in the class of conditional model in (4.12) the 
correlation between fund betas and future market excess returns which is attributable to 
public information variables is not considered to reflect market timing ability. 
4.1.4.2 The Henriksson and Merton Model 
Henriksson and Merton (1981) describe a similar model of market timing. In this model, 
fund managers forecast whether the future market excess return will be positive or 
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negative. In this binary response function, a positive (negative) forecast causes the 
manager to target a higher (lower) beta. From (4.1), ß; may be expressed as a (linear) 
function of a constant plus a dummy variable which takes a value of one (zero) 
corresponding to a positive (negative) market forecast. Subbing such a linear response 
function in place of ßi in (4.1) yields a model of the form 
(4.13) ri, t+l = ai + ei(rm, tl) + Yiuýrm, t+1ý + &i, t+i 
where [rmt+1]+ is defined as max(O, rmt+1)" yip is the unconditional measure of market timing 
ability. (Henriksson and Merton (1981) interpret max(O, rmt+i) as the payoff to an option 
on the market portfolio with a strike price equal to the risk free rate). 
To extend the Henriksson-Merton model to a conditional setting, suppose ß; in 
(4.1) is written as 
(4.14) ßic= bd + YicD + (B'd + 0'D)*zc 
where D=a dummy variable which equals one for a positive forecast of the future market 
excess return and equals zero otherwise. The specification in (4.14) is equivalent to the 
following: if the forecast is positive the manager selects ß,, p = b p+ B'p*zt while if the 
forecast is negative the manager selects ßd = bd + B'd*zt, where forecasts are made 
conditional on zt. Subbing (4.14) in place of ßi in (4.1) yields 
(4.15) ri, t+1 = ai + bd(rm, t+l) + B'd[Zt*rm, t+1l + Tic[rm, t+ll+ + A'[Zt*(rm, t+l)+] + £i, t+l 
where yi, = b, ,p- bd, A= BP - Bd. The null hypothesis of no market timing ability implies 
that'yic and A are zero. The null hypothesis of no selectivity implies a; = 0. 
4.2 Model Selection 
In testing the abnormal performance hypothesis a researcher faces the joint hypothesis 
problem of whether the performance model is the `true' model of equilibrium security 
returns. In this section, many variants of the performance models described above are 
estimated for the data set of UK mutual funds. In all, over 50 models were estimated. Each 
model is estimated for each individual fund. For each model, cross-sectional (across 
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funds) average statistics are presented. It is useful to examine the level and distribution of 
alpha, normality and serial correlation characteristics, the significance of factor loadings 
and model selection diagnostics. Based on these statistics a single best-fit model from 
within each of the classes of (i) unconditional models, (ii) conditional beta models and (iii) 
conditional alpha-beta models is selected for the later bootstrap analysis in chapter 6. One 
model is selected from each class because the bootstrap methodology is computationally 
intensive. 
The model estimation results are reported in Table 4.1 where, in the interests of 
parsimony, a summary selection of findings is presented. Results relate to the full cross- 
section of UK equity mutual funds over the period April 1975 
- 
December 2002, ie over 
all equity sectors including equity income, general equity and small stock funds. Results 
are based on funds with a minimum of 36 observations in order to ensure a high degree of 
precision in the estimation of alpha and other statistics. (This issue is discussed in greater 
detail in chapter 5 on bootstrap methodology). 
4.2.1 Unconditional Models of Performance 
Table 4.1 Panel A shows the estimation results of the unconditional models including the 
CAPM (model 1), Fama and French three-factor (model 2) and Carhart (model 3) along 
with the unconditional market timing models of Treynor-Mazuy (model 4) and 
Henriksson-Merton (model 5). The CAPM indicates that the cross-sectional average alpha 
was 0.001% per month (0.012% annually) indicating that the average mutual fund 
manager outperformed the market by this amount. However, this abnormal performance is 
not statistically significant at 5%. t-statistics presented are averages of absolute values as 
otherwise average t-statistics may centre on zero. In addition, all t-statistics are based on 
Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors. The Fama 
and French and Carhart multi-factor models produce broadly similar performance findings 
where the cross-sectional average alpha in each case is negative at around 
-0.05% per 
month (0.6% annually) but is not statistically significant on average. A lower value of 
alpha may be expected as fund performance is adjusted for additional risk factors. In 
results not shown, the three-factor model indicates that around 3% (16%) of funds yield a 
statistically significant positive (negative) value of alpha by a conventional t-test. The 
finding of negative abnormal performance (on average) is consistent with the findings of 
Blake and Timmermann (1998) who report an even lower average alpha. The difference in 
97 
findings may lie in the minimum 36 observations restriction imposed here which may 
remove some short-lived poor performing funds. This explanation is supported by looking 
at the alpha of a single equal weighted portfolio of all funds (see Table 4.1). In forming 
the equal weighted portfolio the minimum 36 observation restriction was dropped for 
comparison. The equal weighted portfolio alpha is 
-0.072% in the FF 3 factor model. Had 
the restriction been maintained, the average alpha across funds and the equal weighted 
portfolio alpha would be equal. 
The cross sectional average alpha is positive when a market timing factor is 
specified (models 4,5). However, alpha remains statistically insignificant on average. 
In terms of the factor loadings, the t-statistics across all unconditional models 
consistently show the market and size risk factors as statistically significant determinants 
of the cross-sectional variation in fund returns. In model 2,100% and 74% of funds 
indicated a statistically significant t-statistic on these factors respectively. The value risk 
factor, with an average t-statistic of 1.472 is not significant: only 23% of the funds have a 
significant t-statistic on this risk factor. The one-year momentum factor from the Carhart 
specification (model 3) is also insignificant on average 
- 
significant for only 33% of 
funds. 
In chapter 3, section 3.5.4, the construction of the momentum factor was described 
in detail where alternative definitions were discussed based on different stock indices and 
various ranking and holding periods. Here, the alternative definitions were estimated. 
Momentum based the FTSE A All Share Index using an 11 month ranking period and 1 
month holding period was found to be the best determined. This is the same definition as 
used by Carhart (1997). The results presented in Table 4.1 are based on this momentum 
measure. 
In terms of the market timing models (4 and 5), the evidence from Panel A 
indicates that the average fund manager (in fact more than 74% of managers) did not 
possess market timing ability over the period. In none of the models tested are the 
Treynor-Mazuy (1966) and Merton-Henriksson (1981) market timing variables 
significant. 
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4.2.2 Conditional Beta Models of Performance 
Table 4.1 Panel B presents the estimation results of the conditional beta models. 
Following Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Kosowski et al (2004), the public economic 
information variables used to model conditional betas are (i) the yield on a UK one-month 
Tbill, (ii) the slope of the term structure defined as the yield on the UK 10 year gilt minus 
the yield on the one-month Tbill and (iii) the dividend yield on the FT A All Share index. 
For example, model 6 is the Ferson and Schadt (1996) model with the market 
factor loading `conditioned' on the full set of public information variables. Model 7 and 
model 8 are Fama and French three-factor specifications where the market factor loading 
is conditional on the full set of, and a subset of, the public economic information variables 
respectively as indicated. Model I1 is also a Fama and French based factor model but in 
this case all factor loadings are specified as conditional on the dividend yield. In results 
not shown, numerous alternative conditional models were estimated. In particular, these 
included hypotheses that the loadings on the market and size factors may be dynamically 
adjusted by fund managers based on the market dividend yield and/or the term spread. 
The findings in relation to alpha and the distribution of alpha among the 
conditional beta models are very similar to those in Panel A for the unconditional models. 
According to all conditional beta Fama and French and Carhart models the average mutual 
fund manager underperformed. Although, from all models alpha is not significantly 
different from zero. Again, in results not shown, only about 20% of funds yield a 
statistically significant value of alpha at the 5% significance level by a standard t-test. 
Results in relation to an equal weighted portfolio of all funds applied to the multi-factor 
Fama and French and Carhart models show the value of alpha falling. Again, this is in line 
with findings from the unconditional models previously. 
Once again, the conclusions regarding the significance of the factor loadings are 
very similar to those reached with the unconditional factor models, ie the market factor 
and the size factor are consistently statistically significant at 5% across all conditional beta 
models while the value and momentum factors are not, although momentum is significant 
at 10%. It is also noteworthy that among conditional beta models, the public economic 
information instruments are unanimously insignificant for the average fund at the 5% 
significance level and were generally insignificant for more than 75% of the funds. 
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4.2.3 Conditional Alpha-Beta Models of Performance 
Table 4.1 Panel C describes the estimation results of the conditional alpha-beta models. 
This class of model reveals a more mixed picture where average alpha varies between 
positive and negative across models. However, in this class of models, the alpha 
performance measure is still not found to be significantly different from zero. Panel C 
strongly demonstrates, once again, that the full set of conditioning public economic 
information variables are not found to be significant (on average). This was generally 
found to be the case for more than 90% of the funds. 
The unambiguous insignificance of the conditioning variables in the conditional 
beta and conditional alpha-beta models provides strong evidence against conditional 
models as the `true' models of equilibrium security returns. The above tests provide 
evidence that fund managers collectively either (i) do not dynamically adjust the risk 
factor loadings of the portfolio, or at least do not do so successfully or (ii) do not adjust 
the factor loadings in response to the set of public economic information variables 
examined in this study. However, the chosen set of public information instruments here is 
typical of that in the literature. 
Notwithstanding this caveat, in this study a model from within each of the three 
classes of models is selected for the bootstrap analysis. This is done as a means of 
examining the robustness of the bootstrap findings across alternative models of 
equilibrium returns. However, owing to the insignificance of the conditional public 
information variables, bootstrap results from the conditional models should be treated with 
caution and perhaps given less weight than the better fit unconditional models. 
4.2.4 Selecting Representative Models of Performance 
The key model selection metrics are the statistical significance of the individual 
parameters and the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). The SIC trades off a reduction 
in a model's residual sum of squares for a parsimonious best-fit model and indicates that 
the model with the lowest SIC should be selected. In Table 4.1, the cross-sectional average 
(across funds) SIC is shown for each model. 
Among unconditional models in Panel A, the three-factor Fama and French and 
four-factor Carhart specifications, with SIC measures of 1.328 and 1.316 respectively, 
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provide the best fit. Although the four-factor model yields a slightly lower SIC, the 
momentum factor is statistically significant for only 33% of the funds. Consequently, in 
order to avoid a possible bias arising from misspecification, in this study the three-factor 
model is selected as the baseline model for the bootstrap analysis. However, as a test of 
robustness the bootstrap results will also be described later for a two-factor (market and 
size risk) and four-factor unconditional model. 
Panel B indicates that model 8, the three-factor Fama and French model with the 
market factor loading conditioned on the market dividend yield, generates the lowest SIC 
value of 1.365. Finally, among the conditional alpha-beta models in Panel C, model 14 
with the lowest SIC of 1.392 is suggested. However, model 14 is very similar to model 8 
where alpha is also specified as conditional on the dividend yield. Given the similarity 
between model 8 and model 14, in the interests of presenting results from a wider range of 
specifications model 15 is instead selected from among the conditional alpha-beta models 
in Panel C. Model 15, which also has a relatively low SIC value of 1.432, is also a three- 
factor Fama and French model where all three factor loadings are time varying. This 
conditional specification hypothesizes that the fund manager dynamically modifies the 
portfolio's sensitivity to the three risk factors based on a signal provided by the market 
dividend yield. 
Therefore, in this study model 2, model 8 and model 15 are selected as 
representative models from within each of the three classes of models above for the 
bootstrap analysis to follow in chapter 6. 
Figures 4.1,4.2 and 4.3 show histograms of the cross-sectional distributions of alpha from 
models 2,8 and 15 respectively. All models selected indicate a negative average alpha. 
However, of key importance for this study (and for investors) is the relatively large cross- 
sectional standard deviations of the alpha estimates which is around 0.26% p. m. (3.1% 
p. a. ), for the unconditional and conditional-beta models and somewhat larger at 0.75% 
p. m. for the conditional alpha-beta model. (Refer to Panels A, B& C). This implies that 
the extreme tails of the distribution of abnormal performance may contain a substantial 
number of funds. This is important since investors are more interested in holding funds in 
the right tail of the performance distribution and avoiding those in the extreme left tail, 
than they are in the average fund's performance. 
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4.2.5 Non-normality and Serial Correlation 
Table 4.1 also reports the percentage of funds which reject the null hypotheses of (i) 
normality and (ii) serial correlation in the regression residuals at 5% by a Bera-Jarque test 
and LM test up to 6 lags respectively. In the case of all models the normality assumption 
is rejected for around 64% of the mutual funds. It is this finding which largely motivates 
the use of the bootstrap technique as non-normal residuals suggests that the alpha 
estimates themselves are also non-normally distributed which in turn invalidates the use 
of standard t-tests and F-tests and questions the reliability of past research which draws 
inferences based on these tests. 
The LM test statistics in each panel suggest that in the case of all models a sizeable 
proportion (around 42%) of mutual fund exhibit serial correlation of order one. This has 
implications for the bootstrap methodology. Firstly, it is important to examine a 
modification of the bootstrap procedure to preserve the information content in the serial 
correlation in order that the bootstrap simulations mimic the original fund return 
generating process as closely as possible. Secondly, the use of Newey-West 
autocorrelation adjusted t-statistics, as in this study, should incorporate the correct order of 
serial correlation. 
This concludes the description of the model selection process. Chapter 5 describes 
the bootstrap methodology. 
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Table 4.1. Model Selection: Cross-Sectional Results of Model Estimations. 
Table 4.1 presents results from the estimation of the performance models using all mutual funds. Panel A relates to 
unconditional models, Panel B relates to conditional Beta models while Panel C relates to conditional Alpha-Beta 
models. T-statistics are based on Newey-West heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors. (t- 
statistics are cross sectional averages of the absolute value t-statistics). Also shown are statistics on the percentage of 
funds which (i) reject normality among the residuals by a Jarque-Bera test at 5% and (ii) reject a null hypothesis of no 
serial correlation among residuals at lags 1 and 6 by a LM test at 5%. The Schwartz Information Criterion is also 
presented. Also shown is alpha and its t-statistic for an equal weighted portfolio of all mutual funds. All figures 
shown are cross-sectional averages. Funds with at least 36 observations are used. 
Panel A: Uncond itional Factor Model s 
1 2 3 4 5 
Model CAPM FF Carhart TM MII 
Regression Coefficients 
Average Alpha (percent per month) 0.001 
-0.050 -0.054 0.128 0.273 
t-statistic 1.033 1.214 1.288 1.201 1.268 
Standard Deviation of Alpha 0.289 0.261 0.268 0.400 0.528 
Unconditional Betas 
(t-statistics in parentheses) rmt 0.886 (22.229) 
0.914 
(25.396) 
0.916 
(25.847) 
0.870 
(21.814) 
0.954 
(15.353) 
SMB 0.284 
(4.887) 
0.283 
(5.043) 
HML 
-0.024 (1.472) -0.021 (1.329) 
PRIYR 0.008 
(1.591) 
Market Timing Measures 
Treynor-Mazuy 
-0.006 (1.453) 
Henriksson-Merton 
-0.159 (1.245) 
Model Selection Criteria 
Adjusted R-s uare 0.728 0.811 0.819 0.734 0.732 
SIC 1.560 1.328 1.316 1.577 1.581 
Rejection of Normality % of funds 64 64 59 64 64 
LM(I) statistic % of Funds 44 39 40 43 43 
LM(6) statistic (% of Funds) 34 33 36 36 35 
Equal Weighted Portfolio 
Alpha 0.028 
-0.072 -0.080 0.167 0.355 
t-statistic 0.391 
-1.661 -1.793 2.213 3.392 
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Table 4.1 continued, Panel B: Conditional Beta Models 
6 7 8 9 10 11 
Model FS FF(l) FF(2) Carhart TM FF(3) 
Regression Coefficients 
Average Alpha (percent per month) 0.062 
-0.022 -0.031 -0.014 0.147 -0.035 
t-statistic 1.074 1.190 1.174 1.230 1.226 1.205 
Standard Deviation of Alpha 0.333 0.281 0.261 0.282 0.405 0.267 
Unconditional Betas 
(t-statistics in parentheses) rmr 0.374 (15.649) 
0.855 
(17.163) 
0.863 
(21.193) 
0.844 
(16.438) 
0.401 
(15.510) 
0.855 
(21.097) 
SMB 0.286 
(4.935) 
0.285 
(4.905) 
0.280 
(4.982) 
0.267 
(4.038) 
HML 
-0.023 (1.449) -0.023 (1.451) -0.020 (1.379) 
0.010 
(1.224) 
PR1YR 0.0007 
(1.693) 
Market Timing Measures 
Treynor-Mazuy Z rmr 
-0.004 (1.156) 
Conditioning Variables, Zt_1 
zl, 
_1* rm, , 
Z1: One month rate -0.782 (1.225) 
0.078 
(1.279) 
0.047 
(1.365) -0.802 (1.139) 
z2, 
_1* 
rm, 
, 
Z2: Term Spread -0.351 (1.146) 
0.155 
(1.220) 
0.214 
(1.262) -0.450 1.133 
z3,. 1 * rm, , Z3: Dividend Yield 
-0.168 
1.337 
-0.067 (1.290) -0.048 (1.408) -0.070 (1.294) -0.137 (1.112) -0.052 (1.476) 
z3,. 1 * SMB, 0.001 (1.482) 
z3, 
_1 
*HMLI 0.030 
1.051 
Model Selection Criteria 
Adjusted R-s uare 0.738 0.816 0.812 0.829 0.741 0.816 
Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC) 1.619 1.410 1.365 1.371 1.642 1.406 
Rejection of Normality (% of funds 64 63 64 57 64 63 
LM(I) statistic (% of Funds) 44 42 40 41 45 42 
LM(6) statistic (% of Funds) 37 39 35 39 39 37 
Equal Wei hted Portfolio 
AI ha 0.069 
-0.111 -0.112 -0.048 0.153 -0.111 
t-statistic 0.962 
-2.455 -2.464 -1.113 2.050 -2.508 
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Table 4.1 continued, Panel C: Conditional Alpha-Beta Models 
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Model FS FF(I) FF(2) FF(3) FF(4) FF(5) Carhart 
Re ression Coefficients 
Average Alpha (percent per. month) 
-0.227 0.458 -0.093 -0.109 0.315 0.027 0.446 
t-statistic 0.979 1.149 1.180 1.187 1.148 1.103 1.156 
Standard Deviation of Alpha 4.332 4.902 0.693 0.754 2.411 0.709 4.553 
Unconditional Betas 
(t-statistics in parentheses) rmt 0.365 
(15.761) 
0.833 
(17.145) 
0.863 
(21.230) 
0.849 
(21.068) 
0.997 
(18.174) 
0.914 
(21.387) 
0.836 
(16.407) 
SMB 0.282 
(4.878) 
0.284 
(4.903) 
0.257 
(4.043) 
0.290 
(5.026) 
0.253 
(4.086) 
0.277 
(4.930) 
HML 
-0.022 (1.449) -0.024 (1.449) 
0.016 
(1.207) -0.024 (1.452) 
0.020 
(1.288) -0.020 (1.371) 
PR 1 YR 
-0.001 (1.685) 
Conditioning Variables, Z, 
_1 
zlt., * rm, 
, 
ZI: One month rate -0.951 (1.261) -0.008 (1.319) 
0.169 
(1.335) -0.019 (1.231) -0.004 (1.403) 
z2,. 1* rm, , Z2: Term Spread 
-0.563 (1.185) 
0.058 
(1.265) 
0.093 
(1.354) 
0.070 
(1.307) 
Z3,., * rm, 
, 
Z3: Dividend Yield -0.151 (1.333) -0.064 (1.306) -0.048 (1.426) -0.055 (1.496) -0.066 (1.302) 
z3, 
_, 
*SMB, 
-0.002 
1.513 
z3, 
_, 
*HMLt 0.033 
1.044 
z1,., *SMB, 
-0.031 (1.529) 
zl, 
_, 
*HMLt 0.159 
(1.001 
zlt_, 2.964 
(1.267) 
2.271 
(1.040) 
1.009 
(0.975) 
0.198 
(0.927) 
2.193 
(1.049) 
z2, 
_1 
4.669 
(1.410) 
2.300 
(1.001) 
0.957 
(0.953) 
2.198 
(0.988) 
z3,., 
-0.819 (1.416) 
0.200 
(1.042) -0.071 (1.000) -0.073 (1.037) -0.184 (1.099) 
Model Selection Criteria 
Adjusted R-s uare 0.742 0.818 0.813 0.818 0.815 0.814 0.830 
Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC) 1.697 1.497 1.392 1.432 1.451 1.448 1.457 
Rejection of Normality (% of funds) 61 61 63 62 63 64 54 
LM(l) statistic (% of Funds) 45 47 41 44 45 44 47 
LM(6) statistic (% of Funds) 40 45 35 39 42 41 45 
Equal Weighted Portfolio 
Alpha 0.022 
-0.122 -0.107 -0.107 -0.117 -0.116 -0.060 
t-statistic 0.313 
-2.652 -2.466 -2.517 -2.652 -2.589 -1.252 
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Figure 4.1: Cross-Sectional Alpha, Unconditional Model 
Histogram of Actual Alpha: Unconditional Model 
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Figure 4.2: Cross-Sectional Alpha, Conditional Beta Model 
Histogram of Actual Alpha: Conditional Beta Model 
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Figure 4.3 Cross-Sectional Alpha, Conditional Alpha-Beta Model 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE BOOTSTRAP METHODOLOGY: 
SKILL VERSUS LUCK IN PERFORMANCE 
This chapter describes the bootstrap methodology used in this study to distinguish skill 
from luck in fund performance. In chapter 4 many models of security returns and tests of 
fund abnormal performance were discussed. Inferences regarding fund abnormal 
performance are usually based on t-tests of the significance of measures such as alpha 
(Jensen's alpha, Carhart's alpha etc). There are two difficulties with this approach. 
First, for their statistical validity these tests require that the alpha measure be 
normally distributed. However, as was seen in chapter 4 the residuals from numerous 
performance models applied to the funds are highly non-normal for around 60% of the 
mutual funds under investigation in this study. Hence, the vector of model random 
disturbances may be poorly approximated by multivariate normality and in turn the 
distribution of alpha may not in fact be normal as required. Furthermore, as will be seen in 
chapter 6, high variance non-normal residuals are particularly prevalent in the top and 
bottom performing funds and it is these funds which are of most interest to investors. 
There are a number of possible explanations as to why non-normal security returns can 
remain at the portfolio (mutual fund) level. As noted by Kosowski et at (2004), co- 
skewness of individual constituent non-normal security returns may not be diversified 
away in a fund'. Also, funds often hold derivatives to hedge return outcomes which may 
result in a non-normal return distribution. The bootstrap methodology in this study is used 
to control for this non-normality in fund returns. 
Second, in a large universe of funds, 842 in this study, there are likely to be some 
funds that perform well (badly), simply due to good (bad) luck. Suppose that all funds 
have no stock picking ability (i. e. Ho: a, =0 for i=1,2, 
..., 
n), each fund's `true' alpha 
is normally distributed and each fund has a different but known standard deviation a,. 
Suppose we are interested in the performance of the best fund. If we `replay history' just 
1 The central limit theorem implies that a large, well diversified and equal weighted portfolio of non- 
normally distributed securities will approximate normality. However, many funds do not have these 
characteristics. 
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for the `best fund', where we impose a, =0 (here i= best fund) but `luck' is represented 
by the normal distribution with known standard deviation or,, we would sample a different 
estimate of alpha. Of course there is a high probability that we sample a value of alpha 
close to zero, but `luck' implies that we may sample a value for alpha which is in the 
extreme tails of the distribution. Similarly, when we resample the alpha for all the other n- 
1 funds, all with a, =0 (but with different a, ), it is quite conceivable that the second or 
third etc. ranked fund in the ex post data, now has the highest alpha. This would hold a 
fortiori if the distributions of the second, or third, etc. ranked funds have relatively large 
values of a,. 
From this single `replay of history', with a, =0 across all funds, we have 
(a, "), a2'),... a, (, ») from which we choose the largest value am'; 
x. 
So, taking the `luck 
distribution' across all funds into consideration (with different a, 's), we now have one 
value amlax for the best fund which arises purely due to sampling variability or luck. 
However, by repeating the above (B-times) and each time choosing a(k) (for k=1,2, 
..., 
B trials) we can obtain the complete distribution of am, 
x under the null of no 
outperformance, which is denoted as f (am, x) here. 
Note that the distribution f (am, X) uses the information about `luck' represented 
by all the funds and not just the `luck' encountered by the `best fund' in the ex-post 
ranking. This is a key difference between this study and many earlier studies. It is 
important to measure the performance distribution of the `best fund' not just by re- 
sampling from the distribution of the best fund ex-post, since this is a single realization of 
`luck' for one particular fund. Clearly, re-running history for just the ex-post best fund 
ignores the other possible distributions of luck (here just the different standard deviations) 
encountered by all other funds 
- 
these other `luck distributions' provide highly valuable 
and relevant information. 
Having obtained the `luck distribution', it is possible to compare the best fund's 
actual ex post performance given by its estimated &maz against the `luck distribution' for 
the best fund, f (am. ) 
. 
If ämax exceeds the 5% right tail cut off point in f (am, X), one 
can reject the null hypothesis that the performance of the best fund is attributable to luck. 
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Above, one could have chosen any fund (e. g. the 2nd best fund) on which to base 
the `luck distribution'. So it is possible to compare the actual ex post ranking for any 
chosen fund against its luck distribution and separate luck from skill, for all individual 
funds in the sample. 
Under the null of no out-performance, this procedure does not assume the 
distribution of alpha for each fund is normal and each fund's alpha can in principal take 
on any distribution. The distribution for each fund's `luck' is represented by the empirical 
distribution observed in the historic data and this distribution can be different for each 
fund. Hence the distribution under the null f (amax) 
, 
encapsulates all of the different 
individual fund's luck distributions (and in a multivariate context this cannot be derived 
analytically from the theory of order statistics). 
As alluded to above, investors are particularly interested in funds in the tails of the 
performance distribution, such as the best fund, the second best fund, and so on. This 
study finds below that the empirical `luck distribution' of alpha for these funds are highly 
non-normal, thus invalidating the usual test statistics. This motivates the use of the cross- 
section bootstrap to ascertain whether the `outstanding' or `abysmal' performance of `tail 
funds' is due to either, good or bad skill or good or bad luck, respectively. 
5.1 Description of the Steps in the Bootstrap Procedure2 
Consider in general an OLS estimated model of equilibrium returns of the form 
(5.1) r =[X, ]b, +e 
where rtt =a (TT x 1) vector of excess returns over the risk free rate for fund i, Xt =a (Ti x 
k) matrix of observations on a constant and k-1 risk factors, e =a vector of OLS residuals 
while b, =a (k x 1) vector of ä, and the estimated factor loadings. The bootstrap 
methodology is as follows: The performance measurement model is first estimated by 
OLS for each fund in the sample. Let N denote the number of funds in the sample. For 
2 For a general discussion of bootstrap methodologies and their properties see Efron and Tibshirani (1993). 
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each fund, the estimated factor loadings and OLS residuals, b, and e 
, 
are saved. In the 
next step, for each fund i, a random sample of residuals of size Ti is drawn (with 
replacement) from e 
. 
For each fund, using the estimated factor loadings from step one 
and the original chronological ordering of Xt and setting ä, =0 under the null hypothesis 
of no abnormal performance, bootstrap fitted returns, i, 
, 
are constructed. By construction, 
for these bootstrapped simulated returns each fund has `true' abnormal performance of 
zero. Using these bootstrap fitted returns, the performance measurement model is re- 
estimated and a bootstrap estimate of abnormal performance under the imposed null 
hypothesis is obtained, ie ä,. For each fund, ä, represents random sampling variation 
around a true value of zero. This simulation process is repeated B times for each of the N 
funds, where B denotes the number of bootstrap simulations. (In this study, results are 
reported for B=1,000, although higher values of B were tested). The bootstrap estimates 
of performance may be gathered in a matrix of dimension NxB as follows. 
blb, 2 b, B 
al al ..... al 
6,1 
-b, 2 b, B a2 a2 
..... 
a2 
L b, l 
-b, 2 bB aN aN 
..... 
GLN 
The first column of this bootstrap matrix contains the bootstrap estimates of abnormal 
performance under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance for each fund i=1, 
2 
... 
N from the first bootstrap simulation. The second column of the matrix contains the 
estimates from the second bootstrap simulation for each fund and so on. The first row of 
this bootstrap matrix contains the B (or 1,000) bootstrap estimates of alpha under the null 
for the first fund. The second row contains the B bootstrap estimates for the second fund 
and so on. 
The next step is to sort each column of this bootstrap matrix from highest to 
lowest. The first row of this sorted bootstrap matrix now contains the highest values of ä, 
from the B bootstrap simulations of each of the funds, under the null hypothesis where in 
all cases the true value of a; is known to be zero. The second row contains the second 
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highest values of ä, from the B bootstrap simulations of each of the funds. The last row 
contains the lowest values of ä, from the B bootstrap simulations of each of the funds. 
The B elements of the first row of this sorted bootstrap matrix represent the 
distribution of the highest possible performance which is simply due to random sampling 
variation or chance as in fact, by construction, there is no true abnormal performance. This 
distribution provides an estimate of, or proxy for, luck for the extreme top performance. 
The second row of this sorted matrix represents the distribution of the second highest 
possible performance which is simply due to chance or luck. The last row of this matrix 
represents the distribution of worst possible performance which is due to random sampling 
variation in the performance measure or bad luck. Each row of this sorted bootstrap matrix 
provides a distribution of performance due to luck at each point or percentile in the 
performance distribution from extreme best performer to extreme worst performer. 
Having already estimated the actual or unmodified alpha performance measures 
for each of the N funds in the sample, ä,, the next step is to rank these funds by ä, from 
highest to lowest. One can then compare the actual highest ranked ä, against the 
distribution of highest performance under the null hypothesis (the first row of the sorted 
bootstrap matrix above) to evaluate whether this fund's performance is superior to random 
sampling variation or luck at that point in the performance distribution, ie does this fund 
possess genuine stock picking ability to beat luck? Similarly, the second highest ä, fund 
can be compared against the bootstrap luck distribution at the second highest point in the 
performance distribution (the second row of the sorted bootstrap matrix above) to evaluate 
whether it possesses genuine stock picking ability. The worst actual a, fund may be 
compared against the last row of the sorted bootstrap matrix above to assess whether its 
performance is worse than bad luck. 
The sorted bootstrap matrix enables the calculation of p values in respect of 
whether funds perform better (or worse) than good (bad luck). The probability that the 
best actual fund alpha, ie highest ä,, represents performance better than mere good luck 
may be estimated as the percentage of bootstrap alphas, ä, at the highest point in the 
performance distribution under the null, (ie the first row of the sorted bootstrap matrix) 
which exceed the highest ä, 
. 
Similarly, the probability that the worst actual fund alpha 
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performs worse than bad luck is the percentage of bootstrap alphas at the lowest point in 
the performance distribution (ie the last row of the sorted bootstrap matrix) which are 
lower than the lowest ranked actual fund alpha. Such comparisons between actual ranked 
fund alphas and bootstrap distributions of alpha under the null hypothesis of zero 
abnormal performance can be made at all points and percentiles of the performance 
distribution from the highest to lowest ranked funds. 
As an alternative interpretation or use of the matrix of bootstrap alphas under the 
null, one can (arbitrarily) select a level of performance, good or bad, and then identify how 
many funds in the sample one would expect to achieve this level of performance by 
chance alone. This can then be compared with how many funds actually achieve or exceed 
this performance. 
5.2 The t-statistics of Alpha as the Measure of Performance 
Equally, we can employ the t-statistic of alpha, rather than alpha itself, as the measure of 
fund performance and repeat the bootstrap methodology exactly as above. This is, we can 
construct the bootstrap distribution of the t-statistic of alpha under the null hypothesis of 
zero abnormal performance, Ho: ai = 0, and compare this bootstrap distribution to the 
actual ranked t-statistics of alpha. Using t-statistics has an added advantage: the alphas of 
funds with few observations may be estimated with high standard error. This may generate 
outlier alphas in the sample. There is a risk that these funds will disproportionately occupy 
the extreme tails of the actual and bootstrapped alpha distributions. The t-statistic provides 
a correction by scaling alpha by its estimated precision, ie its standard error. Therefore, the 
distribution of bootstrapped t-statistics has superior statistical properties and more reliably 
identifies talented fund managers. This is especially the case in the extreme ends of the 
performance distribution 
- 
the areas of particular interest. In this study, the t-statistic is 
adopted as the fund performance measure. (see Mamaysky, Spiegel and Zhang 2004) for 
discussion of estimation error in alpha). 
In general, if 0;, a parameter of interest, is a pivotal statistic, ie one that is 
independent of `nuisance' parameters such as regression error variance, an Edgeworth 
expansion provides a refined approximation to the asymptotic probability distribution 
function of 'Ti. [ 0, (C; ) 
- 
0, (C; )], where C; is the population cumulative distribution 
function of the returns data of fund i, r;, ti is the empirical distribution of same and 0, (C; ) 
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is an estimated performance statistic. In turn the bootstrap method provides a close 
approximation to the Edgeworth expansion. In this study, fund abnormal performance as 
measured by ä, is not a pivotal statistic. However, the t-statistic of alpha is a pivotal 
statistic. (See Hall 1992, Kosowski et at 2004 for further discussion). 
5.3 A Restriction to Funds With a Minimum Number of Observations 
As indicated, funds with few observations may have higher sampling variability in the 
alpha estimate. This could widen the tails of the bootstrap distribution making it more 
difficult for funds to beat luck. While using the t-statistic of alpha mitigates this potential 
problem it may also be advisable to restrict the analysis to funds with a minimum number 
of observations. In this study a minimum fund history of 3 years (36 observations) is 
imposed for a fund to be included in the analysis. However, while statistically 
advantageous, this may induce a look-ahead bias by restricting the entire analysis to funds 
which have been skilled (or lucky) enough to survive for at least 3 years. Because using 
the t-statistic of alpha rather than alpha as the performance measure already mitigates the 
problem, in this study the restriction is set at 36 observations rather than say 60 or higher 
in order to minimize the probability of inducing a look-ahead bias. To examine the 
significance of this issue, the sensitivity of the bootstrap results in this study are tested for 
a number of alternative minimum observations restrictions. 
On a point of clarity, note that survivorship bias arises from omitting nonsurviving 
funds and therefore is a property of the sample. Look-ahead bias arises by requiring funds 
to have existed for a minimum period of time and as such is a property of the 
methodology. 
Accurate modeling of the tails of the performance distribution is the central 
purpose behind the bootstrap methodology here and is an important strength of this study. 
A further strength is the large number of funds in the sample. In particular, this allows for 
improved estimation of the sampling distributions of performance in the tails. For 
example, a study with relatively few ex post high and low ranked funds risks having 
slimmer tails in the bootstrapped distribution of performance which may in turn lead to 
unreliably low p values. This point underpins the importance of including the nonsurvivor 
class of funds in the analysis for more accurate modeling of the left tail of performance. If 
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nonsurvivor funds have closed due to poor performance, the increased number of poor 
funds allows for a more accurate picture of the left tail of the bootstrapped distribution. 
5.4 Extensions of the Bootstrap Methodology 
The methodology outlined above is the `baseline' methodology in this study and is 
implemented in chapter 6. However, the bootstrap procedure can also be modified to 
incorporate additional fund return characteristics such as serial correlation, 
heteroscedasticity or cross-sectional (across funds) correlations among fund regression 
residuals. Where such features are present, refinements to the bootstrap procedure help to 
retain this information in the construction of the bootstrap distributions. This is important 
in order to mimic the underlying `true' return generating process as closely as possible. 
Furthermore, alternative bootstrap procedures may be applied in which we randomly 
resample not only the residuals but also the risk factors. These alternative bootstrap 
procedures are important as the variability of the bootstrap estimates of alpha under the 
null hypothesis may be sensitive to the choice of procedure. These extensions of the 
bootstrap procedure are now discussed. As a sensitivity analysis these extensions to the 
bootstrap procedure are also implemented in chapter 6 and results are compared with the 
baseline procedure. 
5.4.1 Serial Correlation 
Residual serial correlation indicates that the underlying distributions of model random 
errors in the data generating process may not be independently (or identically) distributed. 
However, a bootstrap residual re-sampling procedure which randomly selects residuals 
`one-at-a-time' makes this assumption. Hence such a bootstrap procedure fails to 
incorporate possibly valuable information content in the residuals as to the nature of the 
`true' sampling mechanism from which returns are generated and as such may fail to 
mimic the return generating process as closely as possible. In this study it is found that 
around 40% of the sample of mutual funds exhibit serial correlation by a Lagrange 
Multiplier test (see chapter 4). To incorporate this residual serial dependence, the 
bootstrap procedure should draw residuals (with replacement) in block lengths 
corresponding to the suspected order of serial correlation. For example, for serial 
correlation of order 1, residuals should be randomly drawn in chronological pairs, for 
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serial correlation of order 2, residuals should be randomly drawn in chronological triplets 
etc. 
5.4.2 Newey-West Adjusted Standard Errors 
Due to the evidence of serial correlation, throughout this study all t-statistics are calculated 
based on Newey-West autocorrelation (and heteroscedasticity) adjusted standard errors. 
These include the actual (unmodified) t-statistics of alpha and the t-statistics of alpha 
calculated under the null hypothesis in the bootstrap procedure. For conclusions to be 
robust it is necessary to examine whether the estimated bootstrap p values are sensitive to 
the order of autocorrelation in the Newey-West adjustment. 
5.4.3 Cross-Sectional Dependence 
Fund regression residuals may provide evidence of cross-sectional correlations, ie 
cov(cj, ej) : t- 0 for funds i and j, where c and sj are vectors of disturbances or the 
idiosyncratic components of fund returns. Such correlations may arise from a 
misspecification in the performance model which is common to many funds and could be 
even more pronounced among funds which have similar stock holdings due to herding 
behaviour. Again, these cross-fund correlations may contain significant information about 
the true return generating process among funds and this information should be retained by 
the bootstrap procedure. The bootstrap procedure described up to now assumes 
independence among residuals across funds. To refine the bootstrap procedure to preserve 
cross-sectional correlations among residuals involves ensuring that within each simulation 
the order in which residuals are randomly drawn is the same for each fund, ie the random 
time ordering of residuals varies across simulations but within a simulation it is constant 
across funds. This will be denoted as a `cross-sectional bootstrap'. This bootstrap 
refinement addresses the estimation of cross-sectional correlations in regression residuals 
and avoids estimating a large covariance matrix of these residuals, which would otherwise 
be necessary in order to characterize the joint distribution of residuals and performance 
estimates. 
However, this refinement presents a difficulty. The sample of funds do not exist 
contemporaneously, ie some funds have closed before others were opened. Thus, ensuring 
that the order in which residuals are randomly drawn is the same for each fund may 
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involve selecting residuals for many funds at time periods when these funds do not exist. 
One solution is to select a sub-sample period during which a sub-sample of funds have a 
complete return history. Because this sub-sample of funds all exist at the same time, it is 
possible to implement a cross-sectional bootstrap procedure. A caveat applies with regards 
to this approach: (i) this restriction would severely reduce the number of funds which 
could be selected for the analysis, (ii) it would limit the analysis to a shorter sample period 
and (iii) it could potentially impose a survivorship bias by excluding possibly poorer 
performing funds which have died during the sub-period. However, of interest here is to 
determine whether there is consistency in findings between the baseline and cross- 
sectional bootstrap procedures and so, as a sensitivity analysis, both procedures are 
applied to a sub-sample of funds in a sub-period. 
Model misspecification is a likely cause of any cross-fund residual correlation. 
However, in this study many alternative equilibrium models of performance are tested and 
hence results are unlikely to be model specific. Kosowski et al (2004) also implement a 
cross-sectional bootstrap technique but the authors report that this did not alter 
conclusions. 
5.4.4 Alternative Bootstrap Procedures 
The baseline bootstrap procedure is a `residual-only' resampling, ie only the residuals are 
resampled in each of the bootstrap simulations. A `factor-residual' bootstrap resampling 
procedure may also be applied in which the residual resampling procedure is augmented 
with (i) factor returns that are resampled independently of the residuals or (ii) factor 
returns and residuals that are resampled together in pairs thus observing the same time 
series pairings as observed in the actual data. 
To illustrate the alternative bootstrap techniques, consider again (5.1) as follows: 
(S. 1) Ti, = [x, it, +e 
In case 1, `residual-only' resampling, residuals are randomly drawn (with replacement) 
from e;, while X, is unaltered from its original chronological time ordering, ie X, is 
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nonstochastic in repeated sampling. In this case, if for a given fund i the variance of e is 
small (of course e always has a mean of zero) then the resulting variability in ä, over B= 
1,000 bootstrap simulations will also be relatively small. As will be seen in the discussion 
of bootstrap results (chapter 6), the variance of fund regression residuals is larger for funds 
at both extreme ends of the performance distribution but this variance falls as one moves 
even slightly closer towards the centre of the distribution, i. e. a large proportion of funds 
have a relatively low variance of residuals and consequently these funds are likely to 
produce relatively low sampling variation in the bootstrap coefficient estimates (including 
alpha) over 1,000 simulations. 
In case 2, an alternative resampling procedure is to augment the random 
resampling from e in (5.1) by also independently resampling from X; t, ie X; t is stochastic 
in repeated sampling. In this study this is denoted `independent factor-residual' 
resampling. Resampling factor returns as well as residuals may allow for greater sampling 
variation in the bootstrap coefficient estimates (including alpha) over the 1,000 
simulations. Furthermore, within this factor-residual resampling technique, consideration 
must also be given to a `cross-sectional factor-residual' bootstrap. In this procedure, 
within each bootstrap simulation both factors and residuals are independently resampled 
but in addition, across funds, the same realized time index of factors and the same realized 
time index of residuals is maintained, i. e. the random time ordering of factors and 
residuals vary across simulations but within a simulation they are constant across funds. 
This cross-sectional factor-residual bootstrap controls for non-normality in residuals that 
may have a factor component, for example a market component, which gives rise to co- 
skewness in returns across funds. 
In case 3, a further alternative is to randomly resample from e and X; t in pairs, ie 
maintaining the same random time sequence from both in each one of the 1,000 draws. 
This procedure captures possible heteroscedastic features in the underlying return 
generating process, ie heteroscedastic errors which are conditional on a factor. In this 
study, this procedure is denoted ` pairwise factor-residual' resampling. However, in such a 
procedure the only source of sampling variation in the bootstrap coefficient estimates over 
1,000 simulations lies in the sampling with replacement, ie the possibility that the same 
time pairing from [ e 
, 
X; t] could be drawn more than once. (If sampling, of size Ti, was 
carried out without replacement then the bootstrap coefficients, including alpha, would be 
118 
identical over all simulations). Therefore, it is possible that within this case 3 bootstrap 
procedure one may obtain a relatively low sampling variation in the bootstrap coefficient 
estimates, including alpha, over the 1,000 simulations. Similar to case 2 above, one may 
also implement a `cross-sectional pairwise factor-residual' resampling procedure in which 
the realized time index of pairwise factor-residual draws is kept constant across funds 
within each of the 1,000 simulations. 
It is important to consider each of these alternatives for carrying out the bootstrap 
methodology as the variability in the bootstrap alphas, and consequently the p values, may 
be sensitive to the chosen procedures. 
5.5 The Power of the Bootstrap Methodology 
In order to examine the power of the bootstrap methodology to identify true performance 
in the data, Kosowski et at (2004) carry out a Monte Carlo analysis of the bootstrap 
procedure. 
The authors generate artificial return data according to a singe factor model: 
(5.2) r,, = a, + b, [X, ]+e,, ,i=1,2, .... N, t=1, .. . Ti 
Xt 
- 
N(O, a,, 2), E; t - N(O, aE2). 
where N and T; correspond to the number of funds and life spans of funds as found in the 
actual data. The study carries out 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations which assume a normally 
distributed factor and fund random disturbance terms. In the Monte Carlo analysis 
residuals are assumed to be uncorrelated across funds. To examine the properties and 
power of the bootstrap procedure, Kosowski et al impose true performance levels on the 
artificially generated fund returns, in separate Monte Carlo simulations, of (i) a, = 
-0.2, (ii) 
a; = 
-0.02, (iii) a; = 0, (iv) a, = +0.02, (v) a1= +0.2. 
Kosowski et al find that under each of the five performance scenarios, the 
bootstrap results are in accordance with the performance imposed on the data. For 
example, with the `true' a; set equal to 0.2 for all funds, the bootstrap p values of funds 
with high estimated alphas all strongly indicate that these funds beat luck while the p 
values of funds with low estimated alphas are shown to be unlucky. In the scenario where 
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the true a; is set equal to zero for all funds, the bootstrap p values for each point in the 
performance distribution are all approximately 0.5, as they should be under the set up. 
These Monte Carlo findings support the bootstrap methodology as a means of correctly 
identifying outperformance and underperformance in the data. 
5.6 Bootstrap Analysis of Subgroups of Mutual Funds 
Also of interest is to examine whether stock picking skills differ between subcategories of 
funds. For example, is it affected by (i) the investment objective of the fund, (ii) possible 
informational asymmetries arising from where the fund is domiciled or (iii) the length of 
fund history. This can be examined by applying the bootstrap procedure separately to the 
different subgroups of funds in each case. For example, in the case of fund investment 
objectives it is interesting to examine whether the evidence of outperformance among 
growth stock funds in the US (Chen et al, 2000) transfers to the UK or to test the 
hypothesis that the market for small stocks is less efficient. 
When the bootstrap methodology is applied separately to subcategories of funds, 
the bootstrap distribution of performance, ie the estimate of luck, is based only on a more 
homogenous peer group or risk group of funds. This further helps to control for cross- 
sectional risk characteristics which may not be adequately captured by the performance 
model. 
This concludes the discussion on the bootstrap methodology. In chapter 6 the 
methodology and the various refinements and extensions described above are 
implemented and results reported. 
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CHAPTER 6 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF BOOTSTRAP ANALYSIS 
In chapter 5 the `baseline' bootstrap methodology of this study, along with numerous 
extensions of this methodology, were described in detail. In chapter 6 these methodologies 
are implemented and results discussed. All tables and graphs of results are presented 
collectively at the end of, rather than throughout, the chapter. 
6.1 All Investment Objectives 
Table 6.1 presents the bootstrap performance statistics for the full sample of UK equity 
mutual funds, ie including funds of all investment objectives and all locations. In chapter 
4, three representative models were selected for the bootstrap analysis. These were a 
Fama and French based (i) unconditional model, (ii) conditional beta model and (iii) 
conditional alpha-beta model. In Table 6.1, Panels A, B and C report the bootstrap 
findings for these models respectively. For ease of presentation results are reported for 
selected points in the cross-sectional distribution of performance as indicated. The first 
row in each panel shows alpha, measured in percent per month. The second row in each 
panel presents "t-alpha", the corresponding t-statistic of the alpha in row 1. Row 3 ("t- 
stat") presents the t-statistics of alpha ranked from lowest to highest. Throughout this 
chapter the t-statistic of alpha is employed as the performance measure and the bootstrap 
findings are discussed in terms of the p values of the t-statistics. From chapter 5, as the t- 
statistic scales the alpha measure by its estimation error, it has superior statistical 
properties,. particularly in the extreme tails of the performance distribution. Row 4 ("p- 
tstat") reports the bootstrap p values of the t-statistic in row 3. For further statistical 
reliability the analysis is restricted to funds with a minimum of 36 observations, unless as 
otherwise stated. This leaves 675 funds in this analysis. All t-statistics of alpha, both 
actual (unmodified) t-statistics and bootstrap t-statistics (under the null), are based on 
Newey-West adjusted heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation adjusted standard errors. All 
bootstrap results are based on 1,000 simulations. Where relevant, many tables also contain 
information on the investment style ("Style"), survival status ("Survival") and operation 
location ("Location") of the funds corresponding to the ranked t-statistics of alpha. 
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In Table 6.1, Panel A reveals that the best fund ranked by alpha from the 
unconditional model achieved abnormal performance of 2.235% per month. This alpha 
has a t-statistic of 2.226. However, ranking by the t-statistic of alpha the highest fund has a 
t-statistic of 3.389. The bootstrap p value (of the t-statistic) equal to 0.437 indicates that 
from among the 1,000 bootstrap simulations across each and all of the funds under the null 
hypothesis of zero abnormal performance, 43.7% of the highest bootstrap t-statistics were 
greater than 3.389. Operating at a 5% significance cut-off, the p value of 0.437 fails to 
reject the hypothesis that the performance of the best fund is within the boundaries of 
performance that may be explained by random sampling variation in the t-statistic around 
a `true, known' value of zero. The p value indicates that the fund's performance is 
attributable to chance or luck at that point in the performance distribution. The p value of 
0.437 fails to reject the hypothesis that the top ranked fund does not possess genuine stock 
picking ability/skill. 
Looking across the entire right tail of the performance distribution, the evidence 
regarding skill versus luck is mixed. The IF", 2nd, 3`d, 5th and 7th ranked funds do not 
exceed performance which could be explained by good luck at 5% significance at each of 
these points in the distribution. However, there is strong evidence to indicate that lower 
ranked funds (10th, 12`h) possess genuine skill. Among the top 20 funds ranked ex post 
(where the 20th ranked fund has a t-statistic of 2.023), 7 (12) funds are found to exhibit 
stock picking ability at 5% (10%) significance. There is no evidence of stock picking 
ability in any fund ranked lower than the top 20. 
Table A6.1 in the appendix to this chapter shows the ranked t-statistics and p 
values of the top and bottom 50 funds for further detail. Critically, the top 7 ranked funds 
are simply lucky while only 7 funds ranked further inside the extreme right tail between 
8`h and 17th are skillful at 5% significance. Clearly therefore skill is not distinguished from 
luck simply by the fund's rank. This is important to note as fund ranking is often used in 
the marketing of funds. This underpins the value of the bootstrap methodology which uses 
an empirical nonparametric distribution at each point in the performance distribution to 
determine the statistical significance of performance rather than relying on a standard t- 
test. The latter, which relies on the normality assumption, would have concluded that all of 
the top 20 funds yielded significant abnormal performance. 
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In the left tail of the distribution, ie the left side of Panel A, the worst ranked fund 
by alpha yields a negative return of 
-0.901% per month with a t-statistic of -2.532. The 
lowest ranked fund by the t-statistic of alpha yields a t-statistic of 
-5.358. The bootstrap p 
value of the t-statistic of 0.009 means that from among the 1,000 bootstrap simulations 
across each of the funds under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance, less than 
1% of the lowest bootstrap t-statistics were lower than 
-5.358. This strongly fails to reject 
the hypothesis that this fund's performance is worse than random sampling variation 
around zero. This fund has produced `truly' inferior performance worse than bad luck. It 
is clear from the left tail of the distribution generally in Panel A that performance levels at 
these selected points in the distribution are worse than may be explained by bad luck. 
As described in chapter 5, as an alternative interpretation, the bootstrap may be 
used to estimate how many funds one might expect to achieve a given level of 
performance by random chance alone. This can then be compared to the number of funds 
which actually do achieve this level of performance. For example, based on the 
unconditional model, by random chance one would expect 7 funds to achieve an alpha of 
0.5% per month or higher. In fact, 19 funds achieve this level of performance (or higher). 
However, alphas of 0.1% are expected to be achieved by 171 funds based on chance while 
in fact only 142 actual funds reach this level. This interpretation is consistent with the 
discussion of the p values above: there is greater evidence of genuine outperformance 
towards the top end of the performance distribution (among some of the top 20) but not 
further inside the right tail. 
Figure 6.1 offers further insight into mutual fund performance relative to luck. The 
figure plots Kernel density estimates of the distributions of both the actual and bootstrap t- 
statistics (unconditional model). The distribution of bootstrapped t-statistics (solid line) is 
a graphical illustration of the random variation or dispersion in the t-statistics of alpha 
around a `true' value of zero 
- 
by construction. It provides a picture of the range in 
performance that may be expected simply due to luck. Comparison between this 
distribution and the distribution of the actual (unmodified) t-statistics puts actual 
performance in context relative to luck. It is clear from Figure 6.1 that the actual 
performance distribution (dashed line) lies largely to the left of the bootstrap distribution. 
There is some exception in the right tail which indicates that there are a number of high 
ranking funds which achieve performance superior to luck. However, the left tail of the 
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actual distribution lies to the left of the bootstrap distribution: poor performing funds 
cannot attribute performance to bad luck. 
Figure 6.2a shows histograms of the bootstrapped t-statistic of alpha at selected 
points in the upper end of the performance distribution. The upper left panel shows the 
histogram of the highest t-statistics across funds from each one of the 1,000 bootstrap 
resamples under the null hypothesis while the upper right panel shows the 1,000 99th 
percentile t-statistics and so on as indicated. Comparing the four histograms it is evident 
that the distribution of bootstrap t-statistics at the top end of the performance scale (BEST, 
99' percentile) are highly non-normal and have a relatively high variance but upon 
moving even slightly closer to the centre of the performance scale (95th, 90th percentiles) 
the histograms more closely approximate normality and exhibit a lower variance. Further 
insight to explain this is provided in Figure 6.2b which presents histograms of the 
regression residuals of the funds ranked at the same points in the performance distribution. 
The set of residuals from the higher ranked funds have higher variance and greater non- 
normality than the residuals of the funds even slightly closer to the centre of the 
performance distribution. It is this high variance and non-normality among the top funds' 
regression residuals, and in particular the existence of large positive residuals, that causes 
these funds to populate the top end of the bootstrap t-statistic distributions and generate a 
wide non-normal dispersion among these top t-statistics in the bootstrap procedure. 
In Figure 6.3a and Figure 6.3b an almost mirror image of this is presented for the 
lower end of the performance distribution. The upper left panel of Figure 6.3a shows the 
histogram of the lowest bootstrap t-statistics across funds from each one of the 1,000 
bootstrap simulations under the null hypothesis, the upper right panel shows the histogram 
of the 1,000 t-statistics at the Ist percentile across funds and so on. Once again there is 
evidence that the histograms at the lower points in the performance distribution exhibit a 
higher variance and greater non-normality than the histograms closer to the centre of the 
performance distribution. Similar to above, as can be seen from Figure 6.3b, this reflects 
the fact that the residuals of the lower ranked funds generally exhibit higher variance and 
greater non-normality than the residuals of funds closer to the centre of the distribution. 
(the absolute worst fund is the exception here). Again, it is this high variance among the 
1 Note the Kernels compare the frequency of a given level of performance among actual performance against 
the frequency of this level of performance in the entire bootstrap matrix. The bootstrap p value is a more 
sophisticated measure and compares the actual performance measure against the bootstrap distribution of 
performance at the same point in the cross-sectional performance distribution. 
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lower funds' regression residuals (and the existence of large negative residuals) that 
causes these funds to populate the lower end of the bootstrap t-statistic distributions and 
generate a wide dispersion among these t-statistics in the bootstrap procedure. 
This non-normality and high variance among the residuals and t-statistics of the 
top and bottom funds motivates the use of the bootstrap procedure to more correctly 
identify the distribution of performance at the extreme ends of the performance spectrum, 
rather than relying on a normality assumption. Therefore, we can more accurately draw 
inferences regarding the statistical significance of individual fund performance in the areas 
of performance of greater interest to investors. 
All results presented above relate to the unconditional three-factor Fama and 
French model. In chapter 4 on model selection it was noted that the value factor in the 
three-factor model is not well specified on average across funds while the Schwartz 
Information Criterion (SIC) for the 4 factor model was also relatively low as it is for the 3 
factor model. In results not shown here (but available on request), the bootstrap analysis 
was also implemented for two-factor (market and size factors) and four-factor models. The 
conclusions as described above for the three-factor model are unaltered: the two, three and 
four risk factor models are remarkably consistent in showing a small number of funds 
beating luck at the upper end of the distribution while poor performance is found to be 
worse than bad luck as above. 
In Panel B of Table 6.1, the bootstrap findings from the conditional beta model are 
reported. The interpretation of results for both the left and right tail of the performance 
distribution is broadly similar to that of the unconditional model in Panel A. Fund 
performance in the extreme right tail of the distribution is attributable to luck. Within the 
top 5% of ranked funds, `true' stock picking skill is slightly more prevalent than suggested 
by the unconditional model. However, again performance is not superior to luck at ranked 
performance even slightly closer to the center of the distribution. In the left tail, poor 
performance is again found to be worse than bad luck. 
Panel C of Table 6.1 presents bootstrap findings for the conditional alpha-beta 
performance model. Again, results here are very similar to both previous classes of model. 
Here, there is superior performance among some, but not all, funds ranked within the top 
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3% in the upper end of the performance distribution but not at the extreme right tail. In the 
left tail of the distribution performance is found to be worse than bad luck. 
The findings reported above for the three classes of model are quite consistent with 
those of the Kosowski et al (2004) US study. Using the t-statistic as the performance 
measure, these authors find in support of stock picking ability among many top 
performing funds while generally poor performance is found to be worse than bad luck. 
However, the evidence of skill in the Kosowski et al study is slightly more widespread 
than is found here among UK equity funds 
In conclusion, the results suggest that there are a small number of UK equity 
mutual funds which can deliver genuine stock picking ability for their investors net of the 
annual expenses charged. Although returns are gross of the load fee. (see chapter 3 on data 
description). 
The bootstrap methodology has been applied to the three classes of model as a test 
of robustness in findings. Findings are generally quite robust. However, from chapter 4 on 
model selection the conditional models are relatively poorly statistically determined. 
Accordingly, the unconditional model is selected here as the `benchmark' model and, in 
the interest of parsimony, the discussion to follow is based on this model. 
6.2 Performance and Investment Styles 
It is of also interest to investors to identify whether stock picking talent is related to the 
investment style (objective) of the fund. From the mutual fund performance and 
persistence literature, specifically among US studies, there is some evidence of 
outperformance among growth stock funds, (Chen, Jegadeesh and Wermers 2000). When 
the analysis is restricted here to funds with a minimum of 36 observations, there are 675 
funds remaining. These consist of 143 equity income funds (21%), 423 equity funds 
(63%) and 109 small stock funds (16%). The top 10 performing funds, (ranked by the t- 
statistic of alpha from the unconditional Fama-French 3 factor model) are comprised of 3 
equity income funds, 5 equity funds and 2 small stock funds. The corresponding 
breakdown of the top 50 funds is 18,24 and 8 respectively while the breakdown of the top 
40% of the performance distribution (top 270 funds) is: 78,154 and 38 respectively. At 
the opposite end of the performance scale, the worst 10 funds consist of 0 equity income 
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funds, 8 equity funds and 2 small stock fund. The corresponding breakdown of the bottom 
50 funds is 1,37 and 12 respectively while the composition of the bottom 40% of funds is: 
22,198 and 50 respectively. In this simple analysis, equity income funds perform 
relatively well while (general) equity funds and to a lesser extent small stock funds 
compare poorly. For example, equity income funds comprise 21% of the total sample of 
funds but comprise 29% of the top 40% of the distribution and 36% of the top 50 ranked 
funds. However, equity income funds make up only 8% of the bottom 40% of funds and 
only 2% of the bottom 50 funds and are completely absent from the bottom 10 funds. In 
general, in relative terms equity income funds disproportionately occupy the upper end of 
the performance distribution and are disproportionately absent from the bottom end. In 
contrast, equity funds comprise 63% of the total sample of funds but make up only 57% of 
the top 40% of funds and only 48% of the top 50 funds while this class of funds comprises 
73% of the bottom 40% of funds and 74% of the bottom 50 funds. Here, equity funds 
appear to disproportionately occupy the bottom end of the performance distribution and 
are disproportionately absent from the top end. Similarly, although slightly less 
pronounced, small stock funds also underperform in relative terms. 
In Table 6.1 Panel A, the row denoted "Style" indicates the investment style of 
funds at various points in the performance distribution, where I= equity income fund, 2= 
equity fund and 3= small stock fund. From among these selected points in the distribution 
all funds which beat luck at 5% significance are equity income funds. Of the top 20 ranked 
funds, 12 beat luck at 10% significance and these are made up of 6 equity income funds, 5 
equity funds and 1 small stock fund. Again, equity income funds perform relatively well. 
To investigate this issue further the bootstrap procedure is implemented separately 
for each investment style. As noted in chapter 5 on methodology, this peer group 
evaluation has the advantage that in each case one is examining a more homogenous risk 
group which helps controls for investment style related risk characteristics which vary 
across funds but which may not be adequately captured by the performance model. 
In Table 6.2, Panels A, B and C present the ranked alpha, its associated t-statistic, 
the ranked t-statistics and the bootstrapped p values of the ranked t-statistics for equity 
income, general equity and small stocks funds respectively. From the three panels it is 
clear that skill is not equal between the investment classes. Among equity income funds in 
Panel A the p values indicate that although the performance of the top 4 funds may be 
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attributed to luck, many funds ranked between 5th highest and the 90th percentile `beat' 
luck. In results not shown, 11 equity income funds beat luck at 5% significance. 
Therefore, as with the full set of mutual funds, among equity income funds skill exists 
inside the extreme right tail rather than at the extreme end of the tail. At the lower end of 
the performance distribution, the p values > 0.05 indicate that the performance of these 
funds is not worse than may be explained by bad luck at their points in the distribution. 
In contrast, both Panel B and Panel C indicate comparatively poor performance. In 
this peer group analysis of equity funds, there is very little evidence of true stock picking 
talent even among high ranked funds while the worst funds perform worse than bad luck. 
Among small stock funds, only the 2Qd highest ranked fund demonstrates skill at 5% 
significance while, again, poor performance may not be excused as bad luck. The evidence 
of some skill among equity income funds but its absence among equity funds is consistent 
with the more simple analysis above. 
In the case of small stock funds, to examine whether findings may be sensitive to 
the choice of benchmark risk factor for size, the bootstrap procedure was repeated for an 
alternative size benchmark. In the three-factor model the size risk factor, SMBt, (ie returns 
on small minus large capitalization stocks 
- 
see chapter 4) was substituted by a small 
capitalization index. However, the conclusions found above were unaltered. 
In the case of equity income funds, for an arbitrarily selected level of performance 
of say 0.1% per month, the bootstrap procedure indicates that 25 funds would be expected 
to achieve this level of performance simply by chance. In fact 43 funds achieve this 
performance. In contrast among general equity funds, the same ratio is 103: 75 while for 
small stock funds the ratio is 36: 24. 
The lack of supporting evidence in this study of stock picking ability among small 
stock mutual funds suggests that the market for small stocks is not less efficient, as has 
been asserted. If the inefficiency hypothesis is correct it has not been exploited by UK 
small stock fund managers. The evidence strongly suggests to investors that pursuing an 
income objective is the most reliable way to achieve genuine abnormal performance. 
Figure 6.4 provides further performance comparison between the different 
investment styles showing the Kernel density estimates of both the actual and bootstrap 
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distribution of the t-statistic of alpha in each case. A comparison of the figures reveals that 
for equity funds and small stock funds the distribution of actual t-statistics (dashed line) 
lies largely to the left of the bootstrap distribution (solid line). In the left tails, this 
indicates that actual performance lies outside the boundary of bad luck. This is consistent 
with the low bootstrap p values in the left tails of the performance distributions in Panels 
B and C in Table 6.2. In the right tail, the actual performance distribution lies, for the most 
part, within mere random sampling variation which is consistent with the high p values in 
the right hand side of Panels B and C. The actual and bootstrap Kernel densities of equity 
income funds reveal a different picture. Many low t-statistic funds lie within random 
sampling variation while many top t-statistic funds lie outside the boundaries of good 
luck. Once again this is similar to the evidence provided by the p values in Panel A, Table 
6.2. 
While the Kernel density plots provide a helpful graphical illustration of the 
comparison between actual and random performance, the plots will not necessarily yield 
an identical conclusion to that of the bootstrap p values. This can be seen in the extreme 
right tail of the distributions of equity funds and small stock funds in Figure 6.4 which 
suggest some skill while the bootstrap p values in Table 6.2 indicate that actual 
performance does not exceed luck. See footnote 1 for an explanation. 
As noted, estimating the bootstrap p values separately within each investment class 
may further control for risk. Of course, however, the bootstrap estimate of luck is not 
necessarily the same for each investment style. Hence care should be taken when 
comparing across investment classes under separate bootstrap analyses. In contrast, in 
Table 6.1 the bootstrap estimate of luck is based on the full sample of all funds. 
6.3 Performance and Fund Location 
As discussed in chapter 3, while all mutual funds in this study invest only in UK equity, 
they may be domiciled either onshore UK or offshore. It is useful for investors to know 
whether there are differences in performance between these classes of funds. 
Of the 675 funds in this study (after the minimum 36 observation restriction), there 
are 553 onshore funds and 122 offshore funds. Onshore funds comprise 82% of the total 
sample yet they form 89% of the top 40% of the distribution, 96% of the top 50 ranked 
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funds and 100% of the top 10 funds. Offshore funds comprise 18% of the total sample yet 
at the lower end of the distribution, they make up 25% of the bottom 40% of funds, 30% 
of the lowest 50 ranked funds and 30% of the lowest 10 funds. Therefore, onshore funds 
appear to disproportionately occupy the top end of the performance distribution while 
offshore funds disproportionately occupy the bottom end. 
In Table 6.1 Panel A, the row denoted "Location" indicates the fund's domicile 
where 1= onshore, 0= offshore. In this table and in results not shown all funds which beat 
luck at 5% significance are onshore funds. 
For further insight the bootstrap procedure is applied separately to onshore and 
offshore funds. Again, this peer group evaluation may be based on a more homogenous 
risk group in each case and controls for possible unknown location related risk 
characteristics not captured by the performance model. Table 6.3 presents the bootstrap 
findings for onshore and offshore funds in Panel A and Panel B respectively. Among 
onshore funds, many (14) of the top 20 ranked funds beat luck at 5% significance. 
However, in Panel B no offshore fund is found to beat luck. From both panels it is clear 
from the bootstrap p values at the lower end of the performance distribution that poor 
performance is worse than bad luck. 
Figure 6.5 plots the Kernel densities of the actual (dashed line) and bootstrap (solid line) 
distributions of the t-statistics of alpha for onshore and offshore funds. The inferences 
from the kernels are clearly consistent with those of the p values above. The upper panel 
depicting onshore funds shows that in the more extreme right tails of the distributions, 
actual performance lies to the right of the bootstrap distribution indicating some genuine 
skill. This is not the case in the right tails of offshore funds. Similarly, in both panels the 
left tails of the actual performance distributions lie outside the boundaries of bad luck. 
There are a number of possible explanations for the relative underperformance of 
offshore funds. First, it may arise due to possible information asymmetries between 
onshore and offshore funds, ie it may be more difficult or expensive for offshore 
domiciled funds to obtain relevant UK equity information and thus such funds may incur 
an informational disadvantage. This is more likely in the past prior to the more 
sophisticated information technology enjoyed today. Second, it may be that offshore funds 
are genuinely less skillful given identical information. However, it should be noted that 
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offshore funds are often (though not always) associated with higher charges, particularly 
during the earlier part of the sample period, and the return data here is net of annual 
charges. Higher fees arose because (i) there was less competition among UK equity funds 
in the offshore areas, (ii) offshore funds were often sold through intermediaries such as 
life assurance companies who added a layer of fees. 
6.4 Performance and Survival 
An important strength of this study is the inclusion of nonsurviving funds in order to 
control for possible survivorship bias in performance results. A commonly held 
assumption is that nonsurviving funds close due to poor performance. If this is true then 
one would expect nonsurvivng funds to underperform surviving funds. 
Of the 675 funds in the bootstrap analysis, 482 (71%) are surviving funds while 
193 (29%) are nonsurviving funds. From a simple ranking of funds by the t-statistic of 
alpha, nonsurvivors represent 31% of the top 40% of the performance distribution, 22% of 
the top 50 ranked funds and 30% of the top 10 funds. While nonsurvivors are slightly 
under-represented among the top 50 ranked funds, they are generally not 
disproportionately absent from the upper end of the performance distribution as might be 
expected if these group of funds close due to poor performance. Nonsurvivors comprise 
27% of the bottom 40% of the performance distribution, only 22% of the bottom 50 
ranked funds and only 10% of the lowest 10 ranked funds: oddly, nonsurvivors are 
disproportionately absent from the lower end of the performance distribution. 
Furthermore, nonsurviving funds are well represented among the group of funds 
which have genuine stock picking talent by the bootstrap analysis. Among the top 20 
ranked funds, 7 funds beat luck at 5% significance, 2 of which are nonsurvivors while 12 
funds beat luck at 10% significance, 3 of which are nonsurvivors. 
As a possible explanation for the better than expected performance of 
nonsurvivors, imposing the minimum 36 observations restriction here may induce a look- 
ahead bias and improve the apparent performance of nonsurviving funds as a group. To 
examine this the restriction was reduced to 18 observations (still maintaining reasonable 
degrees of freedom). However, this does not alter the performance comparison. 
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As a further possible explanation, it may be possible that nonsurviving funds yield 
particularly poor results towards the end of their lives (say in the final 3,6 or 12 months) 
and while this poor performance is responsible for their closure it is not adequately 
captured by the t-statistic which is an `average' performance measure over the life of the 
fund. To investigate this, Figure 6.6 plots the relative performance of surviving and 
nonsurviving funds over the last 24 months of nonsurvivor fund lives. Specifically, for 
each of the last 24 months of each nonsurviving fund the difference between the 
nonsurviving fund's return and the cross-sectional average of the surviving funds' returns 
that month is calculated. For each of the last 24 months this is then averaged across 
nonsurviving funds in `event time' and is plotted in Figure 6.6. If nonsurviving funds 
deteriorate relative to surviving funds towards the end of their lives, the plot in Figure 6.6 
would trend downwards from left to right reflecting a growing gap in performance prior to 
termination. However, there is no evidence of this occurring. 
A possible explanation for the better than expected performance of nonsurviving 
funds is that a large number of these funds do not close due to poor performance but are 
merged or are taken over, possibly even because of their strong performance and 
consequent attractiveness. If this is the case it clearly gives rise to an important caveat 
when interpreting `nonsurvivor' data in mutual fund data sets (particularly the UK case). 
Indeed, Blake and Timmermann (1998), citing the UK Unit Trust Yearbook, point out that 
over their sample period 1972 
- 
1995,89% of the funds reported as nonsurvivors were 
merged with other funds while only 11% were closed down over the period. 
As a general point note that in making performance comparisons between classes 
of funds such as survivors/nonsurvivors, onshore/offshore, income/equity/small stock 
funds etc., the comparisons are based on funds which are not necessarily in existence at 
the same points in time. For example, if the concentration of onshore and offshore funds 
exist during different time periods, this may account for differences in performance if this 
is not otherwise adequately captured by the performance model. However, while this issue 
is noteworthy, it is highly unlikely to impact on results. First, the data set is sufficient to 
ensure that during all time intervals of 3 years or more (the minimum requirement) a large 
number of funds exist within each class of funds where a comparison is being made. 
Second, if the alpha measures of the different sub-classes were sensitive to the sub-time 
periods in which they are estimated one might expect evidence of time varying alphas. 
From chapter 4 the conditional alpha models found no evidence of this. 
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6.5 Sensitivity of Findings to Length of Fund Histories 
In this section the potential for look-ahead bias arising from imposing the minimum 36 
observation restriction is examined in further detail. This study conducts the bootstrap 
procedure for a range of alternative minimum fund histories. The results are reported in 
Table 6.4 where Panels A, B, C, and D present results for minimum fund histories of 18, 
36,60 and 120 observations respectively. Panel B repeats the results of Table 6.1 Panel A 
for ease of comparison. The final row of each panel, denoted "No. Obs. " indicates the 
number of observations of the fund at that selected point in the performance distribution. 
Results relate to the unconditional Fama-French model applied to all funds. 
The values of alpha, the t-statistics and the bootstrap p values across Panels A, B, 
C and D reveal that the minimum observation restriction does not bias performance 
findings upwards. On the contrary, it is evident from the upper end of the performance 
distributions that performance is generally higher as the minimum fund history 
requirement is reduced from 120 to 60 to 36 to 18. In each case, reducing the fund history 
restriction includes some high performing funds. Accordingly, one cannot say that the top 
end of the performance distribution is comprised of the same funds irrespective of the 
minimum observation restriction. The p values reveal that stock picking skill becomes 
more prevalent as minimum fund histories become shorter. In results not shown, when the 
restriction is set at 18 observations, there are 754 funds in the bootstrap analysis. 32 of the 
top 37 funds (as ranked by the t-statistic) show evidence of skill at 5% significance while 
37 do so at 10%. Increasing the restriction to 36 observations leaves 675 funds in the 
analysis where there are 7 (12) skilled funds at 5% (10%) significance. Increasing the 
restriction to 60 observations leaves 573 funds where there is 1(5) skilled funds at 5% 
(10%) significance. Finally, when the restriction is further increased to a minimum of 120 
observations there are 405 funds included but there is no evidence of stock picking talent 
at either 5% or 10%. 
From Table 6.4, at the lower end of the performance distributions the interpretation 
of the bootstrap p values is unchanged across all minimum observation restrictions: poor 
performing funds cannot attribute their performance to chance or bad luck. The row 
denoted "No. Obs. " reports the number of observations of the fund at the various points in 
the distribution. From Panel A, some of the poorest performing funds have survived for a 
relatively long time compared to many shorter lived funds in the right tail. In results not 
shown, when the minimum requirement is set at 18 observations, 6 of the 10 lowest 
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ranked funds have more than 200 observations while 8 of the 10 funds have more than 150 
observations. In contrast, of the top 10 ranked funds only I fund has more than 100 
observations. Why any fund, particularly a long-lived fund, with such strong evidence of 
poor performance would be permitted to survive in a competitive market is puzzling. 
Kosowski et at (2004) suggest that performance measurement is a difficult task requiring, 
for precision, a long fund life-span and that sustained underperformance is consistent with 
consumers who have difficulty identifying the comparatively few funds which can beat 
their benchmarks. Hendricks et al (1993) suggest that sustained poor funds are those 
without skill which "churn" their portfolios too much, incurring high expenses which 
lowers net performance. Here in this study it is suggested that successful fund managers 
may be enticed away from their funds to manage other funds thus limiting long run 
superior performance in any given fund. It may be that shorter-lived funds are initially set 
up to exploit perceived investment opportunities but `run out of ideas' in the longer term. 
Or it may be that long-lived funds may be less efficiently managed, possibly because they 
become quite large. 
Figure 6.7 shows Kernel density plots of the actual and bootstrap distributions of 
the t-statistics for the alternative fund history requirements as indicated. In particular the 
left tails of the distributions clearly demonstrate this lack of skill relative to luck. 
The findings in this section provide some indication that investors would do better 
selecting shorter-lived funds. These are, for the most part, funds which exist in the later 
part of the sample period. Therefore we might expect that if the bootstrap procedure is 
applied separately to earlier and later sub-sample periods we would find greater evidence 
of selectivity skill in the latter relative to the former. Indeed this is the case, in results not 
shown. Selecting periods of (i) 1975-1990 and (ii) 1991-2002 no evidence of skill was 
found in the first period. In the later 1991-2002 period the results are very similar to the 
results for the full period as reported in Table 6.1, Panel A. However, these findings raise 
the bigger issue for investors: is there persistence in performance over time among mutual 
funds. This is the discussion of chapter 7 and chapter S. 
However, in the bootstrap procedures that follow in this chapter the minimum 36 
observation restriction is maintained. This is done confident in the evidence that this 
restriction does not impart a look-ahead bias. 
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6.6 Extensions of the Bootstrap Methodology 
In chapter 5 on the bootstrap methodology, a number of extensions to the `baseline' 
bootstrap procedure were discussed. These involve retaining valuable information on the 
fund return generating process and incorporating it into the bootstrap procedure. This 
includes residual serial correlation and cross-sectional (across funds) dependence among 
fund residuals. They also involve applying bootstrap techniques where both residuals and 
risk factors are resampled in the simulations. The results from implementing these 
extensions are now presented. 
6.6.1 Serial Correlation in Fund Performance Regressions 
Incorporating serial correlation involves randomly drawing residuals in the bootstrap 
simulations in block lengths corresponding to the suspected order of serial correlation. To 
determine whether the bootstrap findings presented above may be sensitive to this 
modified procedure, the bootstrap was repeated for a number of alternative block lengths. 
Findings are reported in Table 6.5. Row 4 to row 6 report the estimated p values of the t- 
statistic of alpha for blocks of 1,2 and 4: hypotheses of serial correlation of orders 0,1 
and 3 respectively. From Lagrange multiplier tests, evidence of serial correlation 
diminishes quickly in the lag order and there is very little evidence across funds 
supporting serial correlation of lag order higher than 3. 
Comparing these results reveals that the p values are not sensitive to the block 
length in the residual re-sampling procedure. At 5% significance, the p values consistently 
provide the same inferences for all residual sampling block lengths. (The only exceptions 
are for the 7th and 15th ranked funds when resampling in block length of size 2). 
Therefore, this study finds that the conclusions drawn previously from the 
bootstrap methodology are not sensitive to whether the bootstrap procedure is modified to 
incorporate residual serial correlation of alternative relevant block lengths. This finding is 
consistent with that of the Kosowski et at (2004). 
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6.6.2 Newey-West Adjusted Standard Errors 
Throughout this study all t-statistics are based on Newey-West autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity adjusted standard errors. In this section, we examine whether the 
conclusions presented previously are sensitive to the order of autocorrelation in the 
Newey-West adjustment. 
Table 6.6 shows the ranked values of alpha, the associated t-statistic of these 
alphas, the ranked t-statistic of alpha and the bootstrap p values of the ranked t-statistics 
for autocorrelation orders of 1,2 and 3 assumed for all funds. A bootstrap procedure was 
also implemented where a Lagrange Multiplier test was used to select the order of 
autocorrelation for each fund individually in the Newey-West adjustment. The results 
from this procedure are very similar to the result shown for autocorrelation of order 3. 
The p values in the final three rows of Table 6.6 show that results are not sensitive 
to the autocorrelation order in the Newey-West adjustment. At 5% significance the p 
values at all selected points in the performance distribution are consistent in interpretation 
between all three autocorrelation orders. 
Of course, as shown in Table 6.6, the t-statistics of alpha change with the 
alternative Newey-West autocorrelation adjustments. However, in results not shown, the 
top 20 funds ranked by the t-statistic are common in all three Newey-West adjustments. 
Therefore, this study finds that the conclusions drawn previously from the 
bootstrap methodology are robust to the order of autocorrelation adjustment in the Newey- 
West corrected standard errors. 
6.6.3 Alternative Bootstrap Procedures 
From chapter 5 on methodology, the alternative bootstrap resampling methodologies were 
(i) `residual-only' resampling, (ii) `independent factor-residual' resampling and (iii) 
`pairwise factor-residual' resampling. It was noted that the sampling variability of the 
bootstrap t-statisticss, and therefore the p values, may be sensitive to the choice of 
bootstrap procedure. The set of bootstrap findings presented so far are derived from a 
residual-only resampling. To examine whether these are indeed sensitive to the choice of 
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bootstrap procedure, this study applies all three bootstrap procedures here. Results are 
reported in Table 6.7. 
Row 4 of Table 6.7, denoted "p-tstat(i)", reports the p values of the t-statistic under a 
residual-only resampling procedure. Row 5, denoted "p-tstat(ii)", reports the equivalent p 
values under independent factor-residual resampling while row 6, denoted "p-tstat(iii)", 
presents the p values from a pairwise factor-residual resamping procedure. In particular, 
this final procedure captures possible heteroscedastic features which may be present in the 
underlying data, where the heteroscedasticity is related to the factors. 
Comparing the three sets of p values in Table 6.7 it is clear that the bootstrap 
results are not sensitive to the choice of resampling procedure. At 5% significance, at all 
selected points in the performance distribution the three sets of p values are consistent in 
interpretation, (the only exception is p-stat(iii) of the 10th ranked fund). This implies that 
the variability of the bootstrap t-statistics is not substantially different between these three 
bootstrap procedures. This finding of robustness in the results lends support to the 
interpretation and conclusions already discussed. 
In results not shown, this study also applied all three bootstrap resampling 
procedures in separate bootstrap analyses of mutual funds (i) by investment objective and 
(ii) by onshore/offshore location. The interpretation of the resulting p values was also 
unaltered from the results already reported for the residual-only resampling procedure in 
Table 6.2 and Table 6.3 respectively. 
6.6.4 Cross-Sectional Dependence 
In addition to time series dependence in residuals within funds, there may be a cross- 
sectional dependence between residuals across funds. In this study, the (absolute) average 
correlation coefficient between fund residuals (from the unconditional model) is 0.332. 
This section implements a `cross-sectional bootstrap' procedure in which within each one 
of the 1,000 simulations the realized time index of residuals drawn is kept constant across 
funds. It examines the sensitivity of findings to this refinement to the procedure. 
2 This figure is calculated for a subset of 311 funds which exist at the same time. 
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However, as discussed in detail in chapter 5 on methodology, implementing this 
procedure presents a difficulty because the funds do not all exist at the same time. To 
maintain the same time sequence of residuals across funds would be likely to involve 
selecting residuals for many funds at time periods when these funds do not exist. To 
surmount this difficulty, in this study a sub-sample period is selected (January 1988 to 
December 1998) in which as many funds as possible (311) have a complete return history. 
The results of this cross-sectional bootstrap procedure are presented in Table 6.8. 
Panel A reports the results from a `residual-only' resampling. Row 4, denoted "p-tstat(i)", 
shows the bootstrap p values of the t-statistic for the `baseline' bootstrap procedure where 
in each of the 1,000 simulations the time sequence of residuals drawn from each fund is 
allowed to vary across funds. This is an identical bootstrap procedure as applied 
previously except in this case the results relate only to the subset of funds in the sub- 
sample period. Row 5 of Panel A records the bootstrap p values of the t-statistic where in 
each of the 1,000 simulations the time sequence of residuals drawn from each fund is kept 
constant across funds, ie a `cross-sectional residual-only' bootstrap. Both sets of p values 
are consistent in indicating that over the sub-sample period funds at the upper end of the 
performance distribution do not beat luck. At the lower end of the distribution both sets of 
the p values indicate that the poor performance is worse than bad luck. The central point 
here is that both sets of p values yield the same interpretation. This is supporting evidence 
that the bootstrap results described previously are not sensitive to the choice between 
baseline residual-only or cross-sectional residual-only bootstrap procedures. 
In Panel B of Table 6.8, bootstrap p values of the t-stat from an `independent 
factor-residual' resampling procedure and `cross-sectional independent factor-residual' 
resampling procedure are presented. Row 4 of Panel B reports p values where in each of 
the 1,000 simulations the realized time sequence of residuals and the realized time 
sequence of factors drawn from each fund are allowed to vary across funds. Row 5 reports 
p values where in each of the 1,000 simulations the realized time sequence of residuals 
and the realized time sequence of factors drawn from each fund are kept constant across 
funds3. Again without exception, at every selected point in the performance distribution 
both sets of p values provide the same conclusion with regards to how both good and bad 
funds perform relative to luck. 
3 In each of the 1,000 bootstrap simulations the realized time sequence of residuals is not the same as the 
realized time sequence of factors. 
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Finally, Panel C of Table 6.8 reports the p values from a 'pairwise factor-residual' 
resampling and a `cross-sectional pairwise factor-residual' resampling bootstrap procedure 
in row 4 and row 5 respectively. In both procedures residuals and factors are drawn in 
pairs at identical time periods but in addition in the case of a cross-sectional factor- 
residual resampling, the time sequence of pairs drawn are kept constant across funds 
within each of the 1,000 bootstrap simulations. The results in Panel C reveal once again 
that the p values from both bootstrap procedures provide the same conclusion regarding 
fund actual performance relative to luck. 
Therefore, from Panels A, B and C in Table 6.8, it is evident that the bootstrap 
results are not sensitive to cross-sectional correlations among the idiosyncratic component 
of returns in funds. This robustness supports the overall conclusions from the bootstrap 
methodology presented so far regarding fund performance and luck. 
While it may be interesting to implement a cross-sectional bootstrap procedure 
separately for funds by investment objective, the requirement that funds have a complete 
return history means there are too few funds available within each investment style to 
produce reliable conclusions. 
6.7 Conclusion 
Overall, the findings in this study point to the existence of genuine stock picking ability 
among a small number of top performing UK equity mutual fund managers, ie 
performance which is not solely due to luck or cannot be explained by random sampling 
variation in the performance estimator. However, the skillful funds are not simply the 
highest funds ranked either by alpha or its t-statistic. At the opposite end of the 
performance scale, the analysis strongly rejects the hypothesis that poor performing funds 
are merely unlucky. Controlling for different investment objectives among funds, it is 
found that equity income funds show more evidence of stock picking ability while such 
ability is not found among general equity funds or small stock funds. Furthermore, 
relative to luck, onshore funds are found to outperform while offshore funds generally 
underperform. To improve the statistical reliability of the performance estimates, this 
study imposes a restriction that funds have existed for a minimum of 3 years in order to be 
included in the analysis. However, a sensitivity analysis reveals that this does not impart a 
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look-ahead bias. Conclusions from the baseline bootstrap procedure are remarkably 
robust with respect to block bootstrapping, serial correlation adjustments, factor-residual 
resampling and cross-sectional residual resampling. 
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Figure 6.2a: Histograms of Bootstrap t-statistics 
(Upper End of the Distribution) 
Figure 6.2a shows histograms of the bootstrap t-statistics of alpha from the unconditional model, at various 
points in the upper end of the performance distribution. The actual t-statistics at each ranking is indicated 
by the vertical dashed line. 
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Figure 6.2b: Histograms of Residuals 
(Upper End of the Distribution) 
Figure 6.2b shows histograms of the residuals of funds ranked at various points in the upper end of the 
cross-sectional performance distribution. 
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Figure 6.3a: Histograms of Bootstrap t-statistics 
(Lower End of the Distribution) 
Figure 6.3a shows histograms of the bootstrap t-statistics of alpha from the unconditional model, at various 
points in the lower end of the performance distribution. The actual t-statistics at each ranking is indicated 
by the vertical dashed line. 
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Figure 6.3b: Histograms of Residuals 
(Lower End of the Distribution) 
Figure 6.3b shows histograms of the residuals of funds ranked at various points in the lower end of the 
cross-sectional performance distribution. 
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Figure 6.4: Kernel Density Estimates of the Actual and Bootstrap distribution of t- 
statistics 
- 
by Investment Style 
Figure 6.4 shows Kernel densities of the actual and bootstrap distributions of the t-statistics of alpha applying the 
boorstrap procedure separately to funds of different investment styles. Results relate to the unconditional Fama- 
French model. t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted. A minimum of 36 observations are used. The plots use a 
Gaussian Kernel. 
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Figure 6.5: Kernel Density Estimates of the Actual and Bootstrap Distribution of 
t-statistics 
- 
by Location 
Figure 6.5 shows Kernel densities of the actual and bootstrap distributions of the t-statistics of alpha 
applying the bootstrap procedure separately to the onshore and offshore funds. Estimates are from the 
unconditional Fama-French model, t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted and funds with a minimum of 
36 observations are used. The plots are generated using a Gaussian Kernel. 
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Figure 6.7 Kernel Density Estimates of the Actual and Bootstrap Distribution of 
t-statistics 
- 
Alternative Minimum Fund Histories 
Figure 6.7 presents Kernel densities of the actual and bootstrap distributions of the t-statistics of alpha for 
funds with a minimum of 18,36,60 and 120 observations using the unconditional Fama-French 3 factor 
model. t-statistics are Newey-West adjusted. The plots are generated using a Gaussian Kernel function. 
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Minimum 60 Observations 
Kernel Density Estimates: Minimum 60 Observations 
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APPENDIX of TABLES Table A6.1 
Unconditional Factor Model 
Rank Rank 
Rank Alpha t-Alpha t-stat p value 
1 2.2348 2.2259 3.3891 0.4370 
2 1.4474 3.3650 3.3650 0.1280 
3 0.7569 1.9019 2.9910 0.2320 
4 0.7239 1.3227 2.9646 0.1090 
5 0.7159 1.7423 2.7771 0.1570 
6 0.7061 1.0093 2.7761 0.0770 
7 0.6861 2.9910 2.6775 0.0940 
8 0.6317 1.0404 2.6719 0.0460 
9 0.6237 1.3975 2.6341 0.0320 
10 0.6169 1.2124 2.5448 0.0380 
11 0.6065 2.2920 2.5223 0.0280 
12 0.5930 1.4504 2.5009 0.0200 
13 0.5879 1.1009 2.4035 0.0360 
14 0.5613 1.0131 2.2920 0.1000 
15 0.5434 2.6719 2.2822 0.0700 
16 0.5304 1.6986 2.2451 0.0710 
17 0.5142 2.1271 2.2259 0.0480 
18 0.5071 2.7761 2.1271 0.1450 
19 0.5037 1.2840 2.0407 0.2990 
20 0.4908 2.6775 2.0235 0.2840 
21 0.4874 1.9482 1.9554 0.4470 
22 0.4786 2.9646 1.9482 0.3830 
23 0.4782 2.7771 1.9205 0.3920 
24 0.4724 1.3563 1.9087 0.3670 
25 0.4708 1.0779 1.9019 0.3200 
26 0.4699 0.9771 1.8599 0.3900 
27 0.4664 1.7886 1.7886 0.6150 
28 0.4598 1.7264 1.7578 0.6760 
29 0.4474 2.0235 1.7423 0.6590 
30 0.4398 0.8060 1.7399 0.5880 
31 0.4312 2.5448 1.7264 0.5810 
32 0.4140 1.0455 1.7199 0.5420 
33 0.4117 3.3891 1.7041 0.5350 
34 0.3957 1.8599 1.6986 0.4910 
35 0.3864 2.2822 1.6826 0.5000 
36 0.3822 2.4035 1.6707 0.4830 
37 0.3741 1.0455 1.6672 0.4430 
38 0.3576 0.6150 1.6276 0.5440 
39 0.3553 0.8807 1.6236 0.5040 
40 0.3428 1.7199 1.6177 0.4770 
41 0.3406 1.5707 1.6105 0.4480 
42 0.3176 1.6105 1.5707 0.5720 
43 0.3172 0.6415 1.5296 0.7120 
44 0.3150 0.4067 1.4988 0.8040 
45 0.3150 1.9087 1.4721 0.8680 
46 0.3145 0.4736 1.4504 0.9010 
47 0.3103 1.0508 1.4290 0.9140 
48 0.3095 1.0314 1.4271 0.8860 
49 0.3024 0.7221 1.4230 0.8700 
50 0.3016 2.5009 1.4137 0.8600 
Rank Alpha t-Alpha t-stat p value 
625 
-0.3915 -2.0702 -2.7069 1.0000 
626 
-0.3936 -3.5620 -2.7088 1.0000 
627 
-0.3985 -1.2944 -2.7133 1.0000 
628 
-0.3988 -2.0563 -2.7397 1.0000 
629 
-0.3998 -4.2783 -2.7423 1.0000 
630 
-0.4038 -2.7915 -2.7718 1.0000 
631 
-0.4049 -2.7718 -2.7735 1.0000 
632 
-0.4069 -1.6944 -2.7915 1.0000 
633 
-0.4130 -1.8248 -2.8812 1.0000 
634 
-0.4132 -1.3225 -2.9150 1.0000 
635 
-0.4133 -2.9716 -2.9256 1.0000 
636 
-0.4136 -3.7514 -2.9533 1.0000 
637 
-0.4192 -2.5966 -2.9543 1.0000 
638 
-0.4200 -2.7735 -2.9707 1.0000 
639 
-0.4216 -2.3563 -2.9716 1.0000 
640 
-0.4240 -2.4753 -3.0333 1.0000 
641 
-0.4266 -2.7088 -3.0432 1.0000 
642 
-0.4272 -1.5634 -3.0448 1.0000 643 
-0.4295 -3.0768 -3.0732 1.0000 644 
-0.4353 -2.5088 -3.0761 1.0000 645 
-0.4403 -2.9533 -3.0768 1.0000 646 
-0.4414 -2.6088 -3.0776 1.0000 
647 
-0.4418 -1.1358 -3.0951 1.0000 
648 
-0.4428 -2.7023 -3.1032 1.0000 
649 
-0.4514 -1.8264 -3.1169 1.0000 650 
-0.4532 -2.1445 -3.1183 1.0000 651 
-0.4663 -3.5220 -3.1244 1.0000 
652 
-0.4691 -2.6807 -3.1469 1.0000 
653 
-0.4791 -3.0951 -3.1609 1.0000 654 
-0.4828 -2.0230 -3.1748 1.0000 655 
-0.4907 -2.5747 -3.1913 1.0000 
656 
-0.5091 -1.7442 -3.1994 1.0000 657 
-0.5104 -2.9150 -3.2499 1.0000 
658 
-0.5182 -2.1812 -3.5212 1.0000 
659 
-0.5204 -3.0776 -3.5220 1.0000 660 
-0.5220 -2.4643 -3.5620 1.0000 
661 
-0.5231 -3.7656 -3.6163 1.0000 662 
-0.5259 -3.0732 -3.6251 1.0000 
663 
-0.5523 -3.0333 -3.6973 1.0000 664 
-0.5531 -0.7559 -3.7514 1.0000 
665 
-0.5586 -2.8812 -3.7656 1.0000 666 
-0.5780 -1.6406 -3.8621 1.0000 
667 
-0.5947 -1.6795 -3.9414 1.0000 668 
-0.5965 -4.4855 -4.1187 1.0000 
669 
-0.6092 -2.4154 -4.1804 1.0000 
670 
-0.6503 -2.9707 -4.1900 1.0000 
671 
-0.6614 -3.1994 -4.2783 1.0000 
672 
-0.7111 -2.3310 -4.4855 1.0000 
673 
-0.7269 -2.3871 -4.4985 1.0000 
674 
-0.7407 -3.0432 -4.9526 1.0000 
675 
-0.9015 -2.5321 -5.3589 0.9910 
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CHAPTER 7 
Persistence Testing Methodology 
A major issue in mutual fund performance is whether abnormal performance can be 
identified ex-ante and for how long it persists. Persistence in the sense of `statistical 
predictability' is usually examined using (rank) correlations or regressions of future on 
past performance or using a contingency table approach. `Economic predictability' is 
usually based on post-sort performance alphas or by observing actual trades of mutual 
funds (i. e. holdings and buy/sell data) and using a characteristic selectivity measure in an 
event study framework. 
This study contributes to the debate on persistence in several ways. First a 
comprehensive survivorship bias free UK data base of over 900 equity mutual funds 
(which includes tracker funds in some of the analysis) over a long data period is used. This 
has not always been the case in earlier persistence studies. Second, persistence is 
examined using a wide variety of alternative sorting rules in evaluating repeat `winner' 
(and ` loser') funds. Third, the study does not focus on statistical predictability as this does 
not necessarily result in explicit investment rules that produce future positive risk adjusted 
returns. Instead it concentrates on the economic value of persistence by focusing on the 
recursive portfolio approach. Here, if persistence is found it may represent an exploitable 
strategy for investors. Fourth, as well as analyzing the post-sort performance of quite large 
and possibly heterogeneous portfolios of funds (e. g. deciles), as done in earlier studies, 
this study also examines alternative smaller fund-of-funds portfolios which is probably of 
more practical interest to both professional and retail investors. Finally, the study 
examines not only the risk adjusted average performance of past winner/loser portfolios of 
funds but also the distribution of final wealth from this ex-ante strategy, taking account of 
`luck' across all funds and transactions costs of rebalancing. In this study `luck' is 
represented by the empirical distribution of all funds' idiosyncratic risks and hence picks 
up any non-normality and contemporaneous cross-correlations in idiosyncratic risks. As 
far as can be ascertained, this approach to an analysis of final wealth has not been 
developed in previous studies. Since most saving in mutual funds (as a whole) is long- 
term, investors are interested in the distribution of final wealth (e. g. mean, skewness, 
kurtosis) from an active strategy, relative to that from alternative strategies such as holding 
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index trackers. These alternatives are examined with respect to the distribution of final 
wealth, taking account of `luck' and transactions costs for both strategies. The 
methodology adopted in this study moves the debate on persistence closer to the practical 
issues surrounding the implementation of ex-ante investment strategies by fund investors. 
7.1 Persistence Methodology 
Tests for persistence/predictability fall into two broad categories. One can test for 
`statistical' predictability or `economically significant' predictability or both. Statistical 
measures of persistence rank funds over some past horizon and measure the association 
between past performance and future performance, where the performance metrics may be 
different in the ranking and post-ranking periods (e. g. ranking into decile portfolios based 
on past raw returns but the post-rank metric being future alpha performance). The 
statistical approach measures the average association between the relative orderings of 
funds in the pre-sort and post-sort periods using correlation, regression or contingency 
tables. However, although such tests may provide evidence of persistence it is often not 
clear how this may be exploited by investors. For example, rank correlations or a 
regression of pre-sort and post-sort alphas can be used to establish predictability. 
However, even though there may be a high correlation between the alphas of past decile 
ranked funds and their subsequent alphas, all of the post-sort decile alphas may be 
negative, indicating (relative) predictability but poor future abnormal performance for all 
decile portfolios. Therefore measured persistence could be due mainly to repeat losers 
rather than repeat winners. In addition (Spearman) rank correlations treat each point in the 
ranking equally and lack power against the hypothesis that predictability in performance is 
concentrated in the tails of fund performance. In this study this is taken up by examining 
the ex-ante performance of small portfolios of funds. 
While the above approaches can be used to establish statistical predictability, 
investors are presumably more interested in the future absolute risk adjusted performance 
of both winners and losers taken separately so this study uses the `recursive portfolio' 
approach which allows a direct assessment of the economic as well as statistical 
significance of persistence. The methodology is as follows. At any point in time, t, funds 
are ranked according to some measure of past performance over a particular horizon (e. g. 
raw returns over the past year). Fractile portfolios are then formed (e. g. deciles) and held 
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over the next h months, which gives rise to a sequence of h monthly `forward looking' 
returns. Rebalancing takes place every h months which results in a sequence of forward 
looking concatenated monthly returns for each fractile portfolio over the whole test 
period, R, f (t, T) where (t =t+1, t+2, 
..... 
T) 
. 
R/ (t, T) are then used to estimate alternative 
factor models (or other performance statistics) which give an economic measure of 
persistence such as post-sort alphas, a; (which are referred to here as `forward looking' 
alphas). Here, results are reported for the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model: 
(7.1) r 
,f= ai + Ql; rm, ý + /32, SMB, + /33, HML, + /j4, MOMt + ei j 
where r = R 
-r is the excess return on the forward looking portfolio, rm,, is the excess 
return on the market portfolio, SMB HML, and MOM, are the zero-investment factor 
mimicking portfolios for size, book-to-market value and momentum effects respectively, 
(see chapter 4). For example, a statistically significant positive (negative) `forward 
looking' alpha of past winners (losers) indicates that a successful ex-ante strategy would 
involve `smart investors' redirecting cash flows into past winner funds and away from past 
loser funds. In this study the forward looking returns R, f (t, T) are based on either sorting 
on the fund's past 12 months (raw) return or on the t-alpha from the 4-factor model (using 
a 60 month estimation window)'. The portfolios are equally weighted and alternative 
rebalancing periods of 1,3,6 and 12 months are examined. Because of possible non- 
normality in a portfolio's idiosyncratic risk (particularly for the extreme tails of the 
performance distribution), this study reports bootstrap p-values of alpha for the different 
size forward looking portfolios. Size here refers to the number of funds held in this 
portfolio of funds strategy. 
The forward looking returns R, f (t, T) consist of a changing portfolio of different 
mutual funds, although not all funds will necessarily be `switched' at each rebalancing 
date. The implications for transactions costs of this `fund-of-funds' strategy is discussed 
below. Note, in this study when a fund closes sometime over the holding period it is 
included in the forward looking portfolio until it closes and the portfolio is then 
rebalanced among the remaining `live' funds until the next rebalancing period. This 
removes any `look-ahead bias' (Carhart 1997). 
Using t-alpha (rather than alpha) helps reduce sorting errors due to outlier residuals. 
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7.2 Calculating Final Wealth 
- 
Rebalancing with Transactions Costs. 
Use of forward looking alphas provides one metric for judging the economic significance 
of persistence but of equal importance to investors is the level of terminal wealth from 
alternative investment strategies. Although figures for a fund's terminal wealth are 
regularly reported in the financial press, actual terminal wealth from a specific active 
strategy (over a specific investment horizon) may be a misleading measure of performance 
since it may be largely due to luck (from chapter 6). It would be useful therefore if we 
could measure the riskiness in terminal wealth from an active strategy. After all, investors 
are not simply interested in the risk adjusted return of their ex-ante investment strategy but 
also in the distribution of their final wealth, taking account of the cross-section of risk 
across all funds and any rebalancing costs of an active strategy. 
In an active strategy, if rebalancing takes place in times per year (y) then the total 
number of rebalancing periods is T=m. y. If p, = proportion of funds switched at each 
rebalancing period, c= percentage cost of rebalancing (assumed fixed) and Rp, = annual 
forward looking portfolio return, then (the log of) final wealth, In W. 
, 
has expected value 
and variance: 
(7.2) In W. =1nWo+ýTlln(1+RP, /m)+ln(l-c. p, ) 
je 1nWo+ýT 1(Rf, lm)-c. p, =1nWo+Z=1RPý°' 
E(1nWT)ý1nWo+ýT, ERp, ef 
Q(1nWT)gý eS2P e 
where Rp ;"= (R p, / m) - c. p, is the per period return net of transactions costs, e is the 
(Txl) unit vector and Q. is the (TxT) covariance matrix of net returns for the forward 
looking portfolio. If expected returns and the expected proportion of funds switched are 
constant each rebalancing period then the active strategy gives: 
(7.3) E(In W,. ) ;e In Wo + y. ERf, 
- 
y. (m. Ep). c 
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A passive (index tracker) strategy with constant expected returns each period and 
zero transactions costs has E(ln Wir,. ) In Wo + y. ER and the variance of the passive 
strategy is 6(lnW, r,,. ) eQ, re . The breakeven condition for the active strategy to give the 
$ame level of expected wealth as the passive strategy is: 
(7.4) ERp 
-ER = (m. Ep). c 
Therefore the standard result is that the active strategy gives a higher expected 
wealth than the passive strategy when the excess (annual) return from the active strategy 
exceeds the annual cost of switching. 
Consider what determines expected final wealth from the active and passive 
strategies. For the active strategy, both RR, and p, are likely to depend on the number of 
rebalancing periods per year, m, and the size of the portfolio, z. If the persistence of 
winners is short-lived then more frequent rebalancing (higher m) will tend to give a 
higher value for the expected annual return, ERR 
, 
and with zero transactions costs, higher 
expected terminal wealth. However, the proportion of funds rebalanced each year, 
(m. Ep), will probably rise with increased frequency of rebalancing which, with 
transaction costs, will detract from returns as transactions cost per annum rise 
proportionately with m. Hence with transactions costs, the resulting level of expected 
final wealth as rebalancing frequency increases depends on the interplay of a higher 
expected return and higher annual rebalancing costs. This cannot be determined a priori 
and forms a key element of the empirical analysis. 
If persistence is concentrated in the extreme tails of the performance distribution 
then the expected annual return on the `winner' portfolio, ERp 
, 
is likely to be negatively 
related the size of the portfolio, z, for any given rebalancing frequency. Therefore 
portfolios containing a small number of winner funds are likely to have higher gross 
returns (i. e. ignoring transactions costs) than larger portfolios. However, it is difficult to 
say a priori how the proportion of funds rebalanced each period (Ep) will vary with the 
size of the portfolio and hence whether the active strategy will `beat' the passive strategy 
(net of transaction costs), see (7.4) where m is fixed. For example, for a winner portfolio, 
how Ep changes with z, depends on the distribution of mean returns and standard 
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deviation for those funds that are close to the bottom of the z-cohort. If there is no 
persistence then p will rise as the size of the fund gets smaller. In contrast, if there is 
persistence only in very small portfolios of winner funds, then we expect p to rise as the 
size of the fund increases (at least initially), since as the fund gets larger we introduce 
extra funds into the winner portfolio whose returns differ only randomly, resulting in more 
turnover at each rebalancing date. The above analysis suggests that if persistence of 
winners is concentrated in relatively small portfolios, this results in higher average gross 
returns and lower transactions costs due to less frequent rebalancing, giving the active 
strategy the best chance of beating the passive strategy. The empirical analysis provides 
evidence on the sensitivity of expected final wealth to different size portfolios. 
Turning now to the distribution of final wealth for the active and passive strategies. 
For the active strategy all n WT) depends on the covariance matrix Q,, of net returns 
R' ' =(Rp, Im)-c. p,. If portfolio returns Rf; " are niid(p, a2) then the logarithm of 
final wealth is In W. 
- 
N(In Wo + pT, a2T) 
- 
so final wealth is lognormally distributed 
with known mean and standard deviation. However, when using alternative sorting rules 
there may be forward looking portfolio returns RP (t, T) which are persistent and hence 
one would not expect the independence assumption to hold and normality is unlikely to 
hold, particularly for small portfolios of funds (from chapter 6 and Kosowski et al 2004). 
In addition, we are interested in the distribution of final wealth taking account of the 
transactions costs of switching and the latter is stochastic depending in part on the serial 
correlation in past returns. So if there is persistence the covariances between future returns 
and the proportion of funds switched p, (which depends on the autocorrelation in returns) 
are likely to be non-zero. Therefore, to obtain the distribution of final wealth this study 
uses bootstrap techniques. 
To illustrate the cross-section bootstrap procedure (see Efron and Tibshirani 1993, 
Politis and Romano 1994) and the methodology used to assess the impact of uncertainty 
across all fund returns on final wealth, consider the simple case of sorting all funds on 
their past t-alphas and initially assume zero transactions costs. First, at each rebalancing 
date t, using the past 60 observations, the 4-factor model is estimated r, = ä, +ß, 'F, + e,,, 
for i= {1,2, 
..., 
M) funds, where F, = vector of risk factors and e are the residuals of 
fund i. For each fund i, the procedure (contemporaneously across funds) draws a random 
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sample (with replacement) from the residuals e and uses these re-sampled bootstrap 
residuals F,,, to generate a simulated excess return series F,., = a, + A' F, + j,,,. Next the 
procedure re-estimates the factor model for all funds using the simulated data (and the 
factors) and then sorts funds by t-alpha and forms different fractile portfolios. The returns 
on these ` forward looking' fractile portfolios are measured over the period (t, t+h). This 
process is repeated for each fractile at each rebalancing period to give the simulated series 
R, f (t, T), which are used to calculate final wealth (WT) for each fractile portfolio. This 
constitutes the first run of the bootstrap. The above is then repeated B-times (B=1,000) 
which gives the bootstrap distribution of final wealth f(14 
. 
), for each fractile portfolio. 
Given the randomness introduced by the cross-section bootstrap at each 
rebalancing date, one will generally obtain a different ordering of the funds, which is 
solely due to the distribution of idiosyncratic risk across all funds. This is what determines 
the distribution of final wealth for each fractile portfolio. Hence for each run of the 
bootstrap, different funds are `switched' into and out of any given fractile portfolio at each 
rebalancing date. 
Now consider transactions costs. At each rebalancing date the specific funds that 
are switched are noted and tracked so one can calculate portfolio turnover and hence 
transactions costs. This has been done here for alternative rebalancing costs (load fees and 
bid-ask spread) of 0%, 2.5% and 5% (of market value) for each fund that is switched and 
the final wealth is calculated for an investment of £1,000 over a 10 year horizon ending in 
December 2002. 
When funds `drop out' of the portfolio at a particular rebalancing date, they are 
sold and the whole of their value is then invested (in equal amounts) in the funds which 
replace them. When purchasing a new fund alternative transactions costs of 0%, 2.5% or 
5% (of value) are assumed which are immediately deducted from the amount invested. 
Also of interest is to compare the distribution of final wealth from the above active 
strategies to that from a passive strategy. The bootstrap distribution for the passive 
strategy is more simple. From among the index tracker funds in the data set, one procedure 
is to randomly choose (with equal probability) a single tracker fund at t=0 and hold that 
fund over the investment horizon. Hence we incur no rebalancing costs and the chosen 
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tracker's returns for the first run of the bootstrap can be used to calculate final wealth. 
The above is repeated B-times to give the distribution of final wealth for the passive 
investment strategy. Although one might expect a relatively narrower distribution of final 
wealth from the passive relative to an active strategy, there is still variation among tracker 
performance, not least because of different management fees (e. g. see Mahoney 2004 and 
Elton et al 2004). All mutual fund returns in the data set are net of management fees and in 
generating the bootstrap distribution of final wealth in this passive strategy the procedure 
assumes zero transactions costs for the single buy-sell transaction of the tracker 
investment. (For consistency transactions costs are not applied to the initial equally 
weighted investment in the active strategy above). 
This completes the discussion of the persistence testing methodology. In chapter 8, 
this study implements these procedures to test for persistence among both fractiles and 
`smaller' portfolios of funds, to estimate actual final wealth from persistence strategies 
and its (bootstrapped) distribution which embodies risk across all funds and also to 
compare final wealth from an active persistence strategy with that of a passive strategy. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Empirical Results of the Persistence Tests 
This chapter presents the main findings from the application of the persistence testing 
methodologies discussed in chapter 7 to the data set of UK mutual funds. Tables and 
Charts of results are presented at the end of the chapter. 
8.1 Recursive Portfolio Formation 
In this section, the study uses all 842 actively managed UK equity mutual funds which 
exist for some or all of the data period. When sorting on past raw returns, results for 
alternative `ranking/rebalancing' horizons of 12/12,12/6,12/3 and 12/1 months are 
reported. When ranking using past 4-factor t-alphas, at each rebalancing date only funds 
which have at least 60 months of data are used and 'ranking/rebalancing' horizons of 
60/12,60/6,60 /3 and 60/1 months are presented. 12 
Table 8.1 reports the `forward looking' decile alphas from the 4-factor model 
where funds are ranked either by past raw returns (Panel A) or past t-alpha (Panel B). 
Results using the 4-factor model are qualitatively similar to results obtained using the 
Fama-French 3-factor model but as the momentum variable is statistically significant for 
most of the `forward looking' portfolios, in this chapter the study reports results for the 4- 
factor model. In particular, the momentum variable is found to be statistically significant 
for the extreme winner and lose decile portfolios (but much less so for the middle ranked, 
4`h to 6th decile portfolios). The statistical significance of the momentum variable is also 
more evident the more frequent the rebalancing. 
After ranking on past one-year returns (Panel A), most of the decile portfolios have 
negative forward looking alphas with those of past `loser' funds being statistically 
1 The minimum 60 observation restriction is applied to reduce estimation error. There is a trade off between 
reduced estimation error and survivorship bias and using 60 months seems a reasonable compromise (see 
Kothari and Warner 2001 on size and power properties in estimating alpha using factor models and 
Mamaysky, Spiegel and Zhang 2005 on errors when sorting on alphas estimated over short horizons). 
2 Different ranking and holding periods have also been tested but this does not qualitatively affect the key 
results. For example, 6/12,6/6,6/3 and 6/1 periods for funds sorted by past returns and 36/12,36/6, 
36/3,36/1 periods for funds sorted by past t-alphas. 
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significant. Only the top decile portfolio, when rebalanced every 6 months (or more 
frequently), reveals a positive (but statistically insignificant) alpha. Broadly similar results 
are obtained when sorting by t-alpha (Table 8.1, Panel B). For example, generally when 
sorted by t-alphas, the negative forward looking alphas for the lower deciles are 
statistically significant and range between 
-0.14 (-1.68% p. a. ) and -0.17 (-2.04% p. a. ) and 
similarly when sorted by returns, range between 
-0.14 (-1.68% p. a. ) and -0.24 (-2.88% 
p. a. ). For the top decile when sorted by t-alpha, the forward looking alphas lie between 
- 
0.003 (-0.036% p. a. ) and 0.012 (0.14% p. a. ) and similarly when sorted by returns are 
between 
-0.046 (-0.55% p. a. ) and 0.038 (0.45% p. a. ) - but none is statistically significant. 
Therefore sorting on either past returns or past t-alphas gives qualitatively similar results 
for the forward looking alphas of the top and bottom deciles 
- 
past losers continue to 
perform badly, while the past winner decile shows little evidence of positive and 
economically significant persistence. 
After sorting on past returns or past t-alphas the top decile does not show evidence 
of statistically significant forward-looking alphas, although some are positive. The latter 
suggests that if there is any positive persistence among UK mutual funds one would 
expect to find it within the top decile of past winners. Given the increase in the number of 
funds through the sample period, the top decile (or any fractile) portfolio tends to contain 
an increasing number of funds over time. The data set consists of 842 (active) funds which 
implies the top decile contains a maximum of 84 funds. This portfolio might be too 
heterogeneous to identify (a few) genuine repeat winners due to a very wide spread in 
past returns or t-alphas. Hence, this study repeats the above analysis for different `smaller' 
fund-of-funds from among the past winner funds. This mitigates the heterogeneity 
problem but smaller portfolios may involve severe non-normality in idiosyncratic risks 
(from chapter 6). This necessitates the use of bootstrap standard errors on the forward 
looking alphas which are reported throughout. Smaller portfolios of a fixed size 
(throughout the whole investment horizon) are likely to be a more realistic ex-ante 
strategy for many investors. 
Table 8.2 reports the alphas (and bootstrap p-values) for the 4-factor model when 
funds are sorted either by returns (Panel A) or by t-alphas (Panel B) using alternative 
`smaller' portfolios of a fixed number of funds ranging from 1 to 50. Sorting by returns 
(Panel A) there are some statistically significant forward looking alphas for portfolios 
containing up to the 3 best funds when the rebalancing period is less than 12 months 
- 
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with the best results in terms of statistical significance for the 12/3, 'ranking/rebalancing' 
period. Sorting by t-alpha, portfolios containing between 3 and 6 funds show statistically 
significant persistence (at a 10% significance level) for monthly rebalancing and a 
portfolio of 3 or 6 funds is statistically significant for 3 monthly rebalancing. When funds 
are sorted by t-alpha, the statistically significant forward looking 4-factor alphas range 
from 0.14 (1.68% p. a. ) to 0.21 (2.52% p. a. ) and when sorted by returns the alphas are 
between 0.28 (3.36% p. a. ) and 0.79 (8.4% p. a. ). What is clear from Table 8.2 is that there 
is some statistically significant positive persistence for small size portfolios of past 
winners as long as rebalancing is quite frequent but this may involve high transactions 
costs, an issue examined later. 
Given that the bottom two deciles of past loser funds tend to have statistically 
significant negative forward looking alphas from Table 8.1, it is not surprising that this 
carries over to smaller portfolios of past loser funds. For almost all small portfolios of 
past loser funds sorted by past returns and comprising between 1 and 50 of the worst funds 
(and for all alternative rebalancing periods), this study finds statistically significant 
negative forward looking alphas (Table 8.3, Panel A). When the worst performing funds 
are sorted by past t-alphas, the results are qualitatively similar with negative forward 
looking 4-factor alphas, very many of which are statistically significant. For example, the 
portfolio formed from the 5 worst past t-alpha funds gives a forward looking 4-factor 
alpha of around 
-0.2% p. m. (-2.4% p. a., p<0.01) for the ranking/rebalancing periods, 
60/12,60/6 and 60/3. There is therefore clear evidence that poor performance persists. 
8.2 Final Wealth: Passive versus Active Strategies with Transaction Costs 
Comparing risk versus return in the distribution of final wealth from alternative strategies 
is problematic. While there may be agreement on the metric for the average level of final 
wealth (e. g. median or mean), the metric for `risk' is much less clear cut. For example, 
variance, semi-variance, interquartile range, skewness, kurtosis, lower partial moment, 
value at risk, expected tail loss, worse case scenario are all potential candidates. In what 
follows this study therefore does not use a single metric for the relative importance of risk 
versus return but merely comments on various aspects of the alternative distributions of 
final wealth, from the alternative investment strategies. 
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The previous discussion of results indicated that some small portfolios of past 
winner funds yield statistically significant positive forward looking alphas if frequently 
rebalanced (every three months or less, Tables 8.1 and 8.2). The study therefore initially 
presents results for the distribution of final wealth for three month rebalancing periods, 
with alternative transactions costs of 0%, 2.5% and 5% and alternative size portfolios. 
Figure 8.1 shows results for funds sorted on past returns while Figure 8.2 shows results for 
funds sorted on past t-alpha. Each figure shows the median level of final wealth from the 
bootstrap distribution (as described in chapter 7, section 7.2) as well as the 5% and 95% 
percentiles for each size portfolio for the active strategy. 
For the passive strategy the median level of final wealth from the bootstrap 
procedure is £1,800 (a geometric average return of 6% p. a. ) with a relatively small 
standard deviation of £180 and a range of £360. The distribution is approximately normal. 
In this section final wealth is calculated for an investment of £1,000 over a 10 year 
horizon ending in December 2002. 
In the active strategy, when sorting by past raw returns (Figure 8.1), average final 
wealth (irrespective of transactions costs) falls as the number of funds, z, rises from 1 fund 
to around 10 funds. From above, the analysis suggests that the very top funds have some 
persistence, i. e. there is persistence in small portfolios of funds, although from Figure 8.1, 
even in small portfolios higher average returns are offset as we add funds whose returns 
vary randomly. However, as long as the portfolio is in excess of about 10 funds, final 
wealth is not dramatically influenced by the size of the portfolio, particularly when 
transactions costs are accounted. 
Average final wealth falls dramatically (for all size portfolios) when transactions 
costs are introduced. For example, for a 10-fund portfolio average final wealth falls by 
36% for 2.5% transactions costs and by a further 39% when transactions costs are at 5%. 
However, when we measure risk as the 5`h-95th range of wealth outcomes (i. e. WT(95%) 
- 
WT(5%) ), there is no reduction in `risk per unit of expect wealth' with higher transactions 
costs, as this risk-to-wealth ratio (for the 10-fund portfolio) is always around 65% for 
either zero, or 2.5% and 5% transactions costs. 
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From Figure 8.1, given that the median level of wealth from the passive strategy is 
£1,800, it is probably the case that most investors would choose the active strategy with 
zero transactions costs over the passive strategy. The simulations indicate a zero 
probability that the active strategy with zero transaction costs would produce a final 
wealth less than £1,800. When transactions costs are 2.5% (per fund transaction), the 
median level of final wealth in an active portfolio with less than 20 funds is greater than 
the median final wealth under the passive strategy, though this is reversed for portfolio 
sizes greater than 20 funds. For portfolio sizes up to about 10 funds there is a probability 
of up to 25% (the probability rises with portfolio size) that the active strategy will yield a 
lower final wealth than the passive strategy. For the larger portfolios this probability rises 
to 50%. There is much less downside risk with the passive strategy (with a standard 
deviation of only £180) but at a cost in terms of less upside potential. So the choice 
between them is relatively even but a loss averse investor would probably favour the 
passive strategy. With transactions costs at 5% there is only a 5% probability or less that 
the active strategy will `beat' a passive strategy even for a very small portfolio of only two 
funds. For larger portfolios the probability is close to zero. 
Turning now to the results based on the t-alpha sort in Figure 8.2. Again, the 
previous section (Table 8.2) points to some evidence of persistence in small portfolios of 
funds. Note, first from Figure 8.2, unlike in Figure 8.1, in small portfolios higher average 
returns are not offset as more funds are added up to around 5 or 10 funds. This is 
consistent with the results in Table 8.2 where evidence of persistence was found among 
slightly larger portfolios of funds (up to 6). Second, when sorting by past t-alpha here 
average final wealth falls less dramatically (for all size portfolios) after transactions costs 
are incorporated, than when sorting by past returns. For example, for a 10-fund portfolio 
average final wealth falls by about 26% for 2.5% transactions costs and by a further 26% 
when transactions costs are at 5%. This latter effect is due to lower proportionate 
rebalancing costs when sorting by t-alpha rather than past returns since in the former case 
any large alpha estimates due to (good or bad luck) are scaled by their standard errors, so 
less funds change their ranking at any rebalancing date (compared with sorting by returns 
which has no `correction' for luck). As before, however, as long as the portfolio size is 
above around 10 funds, when sorting by either past raw returns or past t-alpha final wealth 
is not dramatically influenced by the size of the portfolio. 
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Similar to the returns sorted case, when looking at the t-alpha sorted results we 
find that there is no reduction in the risk-wealth ratio when transactions costs are 
incorporated. For example, for the 10-fund portfolio this metric is always around 12% for 
either zero, or 2.5% and 5% transactions costs. The latter compares with 65% for the 
returns sorted strategy 
- 
so the latter has more risk per unit of average wealth than the t- 
alpha ranking strategy. But as we argued above, looking at any single metric for the risk- 
return trade off is somewhat arbitrary. 
Comparing the t-alpha (active) ranking strategy with the passive strategy it is 
probably the case that nearly all investors would choose the active strategy with zero 
transactions costs and also with 2.5% transactions costs, since even in the latter case the 
active strategy has a less than 5% probability of doing worse than the median outcome of 
£1,800 for the passive strategy (for almost all portfolios sizes). However, with transactions 
costs at 5%, the simulations indicate that the active strategy has a 0% chance of producing 
a higher final wealth outcome than the passive strategy for all size portfolios (and has 
considerably more downside risk) so the choice here seems to favour the passive strategy. 
The above results show how important transactions cost are when deciding 
between a passive or active strategy. The analysis suggests that if transactions costs are 
less than 2.5% per fund round trip, an active strategy sorting on past t-alpha (with 3 month 
rebalancing) will with high probability yield a higher final wealth than the passive 
strategy. With transactions costs of 5% the passive strategy is most probably superior. So 
there is a prima facie case for active management in the UK based on ex-ante `sorting 
rules', for `small' fund-of-funds portfolios with rebalancing every 3 months and where 
transactions costs of rebalancing are at or below 2.5% per fund transaction. 
8.3 Conclusion 
Chapter 7 and chapter 8 examined the economic and statistical significance of persistence 
for a large sample of UK `active' equity mutual funds with a data set from April 1975 to 
December 2002. Sorting funds into deciles based on past raw returns or on past 4-factor t- 
alphas the study finds strong evidence that past decile loser funds continue to perform 
badly in terms of their future 4-factor alphas and little evidence that past decile winner 
funds provide future positive risk adjusted performance - similar to earlier results in 
Quigley and Sinquefield (1999) using around 750 UK equity funds over the period 1978- 
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97. However, on investigating relatively small fund-of-funds portfolios of past winners, 
there is evidence that rebalancing every 3 months (or every I month), with portfolios of up 
to around 5 funds does yield some statistically and economically significant 4-factor 
alphas. So an active portfolio strategy of avoiding past loser funds and choosing a small 
portfolio of past winner funds may earn positive risk adjusted returns (after management 
fees but before the deduction of transactions costs of the active strategy). 
Long-term, investors are interested in the distribution of final wealth (e. g. mean, 
skewness, kurtosis) from an active strategy, relative to that from alternative strategies such 
as holding index trackers 
- 
taking account of `luck' across all funds and transactions costs 
of rebalancing. Using a cross-section bootstrap approach the study derived the empirical 
distribution of final wealth over a 10 year horizon for active strategies, incorporating 
transactions costs in each rebalancing period and compared this with the distribution from 
a passive strategy of (randomly) holding an index tracker fund over the whole investment 
horizon (thus avoiding transactions costs). The analysis suggests that if rebalancing is 
frequent (e. g. every 3 months) and if transactions costs are less than 2.5% per fund round 
trip, then an active strategy of sorting on past t-alpha seems at least as good as a passive 
strategy but with transactions costs of 5% the passive strategy is most probably superior. 
So there is a prima facie case for an active strategy in the UK based on ex-ante `sorting 
rules', for `small' fund portfolios as long as average switching costs of rebalancing are 
below 2.5%. 
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CHAPTER 9 
NONPARAMETRIC MARKET TIMING METHODOLOGY 
This chapter describes the nonparametric test of market timing used in this study. This 
methodology is applied to the UK equity mutual fund industry in chapter 10. 
9.1 A Nonparametric Test of Market Timing 
The test was first applied by Jiang (2003) to US mutual funds. The market model dictates 
that 
(9.1) r,,, +i = a, + /j,,, rm,, +i + e,,, +i 
where ri is the excess return on fund i, a; is a security selectivity measure assumed to be 
independent of market timing, ßi, t is conditional on the fund manager's market timing 
information at time t. The market timer decides on ßt, the fund's exposure to the market 
for the forthcoming period, at time t. r,,,, t+i is the relevant benchmark market excess return 
against which the fund is evaluated. 
The manager's timing ability is determined by his ability to correctly predict market 
movements. Let P.,, +, = E(rm., +, I I) be the manager's forecast for the next period's market 
return based on the information set I. The parameter v is defined as 
(9.2) V= Pr(rm, r=+1 > rm, rý+1 I rm, r=+1 > r.,,, +, ) - m, i, i - Pr(rm, r3+1 < rm,, 1 +1 1 rm, r1+1 > rm, fi+l ) 
Under the null hypothesis of no market timing ability v=0 since the probability of a 
correct forecast equals the probability of an incorrect forecast. v e[-1,1] where the two 
extreme values represent perfect negative and perfect positive (i. e. successful) market 
timing respectively. Equation (9.2) may also be written as: 
(9.3) v=2 Pr(r", 
, º_+i > 
rm, 
r, +t I rm, r2+> > rm, º, +i ) -1 
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The next step is to link the manager's forecast of the market with his response in adjusting 
ß;, l in (9.1). For any triplet of market return observations {rm,, ý , r,,, 3 , r,,, ,3} sampled 
from any 
three time periods (not necessarily in consecutive chronological order) with 
{rm, 
i 
<rm,, <rm, 
l} an 
informed timer will maintain a higher exposure to the market over 
the rm ] range than in the [rm,,, 
, 
rm,,, ] range. Simple (nonparametric) beta estimates 
for both time ranges are A, = (r= - r,,,, )-r.,,, ) and ß12 = (r, - r3 )- rm,,, ) 
. 
Beta embodies both the precision of the market return forecast and the aggressiveness of 
the manager's response. The latter is affected by risk aversion. Grinblatt and Titman 
(1989) show that for a fund i with non-increasing absolute risk aversion and independent 
timing and selectivity information 
a8 
>0 yielding a convex fund return/market return arm, 
t+l 
relationship 
(9.4) r, - 
r= 
> 
r,,, 2 - r,,,, 
rm, y - rm,, l 
rm t2 - rm r, 
which allows (9.3) to be written as 
(9.5) v=2 Pr(fl, 
= 
> ß,, I rm, r2+1 ý rm, y+l) 
_1 
A sample statistic of a fund's timing ability may be constructed as follows: assigning a 
sign function that assumes a value of 1(-1) if the argument is positive (negative) and 
equals zero if the argument equals zero, it is a U-statistic with kernel of order three. 
(9.6) 9= n r-r 
''2 r''2 -r,,,, sign 3 
, ýýý<ý, 2<ýý2 
rmý2 
_rmf2 rm22 ýrm', 
1 
9 is the average sign across all triplets taken from n observations. 9,, is a 4n-consistent 
and asymptotically normal estimator (Abrevaya and Jiang, 2001, Serfling, 1980). 
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Hence J(9 
- 
0) 
-4 N(0, a26. ) 
where 
(9.7) 
and 
-1 2 
"n 6 
-E 
2] h(z,,, z,: 
ºz,, 
)-B" 
"nf, 
=1 2 ,, <,, ,, x,, ,, m,, 
(9.8) h(z z z)=sign l rt'-r, f' > rtZ-rt, ýr <r <r t, ý f3 , tý l rm, y - rm, f= rm tl - rm, ti 
Under the null hypothesis of no market timing z=J. 9/äe is asymptotically N(0,1). 
Note, the calculation in (9.7) includes triplets h(z,, 
, 
z,, 
, 
z,, ), h(z,, 
, 
z,, 
, 
z,, ), h(z,, 
, 
z,, 
, 
z,, ) 
, 
i. e. 
the same three market return observations drawn in different combinations. However, the 
sign in (9.8) is equal in all three cases as from (9.8) it is conditional on rm 
,, 
< rm 
,, 
< rm 
,,, 
i. e. irrespective of the order in which the market return observations are drawn they are 
first sorted in ascending order and there can only be one such sorting. 
One difficulty in examining a fund's market timing skill is decomposing the 
quality of the manager's information concerning the future market return and the 
aggressiveness with which he responds to this information. A rational investor is more 
concerned with the former as the investor can control the latter himself by choosing the 
proportion of their wealth to be invested with the mutual fund manager rather than in cash. 
The market timing tests of Treynor-Mazuy (TM) and Henriksson-Merton (HM), as 
outlined in the literature review section of this study, do not decompose the quality of 
market timing signals from the aggressiveness of response in market timing. 
Recall from the literature review that the TM test specifies a quadratic regression 
of the form 
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Yiuýrm, t+I]z + E(9.9) ri, t+l -ai + e, (rm, t+l) + i, t+1 
where the coefficient y;,, measures market timing ability. r;, t+i and rm. t+t are the fund and 
market excess returns respectively. Admati et al (1986) demonstrate that the model is 
consistent with a manager with constant absolute risk aversion who adjusts the portfolio 
beta at time t according to a private linear signal of the form 
(9.10) ß, t - Oi +'Yiu[rm, t+i] + 11t 
where Tit is random noise. The hypothesis of no abnormal timing performance implies y;,, = 
0. 
Henriksson and Merton (1981) propose a model in which the conditional portfolio 
beta has two target values in a binary response function depending on the manager's 
forecast of whether market return will exceed the risk free rate. The authors show that if 
the manager can successfully time the market then the coefficient Yju in the following 
regression will be positive. 
ý9.11ý ri, t+l = ai + e, (rm, t+l) + Yiuýrm, t+lý + Ei, t+l 
where [rmt+i]+ is defined as max(O, rmt+1)" 
In the TM measure the estimated market timing coefficient in (9.9) clearly picks up 
on the response (aggressiveness) function, r, u, in (9.10). Consequently more aggressive 
response may show up as a higher timing coefficient in (9.9). Similarly, Henrikkson- 
Merton (1981) show that (p1 + p2 
-1). (r7z -r71) is a consistent estimate of r,, in 9.11, 
where pi and p2 are the conditional probabilities of the manager correctly forecasting 
negative and positive market excess returns respectively in period t+1 and r7, and 17, are 
the fund target betas in each case. Hence the estimated HM timing measure in 9.11, y, M, 
incorporates both the quality of manger information, p, +p2 
-1, and the aggressiveness of 
response, 172 
-771. The nonparametric measure of Jiang (2003) on the other hand simply 
measures how often a manager correctly forecasts a market movement and acts on it, 
irrespective of how aggressively he acts on it. This is reflected in the fact that the sign 
function in (9.6) assigns a value of 1(-1) if the argument is positive (negative) regardless 
of the size of the argument. 
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A further advantage of the nonparametric measure is that it is more robust in 
testing for timing skill among managers whose timing frequency may differ from the 
frequency of the sample data and/or whose timing frequency may not be uniform. The 
timing statistic in (9.6) investigates timing over all triplets of fund returns rather than just 
consecutive observations and consequently uses more information than the regression 
based tests. Furthermore, therefore, the nonparametric measure permits the cross-section 
of fund managers to have different timing strategies. The model based approaches of TM 
and HM, however, are more restrictive in that they assume knowledge of the timing 
frequency of the manager and that this is the same across managers. 
As discussed in the earlier section on the literature review, the HM regression may 
exhibit conditional heteroscedasticty. Breen et at (1986) show that the test that ignores 
heteroscedasticity falsely rejects the true null hypothesis of no market timing too often 
while the probability of failing to reject the null hypothesis when it is not true also 
increases significantly. This can significantly affect the conclusions of the HM test. 
However, as noted by Jiang (2003) the asymptotic distribution of the nonparametric 
timing measure in (9.6) is unaffected by heteroscedasticity in fund returns. 
The nonparametric test is mildly restrictive in behaviour but less restrictive than 
standard parametric tests: The nonparametric test requires ßt be a non-decreasing function 
of Grinblatt and Titman (1989) demonstrate that this requires (i) non-increasing 
absolute risk aversion, (ii) independently and identically distributed (iid) market returns 
and (iii) independent selectivity and timing information. 
First, the requirement of non-increasing absolute risk aversion is less stringent than 
that of the TM and HM measures which require more specific linear and binary response 
functions respectively. 
Second, the lid assumption rules out heteroscedasticity in market returns and hence 
volatility timing by fund managers. As noted earlier in the discussion on market timing 
literature, a manager may reduce the fund's exposure during periods of expected high 
volatility and consequently if market volatility and market return are positively correlated, 
the market timing measure may under-estimate the quality of the manager's timing 
information. If market volatility and return are uncorrelated then the timing measure 
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remains consistent in the presence of volatility timing. US evidence suggests that the 
relation between market return and volatility is weak (Breen et al 1989, Glosten et al 1993 
and Busse 1999). 
Third, it is a common assumption among market timing studies that the manager's 
market timing and selectivity information are independent (Admati et al, 1986, Grinblatt 
and Titman, 1989). The nonparametric procedure makes a similar assumption. However, 
as discussed in the earlier literature review, Jagannathan and Korajczyk (1986) question 
this assumption, particularly when applied to portfolios containing options and option-like 
securities (such as the common stock of highly levered firms) with nonlinear pay-off 
structures. The Jiang measure, like that of TM and HM, cannot distinguish between 
market timing and spurious option related effects. However, as described in the section 
on data description, all funds examined in this study are composed of at least 80% UK 
domestic equity so any distortion due to holding options is likely to be relatively small. 
9.2 Public versus Private Information: Conditional Market Timing 
It is interesting to examine whether mutual fund managers are able to add market timing 
value to investors by the quality of the manager's private market timing information 
(timing signals) in excess of the information quality contained in publicly available 
information. The latter information is already available to the investor and as such may 
reduce the need for the investor to avail of mutual fund services. 
The nonparametric test can be applied as a conditional statistic after allowing for 
market timing skill attributable to public information. This conditional measure involves 
first calculating both sets of residuals from regressions of the mutual fund returns and 
market returns on the set of public information variables. Clearly, these residuals represent 
the variation in the fund and market returns not explained by the public information. 
Denote the pairwise fund and market residuals as F,,,, and rFm 
,, 
j=1,2,3... T, respectively. 
The procedure described above in (9.6) may then be applied to the residuals to yield a 
conditional timing measure 
(9.12) 0n= iI aS% 
r(3 
- 
r, 
2 >r 
ý_ - 
r, 
' gn 
rM 
ý3 rm ý_ rm ý2 rm 11 
191 
Note, B in (9.6) and B in (9.12) can clearly be of different magnitudes but may also be of 
different sign. For example, B>O but j.: 50 may indicate a successful market timing 
manager whose skill is attributable to public information. 
This study examines conditional market timing using a set of public information 
variables commonly applied in this area of the literature, (see Ferson and Schadt, 1996). 
These variables may have market predictability. They include (i) the one month UK Tbill 
rate, (ii) the market divided yield and (iii) the term spread (10 year 
-1 month yield spread) 
and (iv) the gilt/equity yield ratio. The gilt/equity yield ratio is the ratio of the coupon 
yield on a long term government bond to the market dividend yield. The coupon yield 
should be that of a long term bond to more closely resembles the expected maturity of 
equity. The ratio captures the relative attractiveness of bonds versus equity and as such 
predicts capital flows and price movements in both markets. (See Clare, Wickens and 
Thomas 1994). In this study the yield on a 30 year UK government bond is used. 
Finally, in this study, the nonparametric tests (both conditional and unconditional) 
as described above are implemented for the sample of UK equity mutual funds. However, 
for these tests the sample period is shortened to 15 years and runs from January 1988 to 
December 2002, ie 180 monthly observations. This is necessary in order to reduce the 
computational intensity involved in calculating the cross-sectional set of 9 in (9.6) which 
rises exponentially with the number of fund observations. As described above, the 
calculation of B involves assessing market timing over all triplets of n return 
observations. If the longer full sample period was used, a fund with n= 333 observations 
involves examining 13331 = 6,099,006 triplets. Even a high speed computer takes a 
substantial length of time to calculate the market timing statistic of such long history 
funds. Because market timing is examined for all triplets of return observations, 15 years 
(180 obs. ) is regarded here as a sufficient length of time to reliably gauge whether timing 
skill exists. Including funds of longer life spans would be unlikely to substantially alter 
overall conclusions. However, a minimum observation requirement of 12 monthly 
observations is imposed in order to improve the statistical reliability of the results. 
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CHAPTER 10 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF MARKET TIMING TESTS 
This chapter presents the results from the implementation of the nonparametric market 
timing tests described in chapter 9. Results from both unconditional and conditional tests 
are reported while possible differences in market timing skills between different fund 
investment styles and fund locations are also examined. The sensitivity of results to the 
chosen market benchmark is also discussed. Results relate to the period 
1988M1: 2002M12 unless otherwise stated (see chapter 9 on methodology). All tables and 
figures of results are presented together at the end of the chapter. 
10.1 Market Timing Performance 
- 
All Investment Objectives 
The findings from the unconditional market timing tests are presented in Table 10.1, that 
is tests which are not conditional on public information. Table 10.1 presents market timing 
statistics at various points in the cross-section of performance ranging from the best to the 
worst performer. Fund performance is sorted by the test statistic, z= vrn-. B/QB, in row 1. 
To further improve statistical reliability results are reported for funds with a minimum of 
12 observations which leaves 791 funds in the analysis. Row 2 in Table 10.1 displays the 
market timing coefficient, B,,. 
From row 1, it is evident that there are a relatively small number of skilled market 
timers as only the top 12 ranked funds demonstrate statistically significant positive market 
timing ability at the 5% significance level (one-tail test), around 1.5% of the sample of 
funds. In fact the cross-sectional average timing test statistic is 
-0.738. More specifically, 
77% of funds demonstrate negative (perverse) market timing. 12% of funds show 
statistically significant negative market timing. Positive market timing is found for 23% of 
funds but this is significant for only 1.5% of funds. Figure 10.1 plots a histogram of the 
cross-sectional distribution of the market timing test statistics and it is clear that the 
distribution is centred on a value less than zero (indicating negative market timing ability 
on average). 
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Overall, the nonparametric market timing test procedure fails to find evidence of 
timing ability among more than a `handful' of actual UK equity mutual funds. For 
comparison, in Table 10.1 row 3 and row 4 present the t-statistics of the market timing 
coefficients of the Treynor-Mazuy (TM) and Henriksson-Merton (HM) tests for the funds 
as ranked in row 1. Interestingly, 10 of the top 12 funds which are found to have 
statistically significant market timing ability by the nonparametric test are also found to be 
successful market timers using the TM procedure while 11 yield statistically significant 
timing coefficients by the HM procedures (at the 5% significance level). The overall 
picture regarding the market timing ability of UK equity unit trusts differs slightly across 
the different testing methods where 31 (22) funds are found to have significant timing skill 
by the TM (HM) procedures. A matrix of correlation coefficients between the market 
timing test statistics of the three procedures reveals a higher coefficient of 0.95 between 
the TM and HM tests than the nonparametric/TM correlation coefficient of 0.81 or the 
nonparametric/HM correlation coefficient of 0.86. Jiang (2003) reports similar findings 
and suggests that the higher correlation between the TM and HM measures may arise 
because these methods capture not only the quality of the fund manager's timing 
information but also the aggressiveness of his response to this information (see discussion 
on methodology). The nonparametric timing coefficient, on the other hand, ignores the 
aggressiveness of response in timing. This methodological difference may also account for 
the slightly higher prevalence of timing found by the TM and HM methods relative to the 
nonparametric procedure. 
Comparing the nonparametric market timing test results here with the bootstrap 
stock selection results in chapter 6, there is no overlap between the best performing funds 
in each case, i. e. funds which are found to have stock picking skill are not the highest 
performing market timers. In fact across the full sample of funds the cross-sectional 
correlation coefficient between the funds' nonparametric market timing statistic and t- 
statistics of alpha is only 0.05. This may suggest that funds generally do not pursue dual 
strategies of stock selection and market timing. However, as noted by Jiang (2003) and 
discussed previously in chapter 9 on methodology, such a conclusion is complicated by 
the fact that a fund manager's stock selection and market timing information may be 
correlated and both performance measures may bias one another. 
Clearly, evaluating the timing skill of fund managers may depend on the market 
benchmark against which funds are assessed. The market timing results discussed above 
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are based on the FTSE A All Share (total) returns index. The market index that actual fund 
managers attempt to time (if any) is generally unknown in the case of the UK'. To 
examine a possible bias in results from selecting an incorrect market benchmark and to 
examine the robustness of findings, in this study the market timing tests above are 
repeated employing an alternative market benchmark: the (total) returns on the FTSE 100 
index. The results of this procedure are reported in row 5, Table 10.1. The results between 
the two benchmark indices are broadly similar. Using the FTSE 100 index, 6 funds 
(around 1%) demonstrate statistically significant market timing skill by the nonparametric 
test. The same 6 funds were also identified as successful timers against the FT A All Share 
index. In the case of the FTSE 100 index, a higher 24% of funds display significant 
negative timing. Generally, however, the timing tests are robust to the choice of market 
index. 
Similar to the earlier chapters in this study on the bootstrap evaluation of security 
selection skill, this section on market timing also mitigates against survivorship bias by 
including nonsurviving funds in the analysis2. Of the 791 funds examined, 208 are 
nonsurvivors. In Table 10.1, the row denoted ` Survival' indicates whether the sorted funds 
were survivors or nonsurvivors: I=a survivor, 0=a nonsurvivor. None of the funds 
which demonstrate statistically significant positive timing ability are nonsurvivors. This 
under-representation of nonsurviving funds among the top performing market timers 
differs from the disproportionately high number of nonsurvivors among funds found to 
have security selection skill by the bootstrap analysis. However, as hypothesised 
previously, it may well be such `selectivity' skill which motivates the acquisition/merger 
of a number of these funds causing them to appear as `nonsurvivors' in the first instance. 
These market timing results for the UK mutual fund industry are broadly in line 
with those of Jiang (2003) for the US industry. Jiang reports unconditional test results for 
a number of alternative benchmark market indices but consistently finds that less than 5% 
of the sample of US funds possess statistically significant positive timing skill. For some 
selected indices, this figure is less than 2%. Similarly, Jiang also finds that the average US 
fund manager displays negative timing ability. One difference in findings between the 
two studies is in the relationship between fund age and fund market timing performance. 
' Except in the case of index tracker funds but these are excluded in this study of market timing. 
2 However, there is a possible look-ahead bias. This arises because of the restriction that a fund must possess 
a minimum of 12 monthly observations to be included in the analysis. This restriction is imposed to improve 
the statistical reliability of the market timing estimates. 
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The final row of Table 10.1 reports the number of (monthly) observations of the sorted 
funds3. It is evident that better performing market timers are generally shorter-lived. In 
results not shown, the average market timing test statistic among funds of between I and 5 
years maturity is 
-0.493 while among funds of greater than 10 years maturity is -0.936, 
although note both figures are negative and statistically insignificant. Jiang (2003) 
similarly reports negative and insignificant market timing (on average) among these age 
categories but the finding is reversed in that the author finds that market timing 
performance improves, rather than worsens with age. Interestingly, the poorer timing 
performance among longer-lived UK funds is consistent with the relatively poor 
selectivity skill from the bootstrap analysis previously. A number of possible explanations 
for this finding were posited in chapter 6. 
10.2 Market Timing and the Sample Period 
In chapter 9 on methodology, it was explained that for computational reasons the sample 
period is restricted to January 1988 - December 2002 (15 years). Although this is a 
sufficiently long sample period from which to draw overall inferences, it nevertheless 
raises a question regarding whether market timing results could be sample period specific. 
More particularly, might timing ability vary according to market conditions, i. e. a bull or 
bear market, a sharp versus moderate upward or downward market trend etc? 
Figure 10.2 shows a time series plot of the market index used in this study, the 
FTSE A All Share Index over the full sample period January 1975 
- 
December 2002. A 
casual inspection suggests that while the market is generally rising over the period, the 
upward trend is stronger in the latter half of the period (aside from a levelling off post 
1999). To examine whether the market timing skills of funds may depend on the strength 
of the market trend, this study repeats the nonparametric market timing tests for the earlier 
15 year period: 1975 
- 
1989. Results are presented in row 2 of Table 10.2 where row 1 
repeats the results of Table 10.1 for comparison. At the upper end of the performance 
distributions there are the same number of successful market timers in both subperiods, 
i. e. 12 funds at 5% significance. (However, the successful funds in the two sub-periods 
are not the same funds). Interestingly, however, the percentage of funds showing positive 
(negative) timing statistics is 55% (45%) in the earlier period compared to 77% (23%) in 
the later period. This indicates that the degree of market mis-timing (on average across 
3 This is examined to address the question of whether the age of the fund leads to better market timing. 
196 
funds) was higher during the stronger upward market trend. One possible explanation for 
this is the volatility timing described in chapter 9 on methodology: market `mis-timing' 
may be rational if funds are reducing the fund's beta during a high volatility/high return 
period 
- 
if these conditions are positively correlated. (see Breen et al 1989, Glosten et al 
1993 and Busse 1999). 
10.3 Market Timing Performance and Investment Style 
As before with security selection skill, it is of interest to examine whether there are 
differences in market timing skills between funds of different investment objectives, i. e. 
income funds, general equity funds, small stock funds etc. Cleary, this would be a 
valuable input in an investor's asset allocation decisions. However, there is some potential 
for spurious timing inferences across fund investment styles. One difficulty is the assumed 
independence between selectivity and market timing. A manager's information in both 
these areas may be correlated and consequently selectivity and market timing inferences 
may bias one another. For example, it has been argued that small stock funds may exhibit 
spurious timing against a market benchmark comprised of large stocks, (Jagannathan and 
Korajczyk, 1986). This is because small stocks have characteristics resembling that of a 
call option on the market: a bull market leads to a high pay-off, a bear market is more 
likely to mean financial distress for a small stock and no pay-off. This may lead to the 
appearance that small stock funds are market timers. Alternatively, it may be argued that 
general equity funds select from the broadest universe of stocks which make up the 
benchmark market portfolio, again creating an overlap between selectivity and timing 
decisions. 
To examine this question further, Table 10.3 reports the nonparametric market 
timing test statistics of funds by investment style as indicated in each panel. (Results here 
relate to the period 1988M1: 2002M12). Comparing row I of each panel it is clear that 
there is some evidence of superior market timing ability for both equity income funds and 
general equity funds in the extreme right tails of the distributions. However, small stock 
funds perform very poorly. The average market timing test statistic among the small stock 
funds is 
-1.55 compared to -0.62 and -0.57 among the equity income and general equity 
funds respectively. This comparatively poor performance is also evident in Figure 10.3 
which shows the three performance distributions. The results of the TM and FlM 
procedures point to a similar conclusion. This would appear to contradict the argument 
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above that small stock funds may demonstrate spurious market timing ability because of 
possible option-like characteristics. 
However, interestingly there is evidence that a number of small stock funds 
attempt instead to time a small capitalisation market benchmark rather than a broader 
market benchmark. In Panel C, the row denoted ` HGSC' reports the nonparametric market 
timing test statistics of small stock funds measured against the Hoare Govett Small 
Capitalisation index of UK small stocks. The cross-sectional distribution reported in this 
row lies considerably further to the right of the distribution presented in row 1 using the 
broader FTSE A All Share market returns. The extent of this difference provides evidence 
that UK small stock funds do attempt to market time in the small stock market and a small 
number do so successfully. Jiang (2003) fails to report significant differences in timing 
ability between funds of various investment objectives where all sectors except a specialist 
technology sector are shown, on average, to mistime the market. 
10.4 Market Timing Performance and Operation Location 
Table 10.4 presents the nonparametric market timing test statistics of UK equity mutual 
funds categorised by the fund location. Panel A presents results for the 623 onshore UK 
funds while Panel B reports results for the 168 offshore funds. Earlier in this study the 
bootstrap investigation of security selection ability revealed substantial differences 
between onshore and offshore funds. Informational asymmetry and/or genuine skill 
differentials were suggested as possible explanations for these differences. This finding 
motivates a similar inquiry here regarding market timing skill. 
From Table 10.4, see also Figure 10.4, it is evident that a small number of both 
onshore and offshore funds exhibit statistically significant market timing ability at 5% 
significance by the nonparametric test. Similarly, in results not shown, both subgroups of 
funds show negative market timing ability on average. In aggregate, differences in 
selectivity do not appear to transfer to significant differences in market timing skill 
between onshore and offshore UK equity mutual funds. 
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10.5 Conditional Market Timing 
From chapter 9 on methodology, conditional market timing tests control for the part of 
fund managers' timing which may be attributed to publicly available information. The 
conditional market timing literature suggests that this part of performance does not add 
value to the investor who could employ such information himself (Ferson and Schadt, 
1996; Becker et al, 1999). In this section, conditional market timing tests are applied to 
determine whether the findings from the unconditional tests above of a small number of 
successful market timers may be attributed to public information or whether it represents 
genuine (private) skill in timing the market. In chapter 9 the set of public information 
variables used in this study was described. 
Table 10.5 reports the results from a selection of conditional tests. (In results not 
shown, conditional tests using a number of alternative combinations of the public 
information variables were applied and results are similar to those presented). Row 1 
repeats of the unconditional test results in Table 10.1 for ease of comparison. The 
remaining rows present the nonparametric conditional market timing test statistics using 
the public information variables: Z1 =1 month UK Tbill rate, Z2 = term spread, Z3 = 
market dividend yield and Z4 = gilt/equity yield ratio. Note, the conditional test statistics 
are for the funds as sorted in row 1. The results show that in the extreme right tail of the 
distribution the skilful market timing performance of the top 3 sorted funds cannot be 
attributed to public information (there is one slight exception for the highest sorted fund 
conditioned on Z1, Z2 & Z3 but this is significant at 10% significance). However, as we 
move further inside the right tail of the distribution, for example for the 10`x' and 12th 
highest sorted funds, there is evidence that their statistically significant market timing 
ability by the unconditional test, may in fact be explained by the public information 
variables where the conditional test statistics are generally insignificant at the 5% level. 
Overall, the evidence indicates that we cannot reject the hypothesis that a very 
small number of funds skillfully time the market, even controlling for public information. 
However, Figure 10.5 shows distributions of the nonparametric tests statistics from 
various conditional tests as indicated where it is clear in all cases that the distributions of 
the timing statistics are centred on negative values. 
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10.6 Conclusion 
This study finds that a relatively small number (around 1.5%) of UK equity mutual funds 
possess significant positive market timing skill. A sizeable majority of funds are shown to 
mistime the market. This finding is robust with respect to the choice of benchmark market 
returns. A smaller number of funds are found to be significant positive market timers after 
controlling for publicly available information. 
Such predominantly poor market timing performance by managers may have a 
number of mitigating factors. First, managers may be attempting to time market volatility 
rather than expected market returns thus lowering the fund's market exposure during a 
high volatility, but possibly also a high return, period. Second, note that the equity funds 
in this study are open ended. This implies that when the equity market generally is 
performing well (rising market) the funds may experience higher investor capital inflows, 
a relatively high (short term) cash position, lower market beta and lower return. 
Conversely, a falling market may be associated with higher redemptions, causing the fund 
to liquidate its cash position leading to a higher market beta4. The latter may offer some 
`defence' to funds who are not successfully timing the market. 
4 The funds in this study are UK domestic equity unit trusts. As outlined in chapter 3 on data description, 
this means (by definition) that the funds are invested in at least 80% domestic UK equity. The remaining up 
to 20% is likely to involve a variable cash position in the short term. 
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Figure 10.1: Distribution of the Unconditional Market Timing Test Statistic 
Figure 10.1 shows a histogram of the unconditional market timing test statistic, z. The figure is based 
on 791 funds with a minimum of 12 monthly observations. 
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CHAPTER 11 
CONCLUSION 
This study evaluates the performance of the UK equity unit trust industry using a large data 
base of 1,620 trusts over the period April 1975 
- 
December 2002. Excluding second units of 
funds as well as market trackers leaves 842 funds, 216 of which are nonsurvivors. Fund 
abnormal performance is first examined by applying different classes of performance 
measurement models. These include unconditional single and multi-factor models, 
conditional-beta models which dynamically adjust risk factor loadings conditional on public 
information signals, conditional alpha-beta models which allow for conditional abnormal 
performance and models of market timing. 
Using best-fit models from within each class, a bootstrap procedure is applied to the 
funds. The bootstrap simulation procedure under the null hypothesis of zero abnormal 
performance provides a means of constructing a distribution of performance which is simply 
due to random sampling variability (chance or luck) in the performance measure. The 
technique uses the empirical distribution of fund idiosyncratic risk across all funds and not 
just fund by fund. The procedure enables the construction of a nonparametric distribution of 
performance at each point or percentile in the cross-sectional (across funds) distribution of 
performance including in the extreme tails 
- 
the funds of greatest to investors. By comparing 
the bootstrap distribution against the actual distribution of fund performance it is possible to 
determine whether high performing funds exceed random sampling variability in the 
performance measure, or `luck'. Similarly, it is possible to evaluate whether poor 
performance is worse than bad luck. 
The model selection process indicates that an unconditional three-factor Fama and 
French type model with market, size and value risk factors fits the data well while the 
evidence in support of conditional models is very weak. The bootstrap results from the 
unconditional model find in support of genuine stock picking ability on the part of a small 
number of top ranking UK equity unit trusts 
- 
even when returns are measured net of annual 
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charges imposed by the fund. Of the top 20 ranked funds, 7 (12) funds exceed performance 
attributable to good luck at 5% (10%) significance. However, these funds are not the 
extreme top 7 (12) performers but lie slightly inside the extreme right tail of the distribution. 
In the negative tail of the distribution, the hypothesis that poor performance is attributable to 
bad luck is strongly rejected at 5% significance. These results are broadly similar to those of 
a US study by Kosowski et al (2004), although these authors report a greater prevalence of 
`star' performers relative to the UK. 
Adjustments to the bootstrap simulation procedure are also applied which retain 
characteristics of the underlying data in order to mimic the `true' return generating processes 
of the funds as closely as possible. These include adjustments for serial correlation, 
heteroscedasticity and cross-sectional (across funds) correlations among fund idiosyncratic 
risk. Furthermore, alternative bootstrap procedures are applied which resample (i) residuals 
only, (ii) residuals and factors independently and (iii) residuals and factors in `time-ordered 
pairs'. Each procedure examines the variability of the bootstrap performance estimates under 
the null hypothesis. Conclusions are remarkably robust with respect to these alternative 
procedures. 
In separate applications of the bootstrap procedure the study examines whether 
security selection skill varies across (i) funds of different investment objectives (income stock 
funds, general equity funds and small stocks funds) and (ii) funds domiciled onshore versus 
offshore. These separate subcategories represent a more homogenous risk group of funds and 
this controls for risk characteristics in funds which may not be adequately captured by the 
performance model. It is found that some of the top ranked equity income funds show 
genuine stock picking skills whereas such ability is generally not found among small stock 
funds and general equity funds. Some highly ranked positive performance among onshore 
funds is found to be due to genuine skill, whereas for offshore funds, positive performance is 
attributable to luck. 
The study controls for survivorship bias in its results by including nonsurviving funds 
in the analysis. However, it is found that funds labeled ` nonsurvivors' are well represented 
among the high performers. This may suggest that many such funds do not cease to exist 
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because of poor performance but rather were attractive funds that may have merged or were 
taken over due to good performance. 
As a means of improving statistical precision, baseline results are based on funds with 
a minimum of 36 observations. While this has many statistical advantages it may introduce 
some survivorship bias. To examine this the bootstrap procedure is re-applied to the entire 
sample of funds separately for a number of alternative minimum fund history restrictions 
ranging from 18 to 120 observations. The inclusion of shorter lived funds slightly increases 
the prevalence of skill found in fund performance. Similarly, longer lived funds are found to 
dominate among the poor performing funds which are found to perform worse than bad luck. 
This result is not consistent with the competitive model. The continued existence over long 
time periods, of a large number of funds which have a truly inferior performance (which 
cannot be attributed to bad luck), indicates that many investors either cannot correctly 
evaluate fund performance or find it `costly' to switch between funds or suffer from a 
disposition effect. Hendricks et al (1993) suggest that sustained poor funds are those without 
skill which "churn" their portfolios too much, incurring high expenses which lowers net 
performance. Here in this study it is suggested that successful fund managers may be enticed 
away from their funds to manage other funds thus limiting long run superior performance in 
any given fund. Alternatively, it may be that shorter-lived funds are initially set up to exploit 
perceived investment opportunities but `run out of ideas' in the longer term. 
Overall, the results indicate that the majority of funds with positive abnormal 
performance may attribute this to `good luck'. It is also shown that `genuine' top performers 
are not necessarily those with an ex post ranking right at the top. This makes it extremely 
difficult for the `average investor' to pinpoint individual active funds which demonstrate 
genuine skill, based on their track records. The above results suggest that many UK equity 
investors may be better off holding index/tracker funds, with their lower transactions costs. 
This question is investigated further in an examination of fund persistence. 
The study also examines a second major aspect of mutual fund performance, i. e. 
persistence. In particular, the study concentrates on the economic as well as statistical 
significance of persistence using the recursive portfolio formation approach of Carhart (1997) 
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and others and sorts funds by both past raw returns and past four-factor t-alphas. Sorting 
funds into deciles based on either performance metric, the study finds strong evidence that 
decile portfolios of past loser funds continue to perform badly in terms of their future four- 
factor alphas and little evidence that past winner funds provide future positive risk adjusted 
performance. However, unlike past studies this study also investigates smaller portfolios of 
funds which are likely to be of more practical relevance to investors. Here, it is found that 
among relatively small `fund-of-fund' portfolios of past winners, there is evidence that 
rebalancing every 3 months (or every 1 month), with portfolios of up to around 5 funds does 
yield some statistically and economically significant four-factor alphas. Therefore, an active 
portfolio strategy of avoiding past loser funds and choosing a small portfolio of past winner 
funds may earn positive risk adjusted returns. These returns are net of management fees but 
gross of the transactions involved in the active strategy. The study then examines the impact 
of transaction costs involved in such an active strategy by constructing the empirical 
distribution of final wealth. 
Long-term, investors are also interested in the distribution of final wealth (e. g. mean, 
skewness, kurtosis) from an active strategy, relative to that from alternative strategies such as 
holding index trackers 
- 
taking account of `luck' across all funds and transactions costs of 
rebalancing. Using a cross-section bootstrap approach the study derives the empirical 
distribution of final wealth over a 10 year horizon for active strategies, incorporating 
transactions costs in each rebalancing period and compares this with the outcome from a 
passive strategy of (randomly) holding an index tracker fund over the whole investment 
horizon (thus avoiding transactions costs). The analysis suggests that if rebalancing is 
frequent (e. g. every 3 months) and if transactions costs are less than 2.5% per fund round trip, 
then an active strategy seems at least as good as a passive strategy but with transactions costs 
of 5% the passive strategy is most probably superior. Therefore, there is a prima facie case 
for an active strategy in the UK based on ex-ante `sorting rules', for `small' fund portfolios as 
long as average switching costs of rebalancing are below 2.5%. 
The study also examines a third important aspect of UK equity unit trust performance, 
i. e. market timing. This study implements a nonparametric timing test and is the first to apply 
this test to the UK market. The nonparametric procedure has several advantages over the 
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widely used regression based tests of Terynor-Mazuy (1966) and Henriksson-Merton (1981). 
The nonparametric test is used to examine both unconditional and conditional market timing 
where the latter considers whether mutual fund managers possess private market timing 
information (timing signals) in excess of the information quality contained in publicly 
available information. Market timing skill is assessed against a number of alternative 
benchmark market indices. 
This study finds that a relatively small number (around 1%) of UK equity mutual 
funds possess significant positive market timing skill at 5% significance. A sizeable majority 
of funds are shown to mistime the market. This finding is robust with respect to the choice of 
benchmark market returns against which funds are evaluated and with respect to whether 
timing performance is measured unconditionally or conditionally upon public information. 
Apparent mistiming of the market by funds may not be irrational, however. It may be 
that managers are attempting to time market volatility rather than market returns thus 
lowering the fund's market exposure during high volatility. This appears as negative market 
timing if returns and volatility are positively correlated, (Breen et al 1989, Glosten et al 1993 
and Busse 1999). Furthermore, in the funds' `defense', as the equity funds are open ended a 
rising market is likely to be associated with higher capital inflows to the fund, a relatively 
high cash position in the short term, lower market beta and lower return. Conversely, a falling 
market may lead to higher redemptions, causing the fund to liquidate its cash position leading 
to a higher market beta. 
On the policy side the UK government wishes to encourage long term saving via 
mutual (and pension) funds (Turner 2004). The type of performance findings in this study are 
central to such policy discussions. The evidence suggests that large scale investment (saving) 
by the public in the majority of actively managed equity funds, in pursuit of abnormal 
performance, may well represent a misallocation of resources relative to passive investment 
strategies. 
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